Rationales of Action in the European Union's Asylum Policy: An Empirical Investigation of Relocation Commitment Between Interests and Norms

Handlungslogiken der europäischen Asylpolitik: Eine empirische Untersuchung von Umverteilungserklärungen zwischen Interessen und Normen

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Contents

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CEAS:	Common European Asylum System
Commission:	European Commission
Council:	Council of the European Union
EASO:	European Asylum Support Office
EBCG:	European Border and Coast Guard Agency (also called Frontex, yet this abbreviation is used for distinction)
EFTA:	European Free Trade Association
EP:	European Parliament
EU:	European Union
EUNAVFOR MED:	European Union Naval Force Mediterranean
EUREMA:	EU Pilot Project on Intra-EU Relocation from Malta
EURODAC:	European Dactyloscopy Database
Frontex:	European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union
GDP:	Gross Domestic Product
JHA:	Justice and Home Affairs
MS:	Member State(s)
ODA:	Official Development Assistance
QMV:	Qualified Majority Vote
UK:	United Kingdom
UNHCR:	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
V4:	Visegrád Group (uniting Hungary, Slovakia, Poland and the Czech Republic)

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF FIGURES

GERMAN SUMMARY

Angesichts der Herausforderungen, die die sogenannte „Flüchtlingskrise“ für die Europäische Union mit sich brachte, hat die Kommission mit ihrer *europäischen Migrationsagenda* versucht, eine neue, multidimensionale Asyl- und Migrationspolitik zu begründen. Hieraus entwickelte sich neben Maßnahmen der Auslagerung eigener Verantwortung durch Kooperation mit Drittstaaten auch der Umsiedelungsansatz, der zunächst Italien und Griechenland entlasten und später gemäß einem Vorschlag über einen permanenten Verteilungsmechanismus (im Rahmen der Dublin-Reform) eine nachhaltige Neustrukturierung der Verantwortung für Asylbewerber etablieren sollte. Im Hinblick auf forcierte Solidaritätsbekundungen einerseits und eine sehr zögerliche Umsetzung des temporären Programms andererseits untersucht diese Arbeit, welche Handlungslogik sich allgemein bzw. für die einzelnen Staaten hinter den Entscheidungen verbirgt: Sind es eher rationale Überlegungen auf Grundlage definierter nationaler Interessen, welche die Länder zu einer Zustimmung bewogen haben oder haben sie sich tatsächlich von der normativen Beistandspflicht leiten lassen?

Um sich dieser Frage theoretisch zu nähern, nimmt die Arbeit Bezug auf March und Olsens idealtypische Unterscheidung zwischen der „Logik der angenommenen Folgen“ und der „Logik der Angemessenheit“ und bettet diese ein in den spezifischeren Rahmen der Theorie öffentlicher Güter einerseits und des Normativen Institutionalismus andererseits. Die hieraus abgeleiteten Hypothesen für die Zustimmung zum und Umsetzung des Umverteilungsprogramms werden unter Anwendung verschiedener Methoden und Quellen untersucht mit dem Ergebnis, dass beide Handlungslogiken die Verhandlungen jeweils in einem gewissen Maß geleitet haben – jedoch mit unterschiedlichem Ausgang für die einzelnen Länder. Die schwache Institutionalisierung der Solidarität, die in den unterschiedlichen Interpretationen der Norm und mangelhafter Anwendung in der Vergangenheit offenbar wird, stellt einen Grund für teilweise überwiegende rationale Überlegungen dar. Während die Interessenbildung durch Faktoren wie innenpolitischen Druck (insbesondere im Wahlkampf), die politische Kultur und die ideologische Ausrichtung der Regierungspartei geprägt ist, wird der institutionelle Einfluss auf die individuelle Entscheidungsfindung u.a. durch die Länge der EU-Mitgliedschaft und damit Sozialisation, die Strategie der Ratspräsidentschaft und die Vertrautheit der Verhandlungspartner beeinflusst. Neben der hieraus resultierenden Intention spielen auch administrative und logistische Schwierigkeiten, Selbstbeschränkungen der offiziellen Entscheidungen sowie die Aufnahmekapazität und der Grad an Vertrauen und Kooperation zwischen den Ländern eine Rolle bei der Erklärung der Umsetzungsunterschiede.

1 INTRODUCTION

'All our actions are based on three fundamental principles: respect, responsibility-sharing and solidarity.' – This is how Commissioner Dimitris Avramopoulos (2017) lately characterised the measures taken by the European Union (EU) in response to the so-called 'European refugee crisis'. In fact, the unprecedented arrival of 'mixed flows' has evoked a competition of diverging unilateral and collective strategies which in combination seriously challenged core achievements and goals of the European Union, such as the Dublin and Schengen systems as well as the principles of humanity and solidarity. The EU's response to the crisis was mainly initiated and coined by the European Commission's (hereafter Commission) *European Agenda on Migration* in which it attempted to formulate a comprehensive approach towards migration and asylum.

In theory, there are three possible ways of dealing with refugees: first, states may attempt to prevent the root causes of flight altogether; second, they can shirk their responsibilities by introducing more restrictive conditions for accepted asylum-seekers or by deterring their arrival through strict visa requirements, carrier sanctions etc.; third, states can engage in burden-shifting to third states either by push-backs or (legal) agreements; finally, countries can actually take the responsibility of hosting refugees, but share it with other states through multilateral cooperation (Noll, 2003, pp. 240; Uçarer, 2006). In the agenda the EU combines these options to some extent: while shirking responsibility via operations to tackle migrant smuggling, a returns handbook and a plan for a common list of safe countries of origin, it also shifts part of its responsibility through cooperation with third countries like prominently Turkey and potentially Libya and other North African states (Commission, 2017h). And whereas the EU engages in supporting regions of origin by providing financial and technical means for local projects through trust funds and contributions to the World Food Programme, it also aims at establishing burden-sharing solutions among EU member states (MS) in terms of sharing norms, costs, expertise and technology as well as people themselves (ibid.; cf. Noll, 2003, pp. 243-246).

In these cases one essential question not examined explicitly in the literature covering these recent developments is which motivational logics have determined the initiation of these measures. Whereas the rationales behind burden-shifting and burden-shirking may seem quite clear, this question is more ambiguous concerning burden-sharing. Therefore, drawing on March and Olsen's (1998) conceptualisation of international cooperation, it is of special interest to find out whether measures of joint responsibility are based on a 'logic of expected

consequences' or rather a 'logic of appropriateness' to better understand European policy-making in the area of asylum and predict the further development of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS). One particularly relevant form of burden-sharing is the relocation of people because they are the immediate source of costs related to refugee protection – be they administrative, economic or perhaps social/cultural. The idea of sharing people has solidified in the emergency relocation decisions taken by the Council of the European Union (hereafter Council) in September 2015 and informed the Commission's proposal for a permanent crisis relocation mechanism as well as the current negotiations on a reform of the Dublin regulation. Hence, the research question of this study is whether it is rather a norm-based or rational logic that accounts for the relocation decisions.

Given that burden-sharing and relocation require collective action to succeed and serve to generate benefits for all MS, as will be explained below, this paper translates the 'logic of expected consequences' into a Public Goods perspective, following the approach of Thielemann (2003). The 'logic of appropriateness', on the other hand, will be embedded in the context of Normative Institutionalism. Since these theories call for internal access to the case at hand, the first part of the empirical assessment draws on interviews with EU officials focussing on the negotiation process. Yet, as statements alone are not reliable if they are not backed up by deeds, the validity test of the two theories is also based on a comparison of the negotiation results to a statistical analysis of the implementation process. Of course, the dominant rationale may differ for every single MS, wherefore groups with similar behaviour and characteristics receive special attention in the overall assessment.

In answering the research question, this study proceeds as follows: first, chapter 2 provides the empirical context necessary to understand the meaning of relocation within the whole crisis by describing the basic challenge of influx as well as the measures taken by the EU and its MS in response to it. Second, the theoretical background of the paper is introduced in chapter 3 by, first, outlining March and Olsen's conceptualisation of international cooperation and, second, embedding it into Public Goods Theory and Normative Institutionalism. Building on their general assumptions and applications to refugee studies, section 3.3 presents the theoretical framework of this study, while the according operationalisation and methodology are reported in section 3.4. Third, the main body of this study assesses the empirical validity of the different theories by applying them to the negotiation and implementation processes. Following a critical discussion of theory and methodology, the paper concludes by summarising the main findings and giving an outlook for further research.

2 *EMPIRICAL BACKGROUND*

This chapter explicitly focusses on the European view on the crisis and the particularly high pressure to respond to it. Hence, following a brief description of the empirical situation, section 2.2 outlines the reactions of both the EU and its MS to this challenge.

2.1 THE 'EUROPEAN REFUGEE CRISIS'

In 2015 Europe experienced a significant increase in arrivals of asylum-seekers for two main reasons: first, the continuing conflicts in Syria and Iraq as well as growing violence and poverty in large parts of North Africa, the Middle East and South Asia have forced many people to leave their homes in the first place (Karageorgiou, 2016, p. 200; Metcafle-Hough, 2015, pp. 2; Vătăman, 2016, p. 545, Wagner *et al.*, 2016, pp. 24). Second, primary destination countries like Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey have become increasingly unable and unwilling to host and integrate the huge refugee community due to a lack of financial and basic means in the camps, growing tensions among the population as well as a deterioration of their own security situation (Hanewinkel, 2015, p. 2; Metcafle-Hough, 2015, p. 3). In view of these concerns and a lack of perspective to be resettled to another country or other legal ways of entry, many refugees who temporarily found shelter in neighbouring regions decided to move on and enter Europe irregularly with hope for better protection.

As a result, approximately 1,3 million asylum applications were registered in the EU in 2015, which equates to a doubling of files in 2014 and even a tripling of numbers in 2013 (Wagner *et al.*, 2016, p. 24). Due to special routes and the divergent attractiveness of EU states, countries like Spain, Portugal or the UK have been less affected by the influx than the transit countries and top recipients (Trauner, 2016, p. 320; see Appendix 5, Figures 2-7). The countries of first entry Italy and Greece were particularly affected by the increase. Already in 2013, Italy started the search and rescue operation *Mare Nostrum*, reinforcing demands for support in saving lives and combatting smugglers by other MS (Pastore & Henry, 2016, p. 52). Yet, even against this background, a European decision on how to deal with the increasing influx was further postponed (Menéndez, 2016, p. 396). Given their limited hosting and assessment capacities and the disproportionate share of responsibility for asylum applications assigned to them according to the Dublin regulation's 'first country of entry' principle, Italy and Greece did in fact suspend the latter's validity by not properly registering migrants so that they could pass through to other countries of destination (Börzel, 2016, p. 23; Menéndez, 2016, p. 397; Trauner, 2016, p. 319). In view of this flow of events and the unpreparedness of the EU to properly address the crisis, an urgent response was required.

2.2 *RESPONSES TO THE CRISIS*

Following Menéndez (2016, p. 397), I distinguish three phases of response to this situation: a first set of common EU emergency measures from April to September 2015 (2.2.1), unilateral MS actions taken since August 2015 (2.2.2) and, finally, a second number of supranational decisions taken from February 2016 onwards (2.2.3).

2.2.1 *FIRST SET OF SUPRANATIONAL EMERGENCY RESPONSES*

Having regard to the European Council's conclusions (2015a) informed by a dramatic shipwreck off the Libyan coast on 19 April and to an according resolution by the European Parliament (hereafter EP, 2015), the European Commission published its *European Agenda on Migration* on 13 May: it recognises that 'a robust fight against irregular migration, traffickers and smugglers, and securing Europe's external borders must be paired with a strong common asylum policy as well as a new European policy on legal migration' (2015a, p. 6). The actions foreseen in the first implementation package cover both the internal and external dimensions of migration policy, including an *EU Action Plan against migrant smuggling,* a new operational plan for the *Triton* mission and guidelines on finger printing as well as a recommendation on a European resettlement scheme (Commission, 2015b). Of particular importance for this study is the Commission's *Proposal for a Council decision establishing provisional measures in the area of international protection for the benefit of Italy and Greece* (2015c) in which it suggests the relocation of 40,000 asylum-seekers to the other MS. In addition, the Commission already announced to present a legislative proposal for a 'mandatory and automatically-triggered relocation system' (2015a, p. 4) by the end of the year. The May proposal was followed up on 20 June by an according resolution of the governments' representatives (Council, 2015a) in addition to the conclusions on the resettlement of 20,000 persons from third countries (Council, 2015b). Yet, the official decision on this first relocation scheme was only passed on 14 September (Council, 2015c); although the objective was binding, its repartition was left at the discretion of the MS. In addition, the European Council meeting on 25/26 June also focussed on return/readmission as well as the cooperation with countries of origin and transit (European Council, 2015b).

By the end of August/beginning of September media attention devoted to another two dramatic events (about 70 casualties found in a smuggling truck in Austria and the picture of a drowned boy stranded on the Turkish shore; Wagner *et al.*, 2016, p. 31) further increased the pressure for immediate action and was, hence, followed by a second implementation package on 9 September, including a proposal for the relocation of another 120,000 asylum-

seekers from Italy and Greece – this time based on a binding distribution key adopted by qualified majority vote (QMV) in the Council (2015d) against the voices of Hungary, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Romania (Barigazzi & de la Baume, 2015). In addition, the Commission also followed its May announcement by proposing a permanent crisis relocation mechanism based on the same criteria as the temporary scheme which would be triggered in a crisis situation (Commission 2015d; Wagner *et al.*, 2016, p. 33). Furthermore, the EU established the new EUNAVFOR MED operation *Sophia* and increased the budget of the existing missions *Triton* and *Poseidon* (Börzel, 2016, p. 21). In financial terms, in addition to the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund supporting MS with registration, integration and return measures (ibid., p. 20), the Union also created the Madad Trust Fund for Syria towards the end of 2014 and the Emergency Trust Fund for Africa in November 2015 in order to support the regions of origin (Börzel, 2016, p. 21; Pauly *et al.*, 2016, pp. 19). With the developing 'hotspot approach' further personnel of the EU agencies Frontex, the European Asylum Support Office (EASO), Europol and Eurojust were to be deployed to special proceeding centres in Italy and Greece, beginning in 2016 (Menéndez, 2016, p. 397; Pauly *et al*., 2016, pp. 14; Trauner, 2016, p. 319). Finally, the EU passed a plan for assisting transit countries on the Western Balkan with reception and returns (Börzel, 2016, p. 21).

2.2.2 MEMBER STATES' EMERGENCY RESPONSES

However, the 'first set of emergency measures proved not only far too little, far too late, but an expression of intentions hardly backed by deeds' (Menéndez, 2016, p. 398). In view of the elevated levels of new arrivals further putting the 'frontline states' under strain and flows increasingly shifting to the Western Balkan and Eastern Mediterranean routes (Hanewinkel, 2015, p. 3; Pastore & Henry, 2016, p. 53), the German government unilaterally decided on 21 August 2015 to suspend Dublin returns for Syrian nationals (ibid.; Menéndez, 2016, pp. 399; Trauner, 2016, p. 319). In a second step, Chancellor Merkel, backed by her Austrian counterpart Faymann, organised for the asylum-seekers to pass through to Germany from Hungary to avoid a humanitarian disaster on the Balkan (Menéndez, 2016, p. 400; Weber, 2016, p. i). Yet, this practice soon led to an extent of waving-through of migrants unmanageable for the German authorities and a shift in the public debate and citizens' concerns about security and integration. Not even one month after the suspension of the Dublin regulation, Germany introduced temporary Schengen border controls with Austria – a decision which induced a chain reaction by other states along the Balkan route for fear of becoming a *cul de sac* and, thus, put the whole Schengen system at risk (Hanewinkel, 2015, p. 3; Pastore & Henry, 2016, p. 54; Trauner, 2016, p. 320; Vătăman, 2016, p. 547; Wagner *et al.*,

2016, p. 39). Merkel's 'coalition of the willing' started to fall apart, giving in to populist pressure, and started passing more restrictive migration and asylum policies (Wagner *et al.*, 2016, p. 38-42; Weber, 2016, p. i).

Austria put all its political weight behind a closure of the Balkan route (Weber, 2016, p. ii). After introducing a yearly and daily cap for the entry of asylum-seekers, on 24 February 2016 the government held a meeting with nine Western Balkan countries of which Croatia, Slovenia and Serbia followed Austria's lead by enforcing daily caps, while Macedonia opened its borders only for a limited number of Syrian and Iraqi refugees (Wagner *et al.*, 2016, p. 39). As Menéndez points out, '[b]y the end of 2015, the area without internal borders had become an area with not only borders but also walls, in which asylum practice was in some cases openly in breach of international, European and national humanitarian law' (2016, p. 400). With the closing Balkan route, pressure on Greece further increased due to 'stranded' refugees and the still lacking capacities to provide for adequate housing, registration and assessment of asylum applications (Börzel, 2016, p. 22; Wagner *et al.*, 2016, p. 39).

2.2.3 SECOND SET OF SUPRANATIONAL EMERGENCY RESPONSES

In view of the continuing influx despite these first measures, the Commission had already proposed the transformation of the old Frontex into a new European Border and Coast Guard Agency (EBCG) in December 2015, yet the legislative regulation only passed in September 2016 (Council & EP, 2016), extending its supranational mandate (Börzel, 2016, p. 24; Niemann & Speyer, 2016, pp. 6). Back in spring, however, none such tools were available yet. Although the Council had adopted a *Regulation on the provision of emergency support within the Union* (2016a), aiming at counteracting the humanitarian misery in Greece, immediate action was considered necessary. Hence, the Union resorted to the 'desperate outsourcing of the EU's refugee management' (Weber, 2016, p. ii) with the EU-Turkey statement of 18 March following the Joint Action Plan of November (European Council, 2016; Pauly *et al.*, 2016, pp. 16; Wagner *et al.*, 2016, p. 34), most importantly introducing the so-called '1:1 scheme' according to which for every person returned from Greece to Turkey a Syrian asylum-seeker is resettled to the EU. The resettlement places were later declared to account for the 54,000 relocation places of the total 160,000 objective that had not been allocated due to Hungary's refusal to benefit (Council, 2016b; Wagner *et al.*, 2016, pp. 31). Although the aim of reducing the flow via the Aegean Sea has been achieved to some extent, the pressure on the Greek state did not decrease since most arrivals now directly filed an asylum application after arriving and camps remained overcrowded (Börzel, 2016, pp. 22).

Apart from this burden-shifting approach, the Commission (2016c) also specified its idea of an internal reform of CEAS by outlining five priorities: first, extending the scope of the EURODAC database; second, transforming the asylum procedures and qualification directives into regulations and revising the reception conditions directive; third preventing so-called 'secondary movements'; and fourth strengthening EASO, which translated into a concrete proposal of 4 May suggesting its transformation into a European Union Agency for Asylum with an extended mandate to increase monitoring of MS' implementation of CEAS and develop operational standards (Wagner *et al.*, 2016, p. 35), revealing the Commission's priority to further harmonise MS' asylum systems (ibid.). The fifth and most important priority for this study is the planned reform of the Dublin regulation: in the proposal of 4 May the Commission (2016e) designs a 'corrective allocation mechanism' that is triggered every time a country exceeds 150% of asylum applicants attributed to it according to a key based equally on GDP and population size. If a MS does not meet its relocation responsibility, it shall pay a solidarity contribution of 250,000 Euro to the country that takes over hosting for every single asylum-seeker (cf. Maiani, 2016, pp. 33; Wagner *et al.*, 2016, p. 51). In addition, the extension of legal paths to Europe was discussed in the CEAS reform proposal, yet is apparently not prioritised (Wagner *et al.*, 2016, pp. 35). On 13 July 2016, the Commission replenished the intended CEAS reform with proposals for a 'Union resettlement framework' (2016j) as well as a 'common procedure for international protection' (2016k).

Meanwhile, the Commission has also developed a *Communication on establishing a new Partnership Framework with third countries under the European Agenda on Migration* (2016g), presented on 7 June. The aim is to produce 'compacts' with priority countries like Jordan, Lebanon, Tunisia, Western Africa, the Horn of Africa, Ethiopia and Libya (pp. 13-15). Since 90% of migrants start their journey to Europe from the latter, Libya has been in the focus of a more recent Commission communication (2017a), which was followed up by the Malta Declaration of the European Council of 3 February, making Libya a key partner to 'significantly reduce migratory flows along the Central Mediterranean route and break the business model of smugglers' (2017, Art. 3). In all this time, internal Schengen border controls were prolonged repeatedly, a final time in May (Commission, 2017e).

Overall, whereas (most) MS prioritised a reduction of flows through restrictive policies and strengthened border control, 'the Commission has pushed for supranational centralization' (Börzel, 2016, p. 24). Yet, while the establishment of EBCG was pushed by the Council, the reform of CEAS is still in the legislative pipeline. Since many Commission proposals did

not translate into rapid action, remedy was sought from shifting responsibility to third countries. Still, some burden-sharing measures like common trust funds, hotspots and foremost relocation have been adopted, raising the question of rationales behind their establishment. The next chapter provides the theoretical frame for a corresponding assessment.

3 *THEORETICAL APPROACH*

As mentioned in the introduction, March and Olsen (1998), as founders of a New or Normative Institutionalism, distinguish two bases of action for international political orders: the 'logic of expected consequences' and the 'logic of appropriateness'. The former regards 'political order as arising from negotiation among rational actors pursuing personal preferences or interests in circumstances in which there may be gains to coordinated action. Whether coordination is achieved and the terms of coordination […] depend on the bargaining positions of the actors.' (p. 949) The actors' preferences are derived from multi-level negotiations and bargaining (pp. 949), meaning that 'changes in international institutions are the outcomes of local adaption by political actors pursuing well-defined interests' (p. 951). The explanation of cooperation traces back actions to those preferences and related expectations, thus interpreting consequential reasons for specific actions (p. 950).

In the 'logic of appropriateness', on the other hand,

> [h]uman actors are imagined to follow rules that associate particular identities to particular situations, approaching individual opportunities for action by assessing similarities between current identities and choice dilemmas and more general concepts of self and situations. Action involves evoking an identity or role and matching the obligations of that identity or role to a specific situation. (p. 951)

In this view, behaviour can be explained by identifying the actors' interpretations of the situation and associated identities (pp. 951). With these two fundamental distinctions at hand, the following sections will fill the two logics with the theoretical assumptions of Collective Action and Public Goods Theory (informed by the logic of consequences), on the one hand, and Normative Institutionalism (informed by a logic of appropriateness), on the other.

3.1 *COLLECTIVE ACTION AND PUBLIC GOODS THEORY*

The application of Public Goods Theory is an important, if not the dominant, approach of analysing collective action since the provision of public goods necessarily requires collective cooperation to achieve an objective that cannot be reached by a single actor's efforts alone (Peinhardt & Sandler, 2015, p. 16). Public Goods Theory has its origins in Rational Choice Theory and is, thus, drawing on a consequential logic.

3.1.1 GENERAL ASSUMPTIONS

A public good is characterised by non-excludability and non-rivalry, meaning that anyone interested can benefit from its provision – even without having contributed – and the consumption by further actors does not diminish its value for everyone else (Olson, 1965, pp. 14). The individual's contribution to this good, however, requires the expending of resources which, thus, cannot be spent on other private goods. Consequently, every single actor has an incentive not to contribute, given the fact that he can nevertheless benefit from the public good if it is produced. The dilemma at hand can especially be gathered when comparing the rational considerations at the macro and micro level: the achievement of the public good provides more benefits for the interested group than its alternative failure, whereas at the individual level non-participation is more beneficial, provided that the other actors make their contribution (cf. Kunz, 2004, pp. 93-102). Under this constellation, the collectively most valuable outcome is expected to be suboptimally produced (Olson, 1965, p. 21).

This theoretical relationship is reinforced for large groups where single actors can hardly recognise the net gain of their contributions – which in turn cannot be observed by other participants –, whereas in small groups the ascription of inputs and the according effect of social sanctions or prestige increase the private stakes, thus denoting an incentive to take one's share. Furthermore, provision is more likely 'for the greater the interest in the collective good of any single member, the greater the likelihood that that member will get such a significant proportion of the total benefit from the collective good that he will gain from seeing that the good is provided, even if he has to pay all of the cost himself' (ibid., p. 34). Hence, heterogeneity of participants presents another favourable factor for the production of public goods (ibid., p. 45). Based on the assumption of non-excludability, Olson argues that actors whose proportional contribution cannot be expected to significantly change the amount of the total good, while the latter's achieved outcome will still suffice for its demand, will exploit or rather free-ride on those actors whose efforts are significant for the final product (Olson, 1965, p. 29). 'It is therefore assumed that countries with a larger income will bear a larger proportional share of the burden.' (Thielemann & Armstrong, 2013, p. 152)

Yet, Todd Sandler and his colleagues point out that deviation from this prediction is possible if the good of interest does not only provide non-excludable benefits for all interested actors, but also private, i.e. excludable gains. In other words, collective goods can provide purely public, purely private or impurely public benefits, depending on the proportion of private to total gains (Sandler & Hartley, 2011, p. 876; see also Betts, 2003, pp. 277; Peinhardt &

Sandler, 2015, p. 39; Thielemann, 2003, pp. 256; Thielemann & Armstrong, 2013, p. 155). For this reason, these scholars call their replenishment of the classical Public Goods approach 'joint product model'. Against this background, Cornes and Sandler find that

> an increase in group or community size need not lead to increased suboptimality when joint products are present. This follows because the jointly produced private output can serve a privatising role […]. Complementarity between the joint products brings out this privatising aspect. (1984, p. 595)

Those actors who profit most from the public and private gains attributed to the collective good are expected to contribute accordingly to its creation (Sandler & Hartley, 2011, p. 878).

Besides the two criteria of group size and heterogeneity explored by Olson and the joint product character of collective goods determined by Sandler and colleagues, Elinor Ostrom (2010, pp. 159-164) advocates the replenishment of a model of complete rationality by a model of the situation and a general theory of human behaviour (which comes closer to normative theories and the logic of appropriateness): she argues that reputation, trust and reciprocity present the core factors in the achievement of collective action. Similarly, Six *et al.* argue that social capital as an important characteristic of social organisations in the form of norms and trust can 'facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit' (2015, p. 155), thus aiding to overcome collective action problems (p. 157).

3.1.2 APPLICATIONS TO REFUGEE STUDIES

Since refugee protection is a legal commitment for all signatories of the 1951 United Nations Refugee Convention, it in fact always requires international cooperation to be meaningful. Therefore, Collective Action and Public Goods Theory have been applied to asylum policies quite frequently. First of all, Suhrke (1998) points out that '[o]rganized sharing means more predictable responses, greater international order, and lower transaction costs during a refugee/migration emergency' (p. 398). Thielemann and El-Enany (2010, pp. 211-213) add that in the EU context the promotion of European integration, increased effectiveness of protection and the exploitation of free-riding opportunities in the sense of collectively shifting responsibility to third countries as well as an insurance logic and a perceived threat to higher order objectives like the Single Market might similarly provide incentives for cooperation in asylum policies. Suhrke summarises the public goods problem related to the achievement of these benefits very clearly: Potential host countries

> probably want to minimize the number of refugees on their own territory, but also to promote international stability and order – an objective that suggests joint regulation of the flow. […] Assuming some respect for international norms, the most obvious co-operation would be to admit refugees according to an agreed formula for distribution. On the other hand, the 'public good' nature of the anticipated benefit

> will invite 'free riders'. Since public good benefits are by definition indivisible, if one state admits refugees, others will benefit from the greater international order that ensues regardless of their own admissions. As a result, all will be tempted to cheat by letting 'the other' state do the job. (p. 400)

Drawing on historical examples, Suhrke concludes that cooperation in refugee protection will only occur where there is either a basis of shared interests and values (like with the resettlement of refugees after the Second World War) or a hegemon nudging other states into promoting his interests (such as in the case of resettling Vietnam war refugees) (p. 413).

Betts (2003) advances another step by introducing the joint product model to the provision of refugee protection: analysing the granting of asylum by EU states and their contributions to international refugee agencies, rather than support for the exploitation hypothesis he finds that some smaller states contribute disproportionately more. Hence, he infers that these countries do so for certain excludable private benefits: on the one hand, there are benefits that can be derived from fulfilling ethical and humanitarian norms – in the form of increased prestige and thus linkage and negotiation benefits or simply through the satisfaction of considering the own behaviour ethically valuable. On the other hand, there might be state-specific security benefits – for instance, if a country is likely to receive more asylum applications from certain nationalities due to historical ties and, thus, attempts to prevent a high influx through expenses for development in that particular country.

Eiko Thielemann has conducted several studies on this topic throughout the years. His 2003 article contributes considerably to the concept of this paper since it contrasts the first two hypotheses of public goods (Suhrke) and joint products (Betts) with a normative approach to asylum policies, referring explicitly to March and Olsen's two logics of action. This approach will basically inform the theoretical framework and operationalisation as described below. While the 2003 article analyses the provision of asylum under the Humanitarian Evacuation Programme during the Kosovo crisis, his 2005 paper focuses on the European Refugee Fund (ERF). He concludes that 'while the decision to create an EU refugee fund can be interpreted as an act of symbolic (and partly solidaristic) EU politics, the decision on the ERF's allocation rules appears to follow a more traditional side-payment logic' (p. 822), rather than an insurance or solidarity logic. In another article on asylum provision as a collective action problem, he and El-Enany find that

> [w]hile there is indeed evidence of north/south burden-shirking and while there remains substantial room for improvement in the EU's asylum and refugee regimes, comparative legal research and the analysis of available UNHCR data on other OECD countries […] suggest that there is no evidence to support the claim that European cooperation has led to particularly restrictive refugee policies and protection outcomes in the EU. (2010, p. 210)

Moreover, Thielemann and Armstrong have drawn on Public Goods Theory to explain the decisions creating the Schengen/Dublin system by '[t]aking account of the various tradeoffs faced and the deals struck across the various contribution dimensions of the Dublin system' (2013, p. 161). Finally, in a forthcoming article Thielemann applies Noll's (2003) typology of sharing policy, resources and people as well as the distinction between voluntary versus obligatory and one-dimensional versus multi-dimensional measures to EU asylum policies, pointing out their development and assessing their effectiveness.

Other authors have worked on burden-sharing of asylum provision from a game theoretic approach: Noll (2003) presents it as a multi-actor, multi-level game, thus examining strategies for host states, sub-state entities and protection seekers. He identifies three considerable factors, when deciding on protection mechanisms: the number of beneficiaries, the extent of rights granted and the degree to which costs are shared with other states (p. 239). In addition, he provides a clear theoretical account of who is sharing what kind of risks and how the involved sharing is agreed upon. Furthermore, Russo and Senatore (2013) analyse the provision of the public good of external border enforcement as a contribution game. They reveal that 'joint contribution occurs only if the national immigration targets are not too different' and 'that the free riding problem is reduced in a sequential framework' (pp. 10).

Finally, Betts (2008) has analysed the global refugee regime as a suasion game, i.e. a situation in which 'there is a stronger actor with little interest in cooperating and a weaker actor with little choice but to either cooperate on the terms of the stronger actor or to scupper cooperation entirely and so make itself worse off' (p. 3). Recognising that 'the majority of the world's refugees come from and remain in the South, and […] that Northern states have little obligation to contribute to in-region protection in the South' (ibid.), he examines conditions for overcoming their defection position. Zaun (2016, p. 7) applies this game to EU asylum policies, including the two actors 'host-state' and 'non-host state': while the former has no chance but to cooperate since otherwise he takes all the burden, the latter is not bound to follow this offer and is thus unlikely to do so, considering lacking compensatory offers.

3.2 NORMATIVE INSTITUTIONALISM

In contrast to the rational approach of Public Goods Theory which considers political actors to behave according to exogenous preferences and calculated expectations that are independent of institutions, Normative Institutionalism reverses these assumptions by fixing the institutional environment as the baseline of individual action.

3.2.1 GENERAL ASSUMPTIONS

Institutionalism as a political theory, as its name implies, highlights 'the role of institutions and institutionalization in the understanding of human actions within an organization, social order, or society' (March & Olsen, 1998, p. 948). The term 'normative' indicates the 'centrality of political values and collective choice' (Peters, 1999, p. 25). March and Olsen define an institution as 'a relatively stable collection of practices and rules defining appropriate behaviour for specific groups and actors in specific situations' (1998, p. 946). These behavioural norms are, in turn, 'embedded in structures of meaning and schemes of interpretation that explain and legitimize particular identities and the practices and rules associated with them' (ibid.). In fact, this version of Institutionalism assumes that the consideration of these identities and practices for individual behaviour supersedes the pursuit of personal gain or rather shape personal preferences (Peters, 1999, pp. 25) – i.e. actors 'think more about whether an action conforms to the norms of the organization than about what the consequences will be for him- or herself' (ibid., p. 29; cf. Thomas, 2011, p. 14). Yet, conformity can merely be achieved to a certain degree since the actors have to interpret what kind of behaviour is considered appropriate regarding the respective norm; these definitions may vary for different constellations of actors and situations (ibid., p. 30). In addition, the expectations following from one institution may conflict with those of another one, so that 'individuals must pick and choose among influences' (ibid., p. 26).

The development of identities might take place either deliberately through 'communication, joint reasoning, and argumentation' (March and Olsen, 1998, p. 961) or unintentionally via 'spillover' of national democratic norms into the international realm or cooperation of international experts on technical issues (pp. 961-964). From a more rational perspective, the development of routines is a 'means through which individual members of an institution can minimize their transaction and decision-making costs during participation' (Peters, 1999, p. 32). Yet, Six *et al.* argue that 'trust encompasses an element of *routine* that cannot be fully explained by such a rational action approach' (2015, p. 160, emphasis in the original); rather 'collective action institutions must be understood as complex pragmatic connectors of trust, i.e. social matrices of collective action that sustain individual commitment, where routine and reflexivity drive trust-based coordination mechanisms in interaction with their environment' (ibid., p. 162). When examining the quality of an institution, one can refer to variations in its common value system and, thus, the relevance of its 'logic of appropriateness' as a quite robust criterion (Peters, 1999, p. 40).

3.2.2 APPLICATIONS TO REFUGEE STUDIES

When it comes to Normative Institutionalism in the context of asylum policies, there have hardly been any explicit applications. Norms of solidarity and shared responsibility have, of course, played a significant role in research and reports on the recent 'refugee crisis' and its context (cf. Bendiek & Neyer, 2016; Karageorgiou, 2016; Lang, 2015; Parkes & Zaun, 2012; Schneider & Angenendt, 2015; Vătăman, 2016), yet such accounts have rather focused on the lack thereof or the general challenge for the Union. In fact, Thielemann's article of 2003 is the only study to my knowledge that explicitly refers to the 'logic of appropriateness' and attempts to operationalise it in the context of contributions to refugee protection. Yet, he concludes that 'there is little evidence for increasing solidarity among the Member States. However, it was suggested that looking at countries' commitment to certain distributive and humanitarian norms in order to explain the varying willingness of states to accept burdens offers a plausible supplementary set of explanations.' (p. 270)

Mitsilegas (2014) analyses how the norm of solidarity is practically conceptualised in 'state-centered, securitised and exclusionary' (p. 186) terms within the Dublin regulation, which in turn is based on the assumption 'that fundamental rights are respected fully by all EU Member States' (p. 190). He criticises both of these interpretations, pointing to human rights concerns and cases before the European Court of Justice. Another article that rather focusses on the influence of supranational EU institutions on the formation process of CEAS than on the role of trust and solidarity was presented by Ripoll Servent and Trauner in 2014. Although again not applying Normative Institutionalism, their results may nevertheless provide some insights regarding to what extent the EP and the Commission are able to alter MS positions in the Council. Drawing on the Advocacy Coalition Framework, they find that whereas the Council and the EP pushed for adversarial outcomes in the formulation of the CEAS directives, revisions under co-legislation were more harmonised although 'by contenting themselves with changes of secondary order, the newly empowered EU institutions accepted and institutionalized the restrictive and half-heartedly integrated core of the asylum regime set by the Council in the first negotiation round' (p. 1153).

3.3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF THIS STUDY

Just as Francisco (2010, p. 3) points out, a theory needs to be tested by, first, extracting its implications for the case at hand; second, operationalising these assumptions; and, third, testing them using aggregate data. Hence, this section derives the expectations of what we should perceive regarding the case of emergency relocation if one of those theories applies.

In the formulation of hypotheses, this study owes much to preceding works of Thielemann (2003) and Thomas (2011). It should be emphasised, however, that the application of Normative Institutionalism plays a greater role in the negotiation process, while implications of Public Goods Theory focus more on the actual contribution pattern. Still, both theories will have to consider the other part of observations as well because (non-)participation in the implementation process may reveal 'empty promises' and thus lack of commitment from the perspective of Normative Institutionalism, while the negotiation might indicate different demands and potential private benefits relevant for the joint product model.

Beginning with Public Goods Theory, it is assumed that the public good achieved through the temporary relocation schemes consists in increased stability in the emergency situation of 2015 where Greece and Italy were no longer able to process asylum applications and host protection-seekers. The relocation programme can be regarded as one step for the return to respect for the EU's legal obligations towards refugees as well as the functioning of the Dublin and Schengen systems and the re-establishment of sufficient security checks and according exchange between MS to ensure that no potential offenders can travel freely within the EU. From the classical Public Goods perspective, we would expect that relocation is suboptimally implemented with regard to the objectives of September 2017 as the individual MS' contribution bears relatively few weight for the overall outcome. Thus, *states whose potential contribution to the public good is marginal are supposed to free-ride on those with a higher capacity, so that the latter would make a disproportionately higher effort to the production of the collective good (H1: public goods/exploitation).*

This first hypothesis assumes that demand for this good correlates with the capacity to contribute and that contributions are based on constant unit costs (Peinhardt & Sandler, 2015, p. 37; Sandler & Hartley, 2001, p. 875). When this is not the case, the exploitation hypothesis can even be reversed, i.e. a smaller state might accept to relocate more asylum-seekers, if it has a comparative cost advantage and/or it is particularly interested in the public good itself (i.e. increased stability and the functioning of the Dublin/Schengen system) – or in other benefits that might be derived from it. This is where the joint product model comes into play: *those MS for whom relocation does not only provide public, but also private benefits are expected to take a larger share of the burden (H2: joint product).* Such gains might consist in releasing the pressure on the own asylum system by animating others to take their share or in bargaining advantages concerning linkage to other issues as well as a particular demand to re-establish the Schengen system to avoid additional costs for intra-EU exports.

From the perspective of Normative Institutionalism, one would predict MS to put the institutional expectations derived from the assigning of a certain identity to the situation at hand before their national interests. We assume that 'EU decision-making on any given issue is shaped by the normative and policy commitments already made by member states in the course of creating the Union's institutions' (Thomas, 2011, p. 14). In the EU environment, such commitments include 'joint action as an intrinsic value, including support for the functionality and credibility of the EU as a global actor; and consistency and coherence in EU policy-making across time and issue-areas' (ibid.). One norm crucial for both these commitments and particularly relevant in the case of relocation is solidarity as the epitome of joint action in different contexts and policy areas. It is enshrined in Art. 80 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, prescribing that policies on border checks, asylum and immigration 'shall be governed by the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility […] between the Member States'. Despite this prominent article and according reference in the *Agenda on Migration* and the relocation decisions, however, there is no single definition of its actual meaning (Bendiek & Neyer, 2016; Ferreira-Pereira & Groom, 2010, p. 597; Russo & Senatore, 2013, pp. 1; Thielemann, forthcoming, p. 22).

As analysed by Ferreira-Pereira and Groom (2010), the scope and meaning of solidarity has developed with the evolution of the EU treaties. In general terms, Thielemann (2003, p. 258) argues that solidarity 'can be said to exist among a group of actors when they are committed to abide by the outcome of some process of collective decision-making, or to promote the wellbeing of other members of the group, sometimes at significant cost to themselves'. Applied to the asylum area, this interpretation could manifest itself in form of 'assistance shown by some states to other states in order for the latter to cope with the financial and procedural responsibilities stemming from the entry and presence of refugees and migrants in European territory' (Karageorgiou, 2016, p. 199). In its *Resolution on enhanced intra-EU solidarity in the field of asylum* the EP explicitly called for an EU distribution key for relocation 'based on appropriate indicators relating to Member States' reception and integration capacities' (2012, para. 47). If the key for calculating the respective national relocation aims for September 2017 (based on 40% GDP, 40% population size, 10% unemployment rate and 10% average asylum applications and resettlements per million inhabitants 2010-2014; Guild, Costello, & Moreno-Lax, 2017, p. 22) are actually considered a good proxy for MS' capacity to receive and integrate refugees (which might be contested), then this study conceptualises respect for solidarity as the efficient implementation of the set quotas.

This expectation also follows from the substantive norms of support for democracy and the rule of law which constitute another basic EU commitment (Thomas, 2011, pp. 14). In addition, procedural norms such as regular consultation and consensus-seeking to avoid outvoting by QMV where it is permitted 'should have a significant effect on how member states negotiate divergences in their policy preferences and on the type of policies they adopt at the EU level' (ibid., p. 15). Consequently, from the perspective of Normative Institutionalism, it is hypothesised that *MS would decide on relocation unanimously, based on a capacity-informed distribution key in order to relieve border countries from high pressures, and abide by this decision via determined implementation (H3: solidarity).*

There are two possible mechanisms through which institutional demands can be translated into norm-abiding decisions by the MS: first, since consistency of current decisions with previously introduced norms and behaviour is desired by MS, those countries whose pre-existing preferences are not in accord with these requirements are likely to find themselves *entrapped* into following the path they once took although contrary to their recent interest and are thus prone to alter their position accordingly (*H3a: entrapment)*. As the perception of (in)consistency depends on prior framing in terms of which norms are at stake, MS have 'a powerful incentive to frame EU policy choices in terms of pre-existing norms and commitments consistent with their policy preferences' (Thomas, 2011, p. 16). Entrapment is more likely to occur where (i) it is clear which norms apply and what they imply in terms of action, (ii) according commitments have already been made before in this policy area, (iii) the situation resembles the original context of the norm, (iv) the discussion forum stresses the salience of substantial commitments and (v) publicity might raise widespread criticism over non-adaption (ibid., pp. 16).

Second, over time the 'identification with common goals and values and trust in the dynamics of diffuse reciprocity' (ibid., p. 18) among MS has manifested itself into the procedural norms of consultation and consensus-seeking. According to the *cooperative-bargaining hypothesis (H3b),* these norms are expected to dominate over competitive tactics like the veto threat. As a result, the negotiation outcome is predicted to entail compromises which even include concessions by potential veto powers. This mechanism is more likely to work (i) in forums which particularly emphasise such procedural norms and (ii) if negotiations take place in camera in order to avoid domestic political costs (ibid., pp. 18-20). Hence, under the condition of low media attention, one would expect a final decision taken by unanimity that differs from controversial original MS positions.

Finally, it might be the case that the institutional influence did not effectively alter MS' national positions through entrapment or cooperative bargaining. Yet, some countries might, nevertheless, be stronger committed to other norms apart from solidarity like the idea of refugee protection and humanitarian obligations. Therefore, we would expect that such *states particularly committed to humanitarian norms relocate a disproportionate share of asylum-seekers from Greece and Italy (H4: humanitarian commitment).*

In sum, the following hypotheses derive from this theoretical framework which must be operationalised and tested based on a suitable methodology.

H1: ***Public goods/exploitation*** – States whose potential contribution to relocation is marginal are supposed to free-ride on those with a higher capacity, so that the latter would make a disproportionately higher effort to the achievement of the overall objective.
H2: ***Joint product*** – Those countries for whom relocation does not only provide public, but also private benefits are expected to show more determined levels of implementation than others.
H3: ***Solidarity*** – MS unanimously decide on a capacity-informed distribution key for relieving external border states and implement it in an efficient manner.
H3a: ***Entrapment* –** MS find themselves entrapped into taking positions in accordance with relevant norms, yet against their pre-existing national preferences.
H3b: ***Cooperative bargaining*** – MS achieve a mutual compromise that reflects a balancing of conflicting positions and decide by unanimity.
H4: ***Humanitarian commitment*** – States particularly committed to humanitarian norms relocate a disproportionate share of asylum-seekers from Greece and Italy.

3.4 OPERATIONALISATION AND METHODOLOGY

In general, the influence of norms is much more difficult to determine than the prevalence of rational motives because they can hardly be directly observed through deeds and actors might try to cover their rational motives for seemingly norm-compliant behaviour by using normative rhetoric and – perhaps most importantly – truly internalised norms are usually not discussed by actors as they are taken for granted (Niemann & Mak, 2010, p. 736; Verhoeff & Niemann, p. 1286). Since actual behaviour may indicate normative convictions, yet is not conclusive as for which motives (norm-based or rational) were actually decisive for the decision taken, one has to explore basic interests and reflexions to prove the existence of normative or rational logics of action. Therefore, following Niemann & Mak (2010, pp. 736), I proceed in two steps: first, taking an internal approach, I attempt to reconstruct the negotiation process in order to reveal national interests, conflicts and the potential role of solidarity. This examination is supposed to give a first impression of which states are likely to follow rational interests and which are potentially norm-guided. Second, taking an external approach, these results will be compared with the decision's implementation to assess whether the commitment to solidarity does actually determine MS' behaviour or whether confessions were only empty words used in a strategic manner.

There are three principal forms of behaviour which might indicate the influence and strength of particular norms: first, as mentioned above, a high correlation between pledges/statements and concrete according action is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for real norm compliance. A more robust indicator consists in actions matching the expectations of the 'logic of appropriateness' which indisputably contradict national preferences and were yet preferred (cf. Niemann & de Wekker, 2010, p. 8). Second, if an actor deviating from the norm makes a particularly strong effort to justify this breach, the norm concerned can be attached some importance which would be denied if the MS showed a lack of understanding for criticism (Niemann & Mak, 2010, p. 737). Third, if norms like solidarity and shared responsibility were actually internalised and thus considered appropriate, we would expect MS to apply them no matter the policy area or the state(s) in need of support (cf. Verhoeff & Niemann, 2011, p. 1288). Regarding the negotiations themselves, normative commitment might be indicated through the norm's position during negotiations, i.e. whether it was at the centre of discussions or was merely added as an explanatory or euphemistic argument in the final decision (cf. Niemann & de Wekker, 2010, pp. 7).

As can be inferred from these introductory remarks, the combination of multiple data and methods in a careful triangulation process is required to examine these criteria and achieve reliable results: expert interviews provide insight into the negotiation process, while a statistical analysis of the implementation contrasts statements with their practical relevance. Both approaches are controlled through cross-interview comparison with regard to external consistency, the official Council decision, reference to additional research literature, Commission implementation reports (2016a, b, d, f, h, i, l-n; 2017b-d, f, g) and media coverage. First, I conducted seven semi-structured research interviews with officials from the Council, the EP and its research service between 6 and 27 June 2017, replenished by another five interviews conducted by Arne Niemann in October 2016, in order to get insight into national preferences, the negotiation process and its stakes[1]. They are of particular importance for the assessment of the solidarity hypothesis and its potential mechanisms (H3a and H3b), but can also provide information necessary to test the joint product and humanitarian commitment hypotheses.

Second, the statistical analysis of the implementation process as important for the examination of objective patterns is based on data provided by the Commission's eighth state of play report (2016n) as well as on data from multiple sources like Eurostat, UNHCR and the World

[1] A full list of interviews and an exemplary interview guide can be found in appendices 1 and 2.

Bank.[2] All data have been chosen for the year 2016 to guarantee timely coincidence (i.e. the implementation rate also dates back to 8 December 2016) apart from the average number of asylum applicants and resettlements per 1 million inhabitants between 2010 and 2016 which is included for it was also considered a factor in calculating the official relocation aims. At this point, two aspects should be emphasised: first, since the analysis only covers the implementation process until the end of 2016 and its end in September 2017 is not reached yet, there is obviously room for changes and the objective could only be achieved to a certain extent by then. It is assumed, however, that about one year is time enough for states to make considerable efforts and to identify according differences. Second, as Sandler and Harley (2001, p. 883) correctly point out, caution must be taken when examining forms of burden-sharing which are based on an institutional arrangement, so that states cannot operate at their own discretion. In the case of relocation, there is, of course, a legislatively binding scheme at work based on certain criteria that are also part of the hypotheses (especially H3). In order to avoid false conclusions, I used the relative relocation rate as the dependent variable, i.e. the percentage of relocated people as of the total aim, and calculated second models with the actual number of relocations for control reasons and to take account of the (non-)contributions of the UK, Denmark and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) states Norway, Iceland and Switzerland.[3]

Following the reflections of Thielemann (2003), Table 1 presents the operationalisation of the hypotheses for the statistical analysis. Since the latter is restricted to objective observations, no conclusions can be drawn on a potential mechanism for norm compliance (entrapment or cooperative bargaining), wherefore they are not considered at this stage of the theoretical applications.

4 *EXPLAINING THE TEMPORARY RELOCATION DECISIONS*

This chapter empirically examines the logics behind the relocation decisions of September 2015 with respect to their negotiations (section 4.1) and their actual implementation (section 4.2). The analysis of interests and norms in fact requires both to produce robust results which are presented in section 4.3.

[2] For a full list of sources see Appendix 3 which also contains the full excel table for the statistical analysis.
[3] Liechtenstein was excluded from the models for lack of data on too many dependent variables. For every model, the aim was to consider the same countries to guarantee comparability.

Table 1: Operationalisation of the hypotheses

Hypothesis	*Operationalisation*	*Argument*
H1: Public goods/exploitation – States whose potential contribution to relocation is marginal are supposed to free-ride on those with a higher capacity, so that the latter would make a disproportionately higher effort to the achievement of the overall objective.	GDP per capita + government deficit/surplus → relocation rate/actual relocation	Rich states with high financial capacities can spend more means on the hosting of refugees (accommodation, education, application proceedings) and can thus take in a greater number. MS with fewer means see that their contributions hardly make a difference; hence, they free-ride on their richer counterparts.
H2: Joint product – Those countries for whom relocation does not only provide public, but also private benefits are expected to show more determined levels of implementation than others.	share of intra-EU/EFTA exports + share of asylum applications in the EU → relocation rate/actual relocation	States who export many goods to other EU or EFTA states profit most from the free trade area within the Schengen system. Thus, they have a strong incentive to work towards the end of internal border controls. Effective relocation might contribute to the re-establishment of this order. MS who have already received a high share of asylum-seekers want others to take responsibility as well. By participating efficiently, they might hope to lead by example and convince others to take their share.
H3: Solidarity – MS unanimously decide on a capacity-informed distribution key for relieving border states and implement it in an efficient manner.	absolute GDP + population size + unemployment rate + average number of asylum applications and resettlements per 1 million inhabitants 2010-2016 → relocation rate/actual relocation	The criteria for calculating the relocation aim for 2017 consider MS' relative capacity to host asylum-seekers. If this is how solidarity is defined, we expect a strong correlation between these factors and actual relocations.
H4: Humanitarian commitment – States particularly committed to humanitarian norms relocate a disproportionate share of asylum-seekers from Greece and Italy.	asylum recognition rate + official development assistance in relation to GDP → relocation rate/actual relocation	Asylum recognition rate and relative development aid are proxies for a state's commitment to humanitarian protection. More committed states in these terms will make a greater effort to fulfil the official objective.

4.1 THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS

The two decisions on emergency relocation were taken under significant pressure due to the high numbers of arrivals and the incapability of Greece and Italy to cope with them (Interview [Int.] Officials B, D, F & G) and also against the background of repeated shipwrecks pushing decision-makers to take urgent action (Int. Official E). Given the 'incredible pace of work' to produce a legislative result within roughly two months (Int. Official D), there was no time to develop full-fledged national positions and consider possible consequences for future development (ibid.; Int. Official C). The basic purpose of the emergency relocation decisions was to help Greece and Italy, to re-establish order by stopping the 'wave through practice' as well as to respect international legal obligations (Int. Officials D & G). With a further increasing influx during the summer, these objectives became even more important

and needed to be achieved very urgently. Hence, the Commission pushed for the second emergency relocation decision, significantly raising the number of relocations. Council officials, however, had doubts whether this approach would find MS' support because one was aware that they had collected diverse levels of experience with immigration and integration (Int. Officials B & C) and, thus, preferred a step-by-step policy which would give those with less experience time to adapt to the process and recognise its value (Int. Official G).

Yet, differences between MS not only concerned their experience in providing asylum: relatedly, social homogeneity was cited as a crucial factor determining a country's integration capacity especially by Eastern European states, most vocally by the Visegrád group (V4) uniting Hungary, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Poland (Lang, 2015). In addition, their governments claimed that fixed relocation quotas violate their sovereign right to decide how their societies should be composed (Int. Officials C & G); thus, 'one of the problems with the quota is that MS feel like they had no say in this' (Int. Official F). Governments 'feel responsible for the social cohesion in their society and the security' (ibid.; Int. Official D). For many Eastern MS this means that immigration by non-Europeans and especially Muslims is opposed (Int. Officials B & F; Park, 2015; Trauner, 2016, p. 320). For these reasons, Hungary and Slovakia even challenged the emergency relocation decisions at the European Court of Justice (Börzel, 2016, p. 24; Int. Official D) and representatives, from Romania as well, explicitly announced not to implement them (Vătăman, 2016, p. 546; Weber, 2016, p. i). All of this underlines the importance of domestic constraints influencing governments apart from or in addition to their own ideological convictions: Zaun summarises the results of a 2015 survey in which '57% of the Polish, 77% of the Hungarian, 84% of the Czech and 79% of the Slovakian respondents said that they feared that their way of life was likely to deteriorate due to refugees' (2016, p. 12). Given these attitudes and the parliamentary elections taking place only one month after the second relocation decision, Poland aimed to keep its quota as low as possible and insist on safeguard clauses to ensure public support (Niemann and myself, Int. Official D). Yet, noticing that it would be outvoted anyway, it considered it a viable option to stay engaged in the discussion, maintaining the impression of showing solidarity towards Italy and Greece and demonstrating pro-European cooperation, while still proving to be in control to the public (ibid.).

Yet, such domestic constraints concern MS in all parts of the EU, taking the form of spreading populism which in many cases urged governments to adopt a restrictive course (Börzel, 2016, pp. 18-20; Int. Officials B & F; Park, 2015; Zaun, 2016, pp. 9-13). This development

might also explain why MS have overall focused on strengthening external border control and reducing 'irregular migration' through cooperation with third countries, rather than reforming CEAS or regulating legal ways of immigration (Niemann, Int. Official B; own Int. Officials A, D, E & F; Zaun, 2016, p. 13). Such domestic constraints are very likely to have dominated the decisions of the UK and Denmark to make use of their opt-out position, arguing that they had to deal with high numbers of asylum-seekers already (Int. Official B).

Yet, although national interests often seem very clear and there is evidence of a general preference to reduce the national share of asylum-seekers as well as a perceived weak bargaining position of Germany as one of the main profiteers (Niemann, Int. Official H; Int. Official E), the conclusion that this inevitably excludes compliance with solidarity and that

> while in some Member States—in particular the traditional asylum recipients Germany and Sweden, but also in the border countries Greece and Italy—there was a high demand for such a solidarity instrument to alleviate domestic pressures preferring a reduction of the asylum-seeker inflow, an important blocking 'minority' among the Member States opposed further EU cooperation in the area for the very same reasons (Zaun, 2016, p. 2)

seems a bit overhasty and too generalising. The 'critical need to show solidarity towards Italy and Greece' emphasised in the second Council decision (2015d, para. 16) was mentioned by several officials with one of them explicitly confirming that 'it was just about following up on solidarity and taking it as a common European challenge – something that should be handled together and not be left to the frontline countries' (Int. Official F). Although it is true that the strongest supporters of relocation can be found among the main destination and first entry countries, indicating an instrumental use of the norm (Niemann, Int. Official B; own Int. Officials B, C, D & G; Zaun, 2016, p. 12), other less determined MS like Spain, Bulgaria and the Baltic states could still be mobilised to agree on the binding temporary quota system – something one might not expect if only considering domestic constraints. Thus, other factors are likely to have influenced their decisions.

Importantly, the main reception countries do not only demand solidarity of other MS, but have also strongly contributed to the fulfilment of the overall obligation of refugee protection. One official argued that while those states aimed to lead by example in promoting relocation and, thus, encourage others to follow, the aspect of granting protection did carry some intrinsic value for them – otherwise they would not take the accompanying costs and security risks (Int. Official E). This evaluation was confirmed by another interviewee, claiming that Germany 'wanted to make everyone more open – like: those people are under distress, so we need to accept and accommodate them' (Int. Official D).

Luxembourg, holding the Council Presidency during the negotiations, also accepted and promoted emergency relocation despite the costs involved because there was a need to function as a role model to convince others (Int. Official G). Yet, in addition to this institutional dynamic, approval was also facilitated through the longstanding experience in integrating foreigners (ibid.). As for France and Belgium, their approval of temporary relocation was similarly interpreted as a 'sign of solidarity' (Int. Official A). Both countries initially (or constantly) had doubts concerning the tool of relocation: France, on the one hand, argued that the external border countries needed the pressure of influx in combination with the Dublin system to provide for effective border control – which could arguably diminish if asylum-seekers were to be transferred to other states anyway (Int. Official C). Belgian representatives, on the other hand, were concerned about the security checks as well as the overall organisation and financing, but in a situation where the basic line of discussion is about 'who is for solidarity in general and who is not […] they are still opting for pro-European solutions' (Int. Official D). In addition, one crucial factor applying for both countries was the longstanding alliance with Germany as one of the strongest promoters of relocation; in other words, they had to 'match up' (Int. Official F). These observations indicate that the degree of solidarity shown by single MS also depends on their length of EU membership: as one representative stated, Benelux and other founding countries have grown together as a Union throughout the years, wherefore solidarity comes more naturally, while new Eastern MS are more mistrustful of the EU and its potential impact on their societies (Int. Official G) – which was arguably the reason why Hungary refused to profit from relocation itself (Int. Official B). Still, an insurance rationale might also play a motivating role for France and Belgium, i.e. the expectation that one would receive the same kind of aid if possibly affected by high numbers of asylum applications oneself (Int. Official D).

Remarkably, Ireland has decided to opt in although, unlike France and Belgium, it has only received a comparably small share of EU asylum applications in recent years and in relation to its population size (cf. Appendix 3; Appendix 5, Figures 2-7), thus rendering an insurance rationale unlikely. There are some clues for assuming that increasing public demands for more refugee protection in view of the dramatic incidents mentioned in chapter 2 has put the government under pressure to alter its comparably restrictive stance towards asylum-seekers (Healy, 2015; Int. Officials D & E; MacGuill, 2015; Russell, 2015). Frances Fitzgerald, by then Minister for Justice and Equality, was quoted saying that 'people are haunted by these images and they want the European Union to respond and provide a comprehensive response' towards the situation in 2015 which she characterised as 'an issue of life and death'

(Russell, 2015). Even more than responsiveness to public opinion, however, officials confirm Irish representatives a 'feeling of solidarity' (Int. Official E):

> From my own experience, I saw the determination with which Ireland was underlining at every occasion relocation was being evoked at the EU level its commitment to EU solidarity and its readiness to provide assistance to every MS that found itself in a difficult migration situation. (Int. Official D)

Similar arguments about solidarity shown by the Dublin associated states Iceland, Norway Switzerland and Liechtenstein were yet part of a more ambiguous picture regarding their motives: in the same sentence as underlining their 'good sense of solidarity' and support for a 'pro-European approach', officials implied that their approval hinges upon societal acceptance in the sense that 'they knew they could afford it, that their societies would accept it – there was no political challenge in this' (Int. Official D) as well as upon the fact that they 'benefit from the internal market and they also have debts towards the EU' (Int. Official B). It was also argued that Switzerland and Norway considered the risk of many asylum-seekers entering their territory in a non-scrutinised way, given their common borders with Germany and Sweden, thus preferring to organise the system (ibid.). Apart from hope for a controlled and more balanced distribution of refugees, there is suspicion that approval to relocation also serves to abolish reasons for further internal border controls, thus saving the Schengen system from which the associated states as well as Germany and Austria benefit in terms of intra-EU/EFTA exports (cf. Appendix 3) and which is of high acknowledged value for the EU (Niemann, Int. Officials D & I). While some interviewees considered this reasoning to be correct or very likely (Int. Officials B & F), others were unsure or replied that it is not a direct aim or did not suffice as a sole reason for MS action (Int. Officials A, E & G).

All constraints and particular interests should, however, be embedded into the institutional negotiation context in the Council in order to examine the potential validity of entrapment or cooperative bargaining (H3a & b). Officials identified an *esprit de corps* among Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) Councillors who negotiated temporary relocation based on frequent informal meetings and cooperative norms, also involving the Commission (Niemann, Int. Officials B & D). The Luxembourg Presidency made a serious attempt to listen to the concerns of the other MS and win their consent through respective amendments (ibid.). Informal bilateral meetings took place at the ministerial and permanent representatives level, accompanied by Commission officials, and delegates of Luxembourg visited Greece, Italy and V4 (Niemann and myself, Int. Official G). This approach does clearly follow the rules of cooperative bargaining in its attempt to find shared compromises although manifest conflicts between MS' positions did occur.

As a result, the Baltic states, initially sceptical towards relocation for similar popular fears as in other Eastern European countries, were convinced by more experienced states that such fears would not realise (ibid.). Yet, their agreement was probably also informed by the facts that expected relocation numbers were limited, they considered their bargaining position insufficient to contradict and 'they don't want to be on the blacklist of the Commission, they want to 'obey as good children'' and not be regarded as part of the V4 opposition group (Int. Official F) – a position which underlines the leverage of potential 'naming and shaming' by the Commission (Int. Official E). Finland was gained which formerly had doubts concerning the pace of decisions as well as Spain which found it difficult to sell its contribution at home since it had coped with high numbers of refugee arrivals some years ago on its own (Niemann and myself, Int. Official G). Only V4 apart from Poland could not be moved.

In contrast to those MS which could be convinced to agree (or not), there are also countries who really seem to embrace the norm of humanitarian protection: Sweden and Malta. The prevailing discourse among the Swedish public and government during the summer months of 2015 was to 'protect those in need' and 'open our hearts' (Niemann, Int. Official I). When more restrictive policies had to be introduced in autumn concerning border control because Sweden was not fully in control, the deputy Prime Minister Åsa Romson (Green Party) even started crying during the announcement (ibid.). This indicates that the government has also entrapped itself rhetorically, yet continuing the Swedish tradition of a strong human rights record. Although populism has grown in Sweden as well, it did not create an overall demand for releasing the pressure on its asylum system (ibid.; Zaun, 2016, p. 11, 16). Even though Sweden as one of the major destination countries had an obvious incentive to involve others into burden-sharing, it equally seems to express its humanitarian culture.

Malta is characterised as one of those MS which 'do not have the capacity and thus cannot take in too many people, but still want to respect their human rights commitments' (Int. Official E). Having directly experienced high numbers of arrivals as well as the horrifying consequences of shipwrecks (as many corpses are brought to Malta), many people made private efforts to help people out (ibid.). This message was also echoed by the media and strengthened by the Maltese President who 'is very much on humanitarian values, on common shared values and the value of solidarity' and, thus, sent 'clear messages to the population' why it was necessary 'to help in this humanitarian situation and do our part' (ibid.). In addition to hosting people, Malta has specialised on providing dignified funerals and contacting families (ibid.). Remarkably, Malta does support relocation although it receives many

arrivals in relation to its population size itself (cf. Appendix 5, Figures 3 & 6) and despite the fact that the *EU Pilot Project on Intra-EU Relocation from Malta* (EUREMA) 2010-2013 and additional bilateral arrangements did not bring considerable relief for Malta with sixteen MS as well as Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland pledging overall 611 places (EASO, 2012, p. 1; European Resettlement Network, n.d.; Int. Officials D & E).

The case of Malta also illustrates that there are often different ways of demonstrating solidarity, which is why several MS have promoted the idea of 'flexible solidarity', meaning that other contributions apart from physical transfer, such as financial support, expertise or technical equipment, are deemed equally suited to help states in need (Int. Officials B, C, D & F; Niemann, Int. Officials B & D). The majority of MS currently supports this option in combination with a minimum share of actual relocation, which would leave more discretion for the MS to decide which form of contribution suits them best (Int. Officials B & F). Yet, the problem remains that such a compromise will prospectively lead to insufficient provision of relocation places, wherefore EU external border countries reject this approach (Int. Official G). The idea of flexible solidarity also touches upon the criteria for determining the respective share for each MS since several states argue that the distribution key for emergency relocation does not take into account other important factors deciding over a country's capacity to host and integrate refugees, such as existing infrastructure or societal homogeneity, and does not respect other forms of contribution to the aims of CEAS, like the control of long external borders, investments in transit countries or countries of origin and the legal admittance of migrants (ibid.). In addition, there are different views regarding the aim of solidarity: while some pursuit a shared admission of refugees, others demand burden-sharing in border control to reduce the influx (Int. Official C; Niemann, Int. Official I).

In other words, norms of solidarity and shared responsibility were centrally discussed in the political negotiations, yet there is dissent over their interpretation and practical implications (Int. Officials B, C & E). A nationalistic interpretation is increasingly conflicting with a European understanding (Bendiek & Neyer, 2016, pp. 3). Solidarity in the latter sense of united efforts for admittance and protection of refugees is indeed 'not on the political agenda of all MS' (Int. Official A) and, thus, in sum results in 'minimal solidarity' (Int. Official E). A Slovakian representative, for instance, when asked about the role of values of shared responsibility and human rights obligations by one official, cynically replied 'Yes, those values, we always have to quote them, don't we?' (ibid.) – an answer which clearly demonstrates lack of commitment.

At this stage, it should also be pointed out that 'substantive', rather than 'symbolic' solidarity, as demanded by Thielemann (forthcoming, p. 22), was also limited (in other policy areas) in the past, for instance regarding social equality and the introduction of an EU unemployment insurance (Bendiek & Neyer, 2016, pp. 2) or the Italian calls for support when facing first significant increases in arrivals in 2013 (Pastore & Henry, 2016, p. 52). The lion's share of refugee protection in form of receiving asylum-seekers and assessing their applications as well as resettlement has been provided by only a few states (EP, 2012, para. 5). Furthermore, factors like social cohesion for the capacity to engage in relocation were not respected when dealing with third countries like Turkey, Lebanon and other major global recipients who face serious social and political conflicts – couching solidarity in financial aid is insufficient to really meet their concerns (Int. Official E). These inconsistencies in the application of the norm of solidarity point to double standards which undermine belief in real normative commitment. Nonetheless, the conclusion of a 'rather instrumental' use of solidarity (Zaun, 2016, p. 18) still conveys the insight that normative convictions and national interests go together, i.e. that there is no single MS which merely acts according to the former or latter (Int. Official C). One Representative confirmed that the arguments of security (regarding hotspot procedures) and humanity were of equal weight in the discussions and were presented 'as a package' (Int. Official G). Hence, rational and normative arguments were equally considered, while the outcome differed for every MS (ibid.).

The situation changed for all MS for three main reasons: first, the series of recent terrorist attacks (see *A timeline of recent terrorist attacks in Europe*, 2017) has caused a shift in media coverage and public debate from humanitarian tragedies in the Mediterranean, the Balkan and Syria to potential terrorists disguising themselves as asylum-seekers (Int. Official D). Accordingly, this development bolstered populism and domestic pressure to ensure full-functional security processes during the assessment of asylum claims. Second, the fact that the handling of the influx became more settled and time pressure decreased gave MS more chance to consider their own position and make their voices heard as well as to reflect more extensively about potential consequences of common decisions for future scenarios. Thus, 'everyone wants to secure their interests' by focussing on safeguards (ibid.). Finally, since several states had been sceptical towards relocation and opposed the 'imposition' of mandatory quotas, their protest transformed into a manifest blockage, driving the divisive image of the EU in the media and intensifying regional confrontations (ibid.; Int. Official G).

These changing factors had considerable influence on the discussion of a permanent relocation mechanism within the framework of the Dublin reform which remains highly contested to date (Int. Officials D & E). The high level of politicisation and media pressure (Niemann, Int. Officials B & D) contributed to a position change of some states who had been won for temporary relocation despite scepticism, but now rejected a permanent version. Hence, resistance was not only expressed by the former V4 opponents and Romania, but also by Spain, Bulgaria and Ireland and to some extent France, whereas Belgium, Estonia and Portugal became promoters of the crisis mechanism despite their initial hesitation towards temporary relocation (Int. Officials B & D; Niemann, Int. Official B; Zaun, 2016, pp. 14). Portugal's support can (partly) be explained by the replacement of the conservative/socialist coalition and 11-day conservative minority government by a new socialist minority supported by a left/green block in November 2015 (Agence France-Presse in Lisbon, 2015; Int. Official B).

The reasons for contestation were various: first of all, the terrorist attacks created strong security concerns, especially in V4, wherefore they long for voluntary contributions, more alternative measures and a precise cap for relocation (Int. Official B; Niemann, Int. Official I; Zaun, 2016, p. 15). Second, a permanent crisis management was difficult to sell to the public and the MS which called for relocation to be considered only after strengthening border control and reducing flows (Int. Official G). Third, some representatives argued that the crisis relocation mechanism introduces another pull factor for migrants, does not consider secondary movements and merely tackles symptoms rather than root causes (Int. Official D; Vote Watch Europe, 2015). Fourth, many states had opted for temporary relocation to aid clearly overburdened Greece and Italy, whereas permanent relocation was associated with relieving top hosts like Germany – an objective disapproved by some for the latter 'were not only more wealthy and capable to receive refugees, but also accused of having motivated further asylum-seekers to come to Europe' (Zaun, 2016, p. 15; cf. Niemann, Int. Official D). Finally, countries prioritising border protection and the prevention of irregular migration like V4 and the Baltic states feared that after the introduction of a permanent mechanism top recipients would lack an incentive to engage in strengthening border control (ibid.).

With respect to these reservations, permanent relocation is retained as a basic element of the Dublin reform, but its extent and conditions are subject of heated debates deciding over progress or deadlock (Int. Official D). Still, the 'first country of entry' principle remains the basic mechanism of the Dublin regulation as 'for some countries it was very convenient to allow others to deal with the problem' (Int. Official E; cf. Int. Official A; Zaun, 2016, p. 15).

Concluding from this first examination of the negotiation process, the following factors are likely to influence countries' interests and normative commitments and decide on which one of them dominates in the context of asylum burden-sharing: perhaps most importantly, domestic pressures in relation to the overall public discourse and level of politicisation constrain a government's room to negotiate, especially in the context of national elections, given the latter's purpose to stay in power. Second, a government's ideological position determines which objectives it pursues and which values it promotes: whereas right-wing parties are likely to restrict immigration to their national societies, left-wing/green parties often promote more open and human-rights-committed policies. Third, a state's socioeconomic situation as well as experience with hosting and integration and relatedly its societal homogeneity are variables determining its capacity to demonstrate solidarity in terms of relocation. Fourth, bargaining power related to size and political capital determine the possibility to direct other representatives towards one's own position (whether it is rational or norm-based). Fifth, the extent of alternative contributions of use for all parties (e.g. in terms of border protection) affects the willingness to further participate in relocation. Sixth, the latter also depends on the capacity of the main beneficient(s) of relocation to host asylum-seekers and their assumed responsibility for the growing influx, i.e. their merit to solidarity by other MS.

Whereas these factors are more on the rational side of the decision, the willingness to follow institutional norms depends on, first, the length of membership and, thus, degree of socialisation; second, the forum of negotiations and associated importance of cooperative bargaining and an *esprit de corps*; and finally, the skills and strategy of the Presidency in respecting the different national concerns. To prove these first results, the next section examines the implementation of the relocation decisions based on research, reports and statistical analysis.

4.2 THE IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS

The implementation of the relocation decisions has begun hesitantly and although pace has increased, by June 2017 (i.e. three months before the end of the programme) it has fallen far short of its aim with only one fifth of the overall target achieved (Commission 2017g, Annex 3; cf. Int. Official D; Maiani, 2016, p. 18). States' engagement significantly differs with some not offering a single place and others making real efforts to fulfil their share (de la Baume, 2016). Table 3 in Appendix 5 illustrates the progress made over time by country and for all contributors collectively. Partly the delay is due to first logistic and administrative difficulties in Italy and Greece (including too few operational hotspots, limited registration capacity and lack of coordination among agencies) (Commission, 2017f, pp. 5; de la Baume,

2016; Guild *et al.*, 2017, pp. 38) – which were, however, to a great extent overcome by summer 2016 (Guild *et al.*, 2017, p. 36; Int. Official C; Maiani, 2016, p. 18) – as well as to the limited attractiveness for asylum-seekers to be relocated to a MS other than their destination country (de la Baume, 2016; Maiani, 2016, p. 19). Yet, the 'problems' of refugee preferences combined with a lack of information on the scheme have diminished to some extent with the borders being closed and measures taken to improve the flow of information. Still, a third reason for overall low implementation rates are hurdles built into the decisions themselves: according to the second decision, only those asylum-seekers are eligible for relocation who have lodged an application in either Italy or Greece after 24 March 2015 and who hold 'the nationality of a country 75% of whose nationals who applied for protection in the EU in the previous quarter […] were recognised as refugees or granted international protection' (Guild *et al.*, 2017, p. 20). Besides serious implications from a solidarity and protection view (ibid.; Maiani, 2016, p. 19), these criteria also result in less relocations because, first, Greece and Italy still have to apply the time-consuming Dublin procedure to applicants and, second, only protection-seekers with the 'right' nationality are eligible. Hence, the number of qualifying persons remains below the targets defined in the decision (Commission, 2017f, p. 2) and the aim is likely to be revised downwards (Nielsen, 2017).

Despite these difficulties, a comparison of actual relocations to the individual relocation rate reveals a significant divergence in country performance and there are clear differences in relative commitment as well, as can be inferred from Figure 1, which need to be attributed to other factors that differ among states. In fact, the targets set out in the decision account for only 38% of the variance in actual relocations (see Table 2, row 13). Therefore, I ran a Stata analysis to test for the hypotheses as operationalised in Table 1, the do-file of which is reported in Appendix 4. Summary statistics describing the data characteristics are presented in Appendix 5, Table 5. Unfortunately, the independent variables intercorrelate to a great extent (see Appendix 5, Table 4), thus causing multicollinearity when included in multiple regression models as originally foreseen. For this reason, only simple regressions were conducted whose results nevertheless should be treated carefully due to the correlations. In addition, heteroscedasticity applied for many variables. Although I assessed all regressions using the Breusch-Pagan test, some t-test results clearly changed when using robust standard errors even where the former test was not significant, pointing to non-linear forms of heteroscedasticity. Hence, I decided to use robust standard errors for all variables and report the uncorrected version in Appendix 5, Table 6. As mentioned in section 3.4, I conducted several models, using relocation rate and actual relocations separately as dependent variables and

distinguishing for several groups of cases. Moreover, I singled out outliers and points with high leverage to examine which countries did not follow the overall trend and how the effect changes when excluding these countries. The regression results are summarised in table 2.

Figure 1: Relocation rate, actual relocations and pledges by country (June 2017)



Source: own depiction based on data from Commission 2017g, Annexes 1-3

Table 2: Simple regression results using robust standard errors

	Relocation rate			Actual relocation				
	(a)	(a.i)	(a.ii)	(b)	(b.i)	(b.ii)	(c)	(d)
1. Absolute GDP	-0.00005/ -0.26** (0.00002) [0.0697]	-	-	0.39/ 0.61 (0.24) [0.3681]	-	0.40/ 0.38 (0.23) [0.1453][1]	0.27/ 0.48 (0.19) [0.2271]	0.39/ 0.61 (0.23) [0.3687]
2. GDP per capita	0.000001/ 0.19 (0.000001) [0.0356]	0.000002/ 0.29* (0.0000009) [0.0829][2]	0.0000004/ 0.04 (0.000002) [0.0017] [3]	0.004/ 0.16 (0.004) [0.0242]	-	0.01/ 0.29 (0.007) [0.0818][3]	0.003/ 0.11 (0.003) [0.0132]	0.001/ 0.06 (0.002) [0.0033]
3. Government deficit/ surplus	1.01/ 0.11 (1.86) [0.0129]	-	2.79/ 0.25 (2.36) [0.0638][4]	-8592.5/ -0.29 (8683.5) [0.0819]	-234.9/ -0.01 (3374.6) [0.0002][5]	-14256.5/ -0.38 (11036.6) [0.1439][4]	-6855.5/ -0.23 (8005.0) [0.0547]	-
4. National share of total EU asylum applications 2016	-0.29/ -0.21*** (0.09) [0.0441]	-	-3.52/ -0.33 (2.20) [0.1108][6]	887.15/ 0.19* (433.02) [0.0375]	-1726.0/ -0.05 (6443.8) [0.0027][1]	-	916.20/ 0.20** (422.72) [0.0389]	938.47/ 0.20** (442.89) [0.0412]
5. Intra-EU/EFTA export rate	-1.001/ -0.33** (0.44) [0.1069]	-	-	4405.4/ 0.43* (2506.0) [0.1825]	-	-	4329.5/ 0.42* (2400.1) [0.1730]	4539.0/ 0.44* (2517.8) [0.1929]
6. Population size	-2.60e-09/ -0.35** (1.03e-09) [0.1242]	-	-5.86e-09/ -0.42** (2.10e-09) [0.1765][1]	0.00001/ 0.58* (0.000008) [0.3357]	0.000006/ 0.21 (0.000005) [0.0452][1]	-	0.00001/ 0.47 (0.000007) [0.2225]	0.00001/ 0.59* (0.000008) [0.3493]
7. Unemployment rate	-0.35/ -0.08 (0.83) [0.0058]	-	-	1860.6/ 0.12 (2215.2) [0.0148]	-	-	2324.8/ 0.15 (2261.3) [0.0235]	2448.2/ 0.17 (2184.9) [0.0290]
8. Asylum applications per 1 m. inhabitants 2010-2016	-0.000004/ -0.04 (0.00002) [0.0018]	-0.00002/ -0.29* (0.00001) [0.0854][2]	0.00001/ 0.10 (0.00004) [0.0103][7]	-0.05/ -0.16 (0.03) [0.0247]	-	-	-0.04/ -0.14 (0.03) [0.0196]	-0.05/ -0.16 (0.03) [0.0251]
9. Resettlements per 1 m. inhabitants 2010-2016	0.0003/ 0.10 (0.0010) [0.0099]	-	-	0.98/ 0.08 (2.14) [0.0072]	1.61/ 0.24 (2.10) [0.0572][5]	9.93/ 0.19 (8.97) [0.0359][8]	0.59/ 0.05 (1.96) [0.0027]	-0.13/ -0.02 (0.89) [0.0003]
10. Asylum recognition rate	0.18/ 0.27 (0.17) [0.0607]	-	0.08/ 0.09 (0.25) [0.0073][9]	-221.28/ -0.09 (567.5) [0.0077]	223.2/ 0.15 (284.0) [0.0223][5]	-875.9/ -0.27 (936.8) [0.0751][9]	-186.6/ -0.08 (523.6) [0.0057]	-126.6/ -0.05 (484.4) [0.0028]
11. ODA share of GDP	-5.91/ -0.09 (12.54) [0.0075]	-	2.93/ 0.04 (16.40) [0.0013][7]	55997.8/ 0.24 (45229.0) [0.0591]	44216.3/ 0.33 (38020.1) [0.1105][5]	111452.8/ 0.40** (46724.6) [0.1566][7]	26268.3/ 0.13 (31804.4) [0.0160]	24273.9/ 0.13 (28110.1) [0.0172]
12. Share of foreigners/ population	0.40/ 0.25** (0.15) [0.0608]	-	0.32/ 0.11 (0.44) [0.0121][3]	-492.5/ -0.09 (440.2) [0.0080]	-	-	-490.1/ -0.09 (432.1) [0.0077]	-543,5/ -0.10 (448.7) [0.0106]
13. Relocation aim	-0.000007/ -0.28** (0.000003) [0.0794]	-	-0.00003/ -0.37** (0.00001) [0.1375][1]	0.05/ 0.61 (0.03) [0.3778]	0.06/ 0.42* (0.03) [0.1776][1]	-	-	-

Note: a = EU24 (23/22); a.i = specification 1; a.ii = specification 2; b = EU24 (23/22); b.i = specification 1; b.ii = specification 2; c = EU24 (23/22) + UK & Denmark; d = EU24 (23/22) + EFTA3

EU24 = Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden

EU23 = EU24 – Croatia

EU22 = EU24 – Bulgaria & Cyprus

EFTA3 = Iceland, Norway, Switzerland

OLS regression coefficients/beta coefficients with robust standard errors reported in round brackets and R^2 reported in square brackets.

***prob.<0.01, **prob.<0.05, *prob.<0.1

[1] excluding Germany and France
[2] excluding Malta
[3] excluding Luxembourg
[4] excluding Spain
[5] excluding France
[6] excluding Germany
[7] excluding Sweden
[8] excluding Sweden and Finland
[9] excluding Hungary and Poland

Beginning with the public goods hypothesis, there is hardly any evidence for an 'exploitation of the big by the small': first, GDP per capita merely has a significant medium positive effect on the relocation rate if Malta is excluded from the model – because Malta had made most relative efforts by the time despite only having the median value on the independent variable. Otherwise, the effect is not significant and literally vanishes when excluding Luxembourg. Furthermore, no significant effect can be found for actual relocation. The same finding results from regressing both relocation rate and actual relocations to the government deficit/surplus. Thus, states with fewer financial capacities are not free-riding on richer states.

Likewise, the joint product hypothesis cannot be confirmed – on the contrary, findings are even inverse to expectations: for national share of intra-EU/EFTA exports, although there is a significant quite strong positive effect on actual relocations (which is arguably due to its high correlation with GDP), this effect becomes moderately negative and even significant at the 5% significance level, when examining the relocation rate. In other words, the higher the intra-export rate, the lower the relative commitment to relocation. Furthermore, the national share of asylum applications in the EU exerts a significant weak negative effect on the relocation rate that becomes moderate, yet no longer significant, when excluding Germany (which has received a share of about 60% in 2016). Likewise, it weakly affects absolute relocations in a significant and positive way – which again only holds as long as Germany and France are included and otherwise becomes even negative, losing significance. Consequently, one cannot assume that states who particularly profit from the Schengen area overall commit themselves to prevent further internal border controls or those countries with high application rates (which are often identical with the former) to lead by example, thus motivating others to take their share. These private benefits from contributing to the public good of increased stability and security do not account for diverging commitments.

Hence, one could expect that the solidarity hypothesis is supported by the analysis. However, obviously if the official objectives are based on solidarity by respecting capacities concerning hosting and integration and states follow this norm, there should not be any differences in performance at all and if they do exist, the variables the key is based on should not account for the discrepancy. But absolute GDP and population size both exert a significant moderate negative effect on relocation rate. This means that states with high GDP and large populations (two variables whose variance is almost identical) relatively contribute *less* to relocation. In contrast, the unemployment rate does not significantly explain any variance in neither relative performance nor actual places. The same applies for the average numbers of

asylum applications and resettlements per 1 million inhabitants between 2010 and 2016. The effect of average asylum applications on relocation rate only becomes significant and moderately negative with Malta excluded (as it received many asylum applications in relation to its population size and still makes the highest effort to meet its relocation obligations). The reasons for these findings concerning GDP/population size and average asylum applications per million inhabitants will be addressed below. Meanwhile, it must be concluded that either states who agreed to the decision are in fact less favourable towards solidarity when it is demanded in practice – or there are other factors that impede the intended norm compliance (or a mix of the two).

If solidarity did not really motivate states to contribute to the scheme, one might argue that it is rather a stronger humanitarian commitment that explains the divergence in relative implementation (hypothesis 4). The asylum recognition rate as one proxy for such commitment has a moderate positive, yet not significant effect on relocation rate which becomes negligible when excluding Hungary and Poland as two MS with low recognition rates and zero participation in relocation. The inverse finding is achieved when excluding these countries from the regression of actual relocations. There is, thus, no robust relationship between the two variables. Regarding the percentage of official development aid (ODA) in relation to total GDP as another proxy, there is no evidence for an effect on relocation rate at all, while the quite strong effect on actual relocations becomes significant when excluding Sweden – which has indeed been granted a one-year suspension of its obligations due to its high burden of asylum-seekers in 2015 (like Austria which received a 30% suspension) and is thus reasonably omitted. However, these two factors do not increase countries' relative contributions as would be expected if the humanitarian commitment hypothesis indeed applied.

Since integration capacity could also be measured by other factors than those included in the distribution key, the percentage of foreigners in the population was included as an alternative explanatory variable – yet finding a significant positive effect only with Luxembourg enclosed due to its comparably high commitment and proportion of non-nationals. Thus, it is no robust explanatory factor – at least in late 2016. In sum, none of the hypotheses derived from Public Goods Theory and Normative Institutionalism can be confirmed on the basis of this statistical analysis – although, again, they examine the overall performance by all countries, whereas motives may vary among the group. Therefore, the individual background needs to be considered when searching for alternative explanatory factors.

A brief overview over relative national engagement shall help in this regard: in absolute terms Germany (5,658), France (3,478), the Netherlands (1,907), Finland (1,640) and Portugal (1,374) rank among the top five MS relocators, while the associated states Norway (1,345) and Switzerland (993) have also relocated many people (Commission 2017g, Annex 3). Yet, when comparing it to relative efforts, this impression is changed with some smaller countries doing particularly well with Malta (105%), Finland (79%), Ireland (77%), Latvia (66%) and Luxembourg (59%) holding the top five ranks. On the other hand, the Balkan countries Bulgaria (4%), Croatia (6%) and Romania (15%), but also the Central European states Belgium (16%), France (18%) and Germany (21%) as well as Spain (10%) and Sweden (6%) were poorly engaged so far. As for Sweden, considering the suspension granted, there seems to be a strong intention to fulfil its share for it has pledged even more places than foreseen in the official target by June (Appendix 5, Table 3). The least commitment, however, was (unsurprisingly) demonstrated by V4 and also Austria with hardly any or no asylum-seekers relocated at all. Therefore, the Commission recently launched infringement procedures against the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland (Nielsen & Zalan, 2017). Austria has only avoided such a reaction by relocating fifty people from Greece (ibid.).

What can explain the divergence in implementation? First of all, administrative and reception capacity seems to be a major factor: countries which have received high absolute numbers of asylum applications in 2015 like Germany, Sweden, Austria, France, the Netherlands and Belgium (see Appendix 5, Figure 2) arguably have difficulties in hosting further refugees (Int. Officials B & G), especially if figures increased significantly compared to previous years (Guild *et al.*, 2017, pp. 32). As mentioned above, Sweden and Austria as the top recipients (per capita) were granted a full or 30% one-year suspension for having experienced an increase in applications by 60% and 230% compared to 2014, while also taking part in resettlement (ibid.). Whereas these decisions account for the low Swedish commitment until March 2017, they do not explain why Austria refused to make an effort to relocate the remaining 70%. Hence, other factors must be at play which will be discussed below. Yet, looking at applications in relation to population size, the thesis that many asylum-seekers denote less engagement regarding relocation is in part undermined by the fact that states like Norway, Finland, Switzerland, Luxembourg or Malta with high relative numbers nevertheless managed to fulfil a large share of their obligations (or voluntary pledges). But again, at least for Finland, this engagement might be due to sufficient administrative capacities: while it had initially been sceptical of the relocation scheme, it later turned into an exemplary participant – possibly because it ‘had received 30,000 Iraqi applicants who had come to Finland

from Sweden' in 2015 and 'had processed their applications swiftly and hence could benefit from a significant number of available places in the relocation process' (Guild, *et al.*, 2017, p. 33). On the other hand, some states, in particular smaller and Eastern European countries with limited experience in providing asylum lack the necessary apparatus (Int. Official B). More specifically, countries like Cyprus, Estonia and Luxembourg stated that they struggled with providing accommodation – especially for vulnerable people and large families –, establishing cooperation channels and lacked staff and interpreters (Guild, *et al.*, 2017, p. 34). Even for strongly engaged states like Ireland, Finland and Portugal, reception capacity limitations have occurred during the implementation phase (Commission, 2017f, p. 7). Finally, further obstacles may evolve when support by local authorities is needed and coordination takes place at different political levels, involving regions and communes (Int. Official B).

Apart from limitations in administrative and reception capacities, there are also operational hurdles which hinder efficient implementation of the decisions: delays occur at many stages in the interaction of beneficiary and relocator, including the reception of pledges, the time for processing applications for relocation of protection-seekers by the Greek and Italian authorities, the response time by receiving states and the final transfer which is restricted by formal requirements on how and when flights should take place (Commission, 2017f, pp. 6; Guild *et al.*, 2017, p. 37; Nielsen, 2017). Guild *et al.* interpret these impediments as 'a manifestation of a lack of sincere cooperation and mutual trust in the relocation system' (2017, p. 38), which, however, constitute significant factors for efficient implementation (Commission, 2017f, p. 2). The lack of trust, especially in the Italian authorities, is also demonstrated by additional security checks imposed by several states like France, Estonia, Ireland and Switzerland, which again retard the entire process (ibid., p. 7; Guild *et al.*, 2017, p. 35).

These checks are the expression of an overall securitisation of asylum policy against the background of recent terrorist attacks, representing an explanatory factor of relocation commitment on its own: countries which experienced such offences and those with public demands for increased security measures are expected to relocate fewer people than countries less affected. After the Manchester and London attacks, Czech interior minister Milan Chovanec was quoted stating that 'due to the aggravated security situation and the dysfunctionality of the whole [relocation] system, the government approved … a proposal to halt this system for the Czech Republic' (McLaughlin, 2017, omission in the original). Similarly, the new Polish government suspended its initial pledge for 100 people after the Brussels attacks in March 2016, indicating that '[u]ntil they'll be 100% sure that safety will be guaranteed

for the Polish public, no asylum-seeker will be relocated' (Int. Official D). Hungarian leaflets during the campaign regarding the referendum explicitly argued that relocation would 'increase the terror threat' (quoted in Guild *et al.*, 2017, p. 30). Apart from additional security checks, such concerns also find expression in national preference policies, which exclude Eritreans in the case of Bulgaria or only allow for people with travel documents for the Czech Republic and Slovakia, while the latter also only accepts single mothers with children (Commission, 2017f, p. 4). In general, many relocation requests have been rejected on national security grounds without providing specific explanations (Guild *et al.*, 2017, pp. 34).

This reasoning, thus, seems to be a mere pretext for an overall anti-immigration agenda and thus lack of political will in these least engaged countries. As already outlined in the previous section, 'the rise in right-wing populism and authoritarianism in various European countries mobilising anti-immigrant sentiment present in countries that have only experienced immigration recently has entailed the orchestrated stigmatisation of and hostility towards asylum seekers and refugees' (ibid., p. 30). Claims for the priority of national sovereignty in combination with anti-Islam sentiments have resulted in an openly expressed rejection of relocation which is given importance with regard to Czech parliamentary elections in October 2017 and a potential Polish referendum on asylum policy to be held in the context of elections in 2019, thus giving public opinion priority over legal obligations and potential sanctions (Int. Official F; McLaughlin, 2017; Nielsen & Zalan, 2017).

By contrast, political support for relocation is unsurprisingly more prevalent in states doing well in implementation. Two (alternative) determinants are deemed central to this overall support: first, national political leadership and, second, local and popular demands – that are both coined by framing and media coverage. Relocation to Finland was supposedly facilitated by the fact that it received little media attention and was, thus, not politically salient (Guild *et al.*, 2017, p. 31). Whereas in Spain local demonstrations urged the government to step up its efforts to meet its goal (ibid.), the change towards a left-wing government in Portugal resulted in an increased effort to relocate people (Int. Official B).

Nevertheless, the engagement of some states cannot compensate for the lack of support by other countries, wherefore the original aim is highly unlikely to be met by September. While some emphasise that the inefficient implementation has confirmed their initial view that other measures would be suited better to react to the crisis, others are 'disappointed because the solidary character was deemed important' (Int. Official C).

4.3 *RESULTS*

The overall limited performance confirms a trend Börzel called a 'growing commitment-compliance gap' (2016, p. 9) that is symptomatic of EU asylum policy in general (Int. Official A). The question, however, is whether the lack of compliance was intended or due to procedural and administrative hurdles not envisaged in the Council decisions. Reasons may, of course, differ among MS: regarding political support as perhaps the most relevant factor, V4 countries have opposed the measure from the outset because of nationalist concerns over sovereignty, social composition and security, whereas other negotiators were more favourable of relocation due to political leadership and/or public and local pressure fuelled by media framing and public discourse. Although depending on regional and national peculiarities, political support for this measure also depends on the government's ideological orientation.

Even where negotiators promoted relocation, however, the initial logistic and administrative difficulties in Greece and Italy, the narrow definition of eligible persons and the unattractiveness for asylum-seekers have contributed to an inefficient implementation, while operational hurdles and lack of trust and cooperation have further aggravated this trend. Furthermore, the lack of administrative and reception capacity not only hampered the implementation process, but was also addressed in the negotiations themselves when discussing legitimate criteria for determining national contributions to relocation. Arguably, the states' experience in the hosting and integration of asylum-seekers and social homogeneity as well as the extent of alternative contributions to CEAS should have been taken into account.

Asking whether the individual decision is based on exogenous interests or shaped by the institutional logic, it seems like representatives are exposed to different influences with domestic pressures, particularly in an election context, on the one hand, and institutional identities and norms, on the other. If both factors point into the same direction, the decision is an easy one – yet, if they compete, closer consideration is required. In this sense, the impact of domestic constraints carries more weight in a politically salient context as is obviously the case in asylum policies, at least from the perspective of many Eastern European countries with limited experience in this regard. The salience was also raised in other states through the overall securitisation in the aftermath of the recent terror series, which might partly explain fewer support for a permanent relocation programme. Institutional norms like consensus-seeking and solidarity seem to have a stronger influence if MS have undergone a lengthy socialisation process, the Presidency adopts a careful and impartial strategy and if negotiations take place in a forum where respective norms have an influential status.

In the case at hand, the norm of solidarity as the baseline of decisions was far from clear, thus pointing to limited strength and quality of the institution. Lacking a legal definition, it faced different interpretations in terms of scope (nationalist vs. European), aim (refugee admittance vs. reduction of flows) and application (substantive vs. flexible solidarity). And since solidarity could hardly refer to previous practical examples, no role model could urge for consistent implications. Hence, the important conditions for entrapment – clarity of the applying norm and its implications, previous commitments and a significant role of the norm in the forum of discussion – were not given. Although relocation received media attention in many states, rather than leading resistant countries to reconsider their opposition, the latter was even enforced due to domestic support and resulted in a manifest blockage that could also affect the general effectiveness of European cooperation. Nevertheless, negotiations were also embedded in an *esprit de corps* among JHA Councillors and accompanied by cooperative bargaining tactics led by the Luxembourg Presidency, wherefore at least some initially sceptical countries could be moved to agree based on compromises. But again, it is difficult to establish which countries' formal agreement was based on real conviction or rational considerations regarding, for instance, limited bargaining power, the significance of reputation and relatedly political capital or an insurance logic.

Similarly, the implementation process does not allow for definite conclusions: on the one hand, solidarity has not been complied with when the frontline countries Italy, Greece and Malta were calling for it in the past, indicating that the norm was not internalised to the extent officially claimed and rather undermined by the interest of profiting from Dublin returns and an unbalanced distribution of responsibility for asylum applications. Relatedly, the support for relocation by states with higher political leverage in a context of immense time pressure seem to have shaped the decisions, underlining the importance of bargaining power. On the other hand, the fact that some MS like Ireland, Latvia or Portugal have made a credible effort to meet their targets although they were less affected by the 'refugee crisis' and thus take the attributed costs for relocation they could have avoided by denying approval supports the interpretation that they preferred a pro-European approach and did respect institutional demands contrary to expectations following from a suasion game. As for other MS, limited implementation progress does not necessarily denote a lack of commitment, but may, at least in part, be due to the operational and administrative obstacles: the significant moderate negative effect of GDP and population size indicates that states with higher absolute objectives had more difficulties in relocating such considerable numbers.

Although no hypothesis has been supported by the statistical analysis, the results are not totally conclusive since they only cover the mid-term period, are based on a legally binding decision and controlled only for certain variables, while the hypotheses could have been operationalised differently. Still, the theories are not completely insignificant for the case at hand: while Public Goods Theory points to the impacts of group size and heterogeneity, arguing that potential social sanctions may result in cooperation in small communities and that actors with a greater preference for the resulting good might make disproportionate contributions, Normative Institutionalism sensitives us for the potential influence of norms and routines and their modes of action. The relationship between the two approaches is subject of the following critical discussion.

5 *DISCUSSION OF THEORETICAL APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY*

As indicated in the previous section, the logics of appropriateness or expected consequences and their embedding in Normative Institutionalism and Public Goods Theory are not necessarily mutually exclusive. In some places, they are even intertwined in each other, like when the joint product model allows for the benefit of fulfilling ethical and humanitarian norms as a potential private benefit derived from refugee protection (Betts, 2003, pp. 287) and routines are understood as reducing transaction and decision-making costs (Peters, 1999, p. 32). While both theories have received various criticism on their own (see March & Olsen, 1998, pp. 950; Peters, 1999, pp. 38), they seem to have a complementary view on explaining behaviour: whereas rationalist approaches like Public Goods Theory emphasise the role of human decision-making based on exogenous preferences, Normative Institutionalism argues that preferences are not developed in an undetermined environment, emphasising that institutions similarly shape interests or at least constrain their pursuit.

Therefore, even March and Olsen acknowledge that 'political action generally cannot be explained exclusively in terms of a logic of either consequences or appropriateness. […] Political actors are constituted both by their interests, by which they evaluate their expected consequences, and by the rules embedded in their identities and political institutions.' (1998, p. 952) Hence, the question is not which of these factors solely explains the outcome, but which of them dominated in its production. The motivational logic for a certain action can, thus, differ among parties and may even change for the same actor in different situations and points in time (Verhoeff & Niemann, 2011, p. 1289). In this sense, the attempt to explain cooperative action becomes contextual (ibid., p. 1290; Niemann & Mak, 2010, p. 735). Research has to identify the conditions under which either logic is more likely to prevail.

Niemann and Mak (2010, pp. 735) identify three circumstances favourable to normative prevalence: first, as already concluded from the empirical analysis, long membership in the negotiation forums furthers socialisation and, thus, internalisation of applying institutional norms. Second, this process is supported by frequent and close contacts which may, as in the case at hand, result in an *esprit de corps*. Finally, institutional norms are more likely to be given priority in 'less politicized and more insulated settings, where the development of trust and thus a mutual responsiveness to foster shared expectations are facilitated and less contested through domestic influences' (ibid.). Regarding relocation, although contacts were close at the official level where relocation was negotiated, the political spotlight and time pressure perhaps complicated an institutional approach and boosted national stakes.

Yet, the exact relation between the two logics remains subject of debate. One possible interpretation argues that 'a clear logic dominates an unclear logic', i.e.

> [w]hen preferences and consequences are precise and identities or their rules are ambiguous, a logic of consequences tends to be more important. When identities and their implications are clear but the implications of preferences or expected consequences are not, a logic of appropriateness tends to be more important. (March & Olsen, 1998, p. 952)

Applying this interpretation to the relocation decisions, the ambiguity of solidarity and its practical implications would be assumed to give precedence to a logic of consequences. While the interest to reduce asylum applications is quite clear for some states, uncertainty over the consequences of an alternative scenario in which Greece and Italy were to deal with the situation on their own might weaken these preferences and render the decision more challenging than initially expected, resulting in diverging national positions.

The actual relationship between norms and interests as well as further conditions for the dominance of a certain logic, however, still need to be examined in further research. As for relocation, a definite decision on which factor prevailed for a certain country cannot be provided at this stage because, first, the results are merely based on statements of some officials, not involving all participants and not equal to actual thoughts, and second, assumptions on alternative explanatory variables could not be verified empirically due to a lack of data concerning reception capacity, political ideology, a systematic assessment of public pressure, the amount of administrative and operational difficulties etc. Nevertheless, the study *can* confirm that the importance attached to (an individual interpretation of) solidarity in the context of the 'refugee crisis' in 2015 and predominance of national interests varied among states and, thus, resulted in an overall suboptimal implementation of the decisions taken.

6 *CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK*

This paper examined which logics of action motivated MS (not) to decide on the two emergency relocation decisions of September 2015 at the height of the so-called 'refugee crisis' (and on following proposals for permanent relocation either as a separate draft or as part of the Dublin reform) as a type of cooperation which equals a direct redistribution of financial, administrative or social costs. To better understand the scope conditions of this scheme and its position among other measures taken in response to the crisis, the negotiations were embedded in the situational context of 2015/16. Given that relocation was frequently characterised as a programme demonstrating solidarity, yet has overall been implemented hesitantly, this study asked whether either a logic of expected consequences or a logic of appropriateness accounts for the decision. Of course, as emphasised in the previous section, this question cannot be answered in general since motives may vary across actors and even change for a single country over time and context, given that the pursuit of interests and institutional expectations regarding rules and norms are permanent competitors in determining behaviour.

The two logics were embedded in the theories of Collective Action/Public Goods and Normative Institutionalism to specify the logics' modes of actions and potential mechanisms. Whereas the former account has been repeatedly applied to different issues of asylum policy, the latter has hardly been employed in this context apart from the article by Thielemann (2003). Following his and Thomas' (2011) lead, four main hypotheses were inferred from these theories: first, applying classical Public Goods Theory, an exploitation, i.e. free-riding of states whose contribution seems marginal on those whose share is crucial to the whole good is expected. Alternatively, this pattern may differ if the collective good does not only provide public, but also private benefits to certain countries, i.e. constitute a joint product. In this case countries are predicted to contribute according to the total personal profit derived – for instance, from economic gains due to unhampered intra-EU/EFTA exports or a reduced share of asylum applications thanks to the involvement of other countries. Third, from the assumptions of Normative Institutionalism the hypothesis is derived that the institutional norm of solidarity as the basic justification of relocation is met through an ambitious and efficiently implemented redistribution scheme based on hosting and integration capacities in order to relief external border countries. Such commitment could either be the result of entrapment where MS have already committed themselves to this norm in the past and are now eager to react in a consistent manner or of cooperative bargaining based on mutual trust and

shared identities resulting in consensus-seeking and concessions even by actors with a formal ability to avoid additional burdens by building a veto minority. Finally, as an alternative or supplement to the solidarity hypothesis, states with a special commitment to the norm of humanitarian protection are expected to particularly support relocation in the discussions and via efficient implementation. Unfortunately, none of these hypotheses was confirmed statistically albeit the limitations of this approach have been pointed out. In particular, other private benefits including package deals and linkage to other policy areas as well as the alternative explanatory factors indicated by interviewers, research studies and media reports could not be tested in this way. Thus, future research should try to find ways to further explore and systemise these factors also with regard to other measures within the asylum field.

The analysis of the negotiation and implementation processes has revealed that domestic pressure (especially in the context of national elections), overall political culture and the government's ideological position mainly determine the latter's position towards the idea of relocation, while a country's ability and willingness to take part also depends on its socioeconomic situation, experience with hosting and integration, administrative and reception capacity against the backdrop of recent challenges related to increasing asylum application numbers as well as the extent of alternative contributions to the aims of CEAS, e.g. in form of unilateral border control or cooperation with third countries, and the perceived merit of main beneficiaries to solidarity. Whereas these elements impact on the rational development of national positions, the length of EU membership and thus exposure to socialisation processes as well as the skills and tactics of the Presidency and the extent and frequency of familiar contact and *esprit de corps* affect the strength of institutional mechanisms and thus define their potential to predominate contradicting interests. These conditions have also been identified by Niemann and Mak (2010, pp. 735) when examining the impact of norms on the Council Presidency, thus underlining the extensive relevance of these determinants. Yet, efficient implementation not only relies on good will, but to some extent also on operational obstacles, the degree of ineffectiveness built into the scheme itself and lack of trust and cooperation among participants – especially regarding security checks and perceptions.

Although solidarity was promoted most vocally by the main destination countries Germany, Austria and Sweden, thus indicating an instrumental use or rather strong coincidence of personal interests and practical implications of the norm, other MS like Luxembourg, France and Belgium accepted the additional national costs for relocation due to their strong European socialisation and therefore support for a pro-European solution instead of unilateral

uncoordinated actions. Still, their support for relocation was also facilitated by experience with reception and integration in their comparably heterogenous societies and arguably informed by an insurance guarantee. Such a logic is, however, unlikely to have motivated Ireland which had received only a small share of refugees in previous years and despite its formerly restrictive stance now promoted a solidary European response – with strong public support in its back. Similarly, Malta as the leading relocator in relative terms demonstrated strong will to help alleviate the humanitarian crisis expressed by its population and government – although having experienced only limited solidarity within the EUREMA pilot project. The diagnosis for the voluntarily participating EFTA states is more ambiguous as they are confirmed a pro-European stance, yet also benefit from the common market, uncontrolled exports and from an organised system that reduces the risk of an unscrutinised inflow of asylum-seekers into their own territory. Furthermore, agreement did not signify a political challenge for them as the topic was not salient with their societies and the total numbers were left at their discretion. In contrast, the Baltic states initially held a very sceptical position as the public was also critical. The reason why they could be persuaded supposedly less reflects their sense of solidarity, but their weak bargaining position and reputational fears of being blacklisted by the Commission – another way of how institutional constraints may inhibit the pursuit of national preferences. Their reliable performance in implementing the decisions might either signal a change in position due to positive experience with relocation or the ambition to demonstrate compliance with EU rule of law.

While these MS could be moved to agree, resistance from the V4 countries (apart from Poland) was not overcome despite repeated attempts to respect their preferences in a compromise. Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic opposed relocation even as an emergency measure due to concerns over national sovereignty, security and foremost their anti-immigration course. The fact that solidarity has not been translated into one collective understanding, but was rather interpreted differently in terms of scope, aims and practical implications and has not been met at several occasions in asylum policy and other areas in the past has weakened the normative logic and preserved room for diverging framings in accordance with different national interests. Thus, while both logics of action have informed the negotiations to some degree and reached different balances for each MS, the overall impact of solidarity seems limited, yet not without any effect. Now it is important to substantiate the conditions for the prevalence of either logic under certain circumstances to infer implications for the future development of CEAS, allowing for practical insights on how to design measures and negotiations which help institutional dynamics to overcome unilateral preferences.

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APPENDIX

1 LIST OF INTERVIEWS

Interviews conducted by myself

- Telephone interview with Official A, EP Research Service (06 June 2017, 40 min.)
- Telephone interview with Official B, Council (07 June 2017, 35 min.)
- Telephone interview with Official C, EP (08 June 2017, 30 min.)
- Telephone interview with Official D, Council (09 June 2017, 70 min.)
- Telephone interview with Official E, EP Research Service (12 June 2017, 65 min.)
- Telephone interview with Official F, EP Research Service (14 June 2017, 45 min.)
- Telephone interview with Official G, Council (27 June 2017, 65 min.)

Interviews conducted by Arne Niemann

- Interview with Official D, Council (Brussels, 06 October 2016, 75 min.)
- Interview with Official H, Council (Brussels, 07 October 2016, 45 min.)
- Interview with Official I, Council (Brussels, 07 October 2016, 45 min.)
- Interview with Official B, Council (Brussels, 10 October 2016, 50 min.)
- Interview with Official G, Council (Brussels, 31 October 2016, 50 min.)

2 *EXEMPLARY INTERVIEW GUIDE*

A. Introduction

1. What exactly was **your task** concerning the negotiations on relocation and the Dublin reform? To what extent were you **personally involved?**

B. The negotiation process (temporary relocation)

1. What was the **atmosphere** of negotiations like? Was there **room for informal exchanges**?
2. How would you **describe the process** to reach the final decision?
3. Were some MS or groups of MS **particularly active** in the negotiations?
4. What would you say were **reasons for activity** of MS?
5. What were the **conflict lines** during negotiations? Which aspects were **most controversial?**
6. Did any **compromises** evolve during the discussions?
7. Was there any **peer pressure** during the negotiations which **urged other members to agree**?
8. To what extent did **Commission and EP** positions influence the negotiations? Where did they manage to **influence the outcome?**
9. How would you **describe the Luxembourg Presidency** regarding this issue?
10. How was relocation **framed** during the discussions?

C. Member state positions

11. Do you think some states had a **bigger incentive to agree** on the scheme?
12. Why were **Sweden, Germany and Austria most favourable** of temporary relocation?
13. In your opinion, **why have non-EU members** like Switzerland, Norway and Liechtenstein **agreed to take part**?
14. What do you think about the **UK and Denmark opting out** of the relocation and resettlement decision?
15. How did **Visegrád countries explain their resistance** to the scheme?
16. Did Member States mention **specific domestic constraints** they were facing that made it difficult to adopt the decision?
17. What was the **nature of these constraints**? (political, economic, electoral, other)

18. Which MS have **altered their opinion** during the negotiations and why?
19. The idea of **redistribution** of asylum-seekers has already been **discussed before**. Did you notice **any change in position of EU members**?
20. Do you think **some MS** are **more committed to common norms** like solidarity, humanity and consensus than others?

D. Permanent relocation

21. Why was there **consensus** on temporary relocation, but **not on a permanent scheme**?
22. **How did MS react** to the Commission's proposal to integrate a **relocation corrective** into the new **Dublin** regulation?

E. Questions on the decision's content

23. Does the relocation and resettlement decision serve to **save Schengen and the Dublin system**?
24. To what extent were **norms** like solidarity, humanitarian obligations and trust **actually discussed**?
25. What are the **advantages of cooperation in asylum matters**?

F. The implementation process

26. How would you **explain the different outcomes** in implementing the decision for relocation?

G. Conclusion

27. Is there anything you would **like to add**?

3 EXCEL TABLE COMPILED FOR THE STATA ANALYSIS AND ITS SOURCES

Country	ID	Country_code	Asyl_app_2010	Asyl_app_2011	Asyl_app_2012	Asyl_app_2013	Asyl_app_2014	Asyl_app_2015	Asyl_app_2016	Asyl_app_mean
Austria	1	AUT	11.045	14.420	17.415	17.500	28.035	88.180	42.255	31.264,3
Belgium	2	BEL	26.080	31.910	28.075	21.030	22.710	44.760	18.280	27.549,3
Bulgaria	3	BGR	1.025	890	1.385	7.145	11.080	20.365	19.420	8.758,6
Croatia	4	HRV				1.075	450	210	2.225	990,0
Cyprus	5	CYP	2.875	1.770	1.635	1.255	1.745	2.265	2.940	2.069,3
Czech Republic	6	CZE	775	750	740	695	1.145	1.525	1.475	1.015,0
Denmark	7	DNK	5.065	3.945	6.045	7.170	14.680	20.970	6.180	9.150,7
Estonia	8	EST	35	65	75	95	155	230	175	118,6
Finland	9	FIN	3.085	2.915	3.095	3.210	3.620	32.345	5.605	7.696,4
France	10	FRA	52.725	57.330	61.440	66.265	64.310	75.750	84.270	66.012,9
Germany	11	DEU	48.475	53.235	77.485	126.705	202.645	476.620	745.155	247.188,6
Hungary	12	HUN	2.095	1.690	2.155	18.895	42.775	177.135	29.430	39.167,9
Iceland	13	ISL	40	75	115	125	170	345	1.125	285,0
Ireland	14	IRL	1.935	1.290	955	945	1.450	3.275	2.245	1.727,9
Latvia	15	LVA	65	340	205	195	375	330	350	265,7
Liechtenstein	16	LIE	105	75	70	55	65	150	80	85,7
Lithuania	17	LTU	495	525	645	400	440	315	430	464,3
Luxembourg	18	LUX	780	2.150	2.050	1.070	1.150	2.505	2.160	1.695,0
Malta	19	MLT	175	1.890	2.080	2.245	1.350	1.845	1.930	1.645,0
Netherlands	20	NLD	15.100	14.590	13.095	13.060	24.495	44.970	20.945	20.893,6
Norway	21	NOR	10.015	8.990	9.675	11.930	11.415	31.145	3.485	12.379,3
Poland	22	POL	6.540	6.885	10.750	15.240	8.025	12.190	12.305	10.276,4
Portugal	23	PRT	155	275	295	500	440	855	1.460	568,6
Romania	24	ROU	885	1.720	2.510	1.495	1.545	1.260	1.880	1.613,6
Slovakia	25	SK	540	490	730	440	330	330	145	429,3
Slovenia	26	SI	240	355	295	270	385	275	1.310	447,1
Spain	27	ESP	2.740	3.420	2.565	4.485	5.615	14.785	15.755	7.052,1
Sweden	28	SWE	31.850	29.650	43.855	54.270	81.180	162.550	28.790	61.735,0
Switzerland	29	CHE	15.425	23.615	28.400	21.305	23.555	39.515	27.140	25.565,0
United Kingdom	30	GBR	24.335	26.915	28.800	30.585	32.785	39.000	38.785	31.600,7

Country	Asyl_pop_2010	Asyl_pop_2011	Asyl_pop_2012	Asyl_pop_2013	Asyl_pop_2014	Asyl_pop_2015	Asyl_pop_2016	Asyl_pop_mean
Austria	1.322,5	1.721,8	2.071,2	2.070,6	3.295,6	10.281,9	4.032,1	3.542,2
Belgium	2.405,9	2.900,7	2.530,5	1.884,1	2.027,0	3.975,7	1.220,4	2.420,6
Bulgaria	138,1	120,8	189,0	980,8	1.529,2	2.827,6	1.982,7	1.109,8
Croatia				252,2	106,0	49,7	226,0	
Cyprus	3.509,8	2.107,8	1.896,7	1.449,4	2.033,8	2.674,1	2.266,8	2.276,9
Czech Republic	74,1	71,5	70,4	66,1	108,9	144,7	107,7	91,9
Denmark	915,1	709,5	1.083,2	1.279,8	2.608,7	3.705,1	934,7	1.605,2
Estonia	26,3	48,9	56,6	72,0	117,8	175,1	99,0	85,1
Finland	576,5	542,3	573,0	591,5	664,1	5.911,3	852,6	1.387,3
France	815,4	882,3	941,2	1.010,7	976,8	1.140,6	931,0	956,9
Germany	592,6	651,2	946,7	1.544,8	2.509,0	5.869,9	7.543,3	2.808,2
Hungary	209,2	169,2	217,0	1.906,9	4.330,6	17.973,1	2.726,9	3.933,3
Iceland	125,9	235,5	359,9	388,4	522,0	1.048,3	1.656,0	619,4
Ireland	425,3	282,2	208,4	205,8	314,8	707,5	341,3	355,1
Latvia	30,7	163,9	100,3	96,4	187,4	166,2	103,2	121,1
Liechtenstein	2.925,3	2.074,7	1.919,1	1.493,0	1.750,7	4.014,3	1.471,9	2.235,6
Lithuania	157,5	172,0	214,7	134,6	149,5	107,8	89,0	146,5
Luxembourg	1.553,6	4.200,5	3.905,9	1.992,4	2.092,1	4.449,7	2.646,7	2.977,3
Malta	422,7	4.554,3	4.981,5	5.327,9	3.173,6	4.297,3	3.237,5	3.713,5
Netherlands	911,0	876,0	782,7	778,3	1.455,5	2.660,8	874,2	1.191,2
Norway	2.061,5	1.827,1	1.940,5	2.361,8	2.234,7	6.028,3	500,3	2.422,0
Poland	172,0	180,9	282,4	400,4	211,1	320,7	258,4	260,8
Portugal	14,7	26,0	28,0	47,7	42,2	82,4	102,7	49,1
Romania	43,6	85,2	124,9	74,7	77,5	63,4	45,0	73,5
Slovakia	100,2	90,9	135,1	81,3	60,9	60,9	17,5	78,1
Slovenia	117,2	173,2	143,5	131,1	186,8	133,3	429,0	187,7
Spain	58,9	73,3	54,8	96,0	120,7	318,3	226,1	135,4
Sweden	3.409,8	3.149,0	4.624,7	5.679,2	8.416,9	16.676,3	2.287,3	6.320,5
Switzerland	1.981,2	3.000,6	3.570,2	2.650,2	2.893,9	4.796,9	2.594,8	3.069,7
United Kingdom	389,3	427,1	453,6	478,6	509,8	601,2	454,1	473,4

Legend: **Asyl_app_2016/2015/2014/2013/2012/2011/2010** – Absolute number of asylum applications in 2016/2015/2014/2013/ 2012/2011/2010
Asyl_app_mean – Average number of asylum applications between 2010 and 2016
Asyl_pop_2016/2015/2014/2013/2012/2011/2010 – Number of asylum applications per 1 million inhabitants in 2016/2015/2014/ 2013/2012/2011/2010
Asyl_pop_mean – Average number of asylum applications per 1 million inhabitants between 2010 and 2016

Country	Asyl_app_rate_2010	Asyl_app_rate_2011	Asyl_app_rate_2012	Asyl_app_rate_2013	Asyl_app_rate_2014	Asyl_app_rate_2015	Asyl_app_rate_2016	Asyl_app_rate_mean	Asyl_decis	Asyl_rec	Asyl_rec_rate
Austria	3,9%	4,2%	4,6%	3,8%	4,2%	6,3%	3,3%	4,3%	42.415	30.370	71,6%
Belgium	9,1%	9,3%	7,5%	4,5%	3,4%	3,2%	1,4%	5,5%	25.010	15.050	60,2%
Bulgaria	0,4%	0,3%	0,4%	1,5%	1,7%	1,5%	1,5%	1,0%	3.045	1.350	44,3%
Croatia				0,2%	0,1%	0,0%	0,2%		285	100	35,1%
Cyprus	1,0%	0,5%	0,4%	0,3%	0,3%	0,2%	0,2%	0,4%	1.975	1.300	65,8%
Czech Republic	0,3%	0,2%	0,2%	0,1%	0,2%	0,1%	0,1%	0,2%	1.305	435	33,3%
Denmark	1,8%	1,2%	1,6%	1,5%	2,2%	1,5%	0,5%	1,5%	10.430	7.125	68,3%
Estonia	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	190	130	68,4%
Finland	1,1%	0,9%	0,8%	0,7%	0,5%	2,3%	0,4%	1,0%	20.765	7.070	34,0%
France	18,4%	16,7%	16,4%	14,2%	9,7%	5,4%	6,5%	12,5%	87.485	28.755	32,9%
Germany	16,9%	15,5%	20,7%	27,2%	30,6%	34,2%	57,7%	29,0%	631.180	433.910	68,7%
Hungary	0,7%	0,5%	0,6%	4,1%	6,4%	12,7%	2,3%	3,9%	5.105	430	8,4%
Iceland	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,1%	0,0%	540	95	17,6%
Ireland	0,7%	0,4%	0,3%	0,2%	0,2%	0,2%	0,2%	0,3%	2.130	485	22,8%
Latvia	0,0%	0,1%	0,1%	0,0%	0,1%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	260	135	51,9%
Liechtenstein	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	80	40	50,0%
Lithuania	0,2%	0,2%	0,2%	0,1%	0,1%	0,0%	0,0%	0,1%	280	195	69,6%
Luxembourg	0,3%	0,6%	0,5%	0,2%	0,2%	0,2%	0,2%	0,3%	1.255	765	61,0%
Malta	0,1%	0,6%	0,6%	0,5%	0,2%	0,1%	0,1%	0,3%	1.435	1.190	82,9%
Netherlands	5,3%	4,3%	3,5%	2,8%	3,7%	3,2%	1,6%	3,5%	28.875	20.810	72,1%
Norway	3,5%	2,6%	2,6%	2,6%	1,7%	2,2%	0,3%	2,2%	19.345	12.780	66,1%
Poland	2,3%	2,0%	2,9%	3,3%	1,2%	0,9%	1,0%	1,9%	2.495	305	12,2%
Portugal	0,1%	0,1%	0,1%	0,1%	0,1%	0,1%	0,1%	0,1%	595	320	53,8%
Romania	0,3%	0,5%	0,7%	0,3%	0,2%	0,1%	0,1%	0,3%	1.295	805	62,2%
Slovakia	0,2%	0,1%	0,2%	0,1%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,1%	250	210	84,0%
Slovenia	0,1%	0,1%	0,1%	0,1%	0,1%	0,0%	0,1%	0,1%	265	170	64,2%
Spain	1,0%	1,0%	0,7%	1,0%	0,8%	1,1%	1,2%	1,0%	10.255	6.855	66,8%
Sweden	11,1%	8,6%	11,7%	11,7%	12,2%	11,7%	2,2%	9,9%	95.605	66.345	69,4%
Switzerland	5,4%	6,9%	7,6%	4,6%	3,6%	2,8%	2,1%	4,7%	22.605	13.190	58,3%
United Kingdom	8,5%	7,8%	7,7%	6,6%	4,9%	2,8%	3,0%	5,9%	31.020	9.935	32,0%

Country	GDP_absolut	Gov_defi	GDP_capita	Pop_2010	Pop_2011	Pop_2012	Pop_2013	Pop_2014	Pop_2015	Pop_2016
Austria	387,299	-1,6%	44.568,0	8.351.643	8.375.164	8.408.121	8.451.860	8.506.889	8.576.261	8.690.076
Belgium	470,179	-2,6%	41.567,9	10.839.905	11.000.638	11.094.850	11.161.642	11.203.992	11.258.434	11.311.117
Bulgaria	50,446	0,0%	7.051,7	7.421.766	7.369.431	7.327.224	7.284.552	7.245.677	7.202.198	7.153.784
Croatia	49,855	-0,8%	11.896,7	4.417.781	4.280.622	4.267.558	4.262.140	4.246.809	4.225.316	4.190.669
Cyprus	19,931	0,4%	23.494,7	819.140	839.751	862.011	865.878	858.000	847.008	848.319
Czech Republic	193,535	0,6%	18.337,9	10.462.088	10.486.731	10.505.445	10.516.125	10.512.419	10.538.275	10.553.843
Denmark	302,571	-0,9%	53.015,2	5.534.738	5.560.628	5.580.516	5.602.628	5.627.235	5.659.715	5.707.251
Estonia	23,476	0,3%	17.839,7	1.333.290	1.329.660	1.325.217	1.320.174	1.315.819	1.313.271	1.315.944
Finland	239,186	-1,9%	43.589,0	5.351.427	5.375.276	5.401.267	5.426.674	5.451.270	5.471.753	5.487.308
France	2.488,284	-3,4%	37.272,1	64.658.856	64.978.721	65.276.983	65.560.721	65.835.579	66.415.161	66.759.950
Germany	3.494,898	0,8%	42.529,6	81.802.257	81.751.602	81.843.743	82.020.578	80.767.463	81.197.537	82.175.684
Hungary	117,065	-1,8%	11.908,4	10.014.324	9.985.722	9.931.925	9.908.798	9.877.365	9.855.571	9.830.485
Iceland	19,444		58.473,1	317.630	318.452	319.575	321.857	325.671	329.100	332.529
Ireland	307,917	-0,6%	65.171,5	4.549.428	4.570.881	4.582.707	4.591.087	4.605.501	4.628.949	4.724.720
Latvia	27,945	0,0%	14.192,8	2.120.504	2.074.605	2.044.813	2.023.825	2.001.468	1.986.096	1.968.957
Liechtenstein				35.894	36.149	36.475	36.838	37.129	37.366	37.622
Lithuania	42,776	0,3%	14.808,8	3.141.976	3.052.588	3.003.641	2.971.905	2.943.472	2.921.262	2.888.558
Luxembourg	60,984	1,6%	105.829,3	502.066	511.840	524.853	537.039	549.680	562.958	576.249
Malta	10,463	1,0%	24.085,9	414.027	414.989	417.546	421.364	425.384	429.344	434.403
Netherlands	769,930	0,4%	45.345,7	16.574.989	16.655.799	16.730.348	16.779.575	16.829.289	16.900.726	16.979.120
Norway	376,268		72.210,4	4.858.199	4.920.305	4.985.870	5.051.275	5.107.970	5.166.493	5.210.721
Poland	467,350	-2,4%	12.309,3	38.022.869	38.062.718	38.063.792	38.062.535	38.017.856	38.005.614	37.967.209
Portugal	205,860	-2,0%	19.906,5	10.573.479	10.572.721	10.542.398	10.487.289	10.427.301	10.374.822	10.341.330
Romania	186,514	-3,0%	9.438,8	20.294.683	20.199.059	20.095.996	20.020.074	19.947.311	19.870.647	19.760.314
Slovakia	90,263	-1,7%	16.634,5	5.390.410	5.392.446	5.404.322	5.410.836	5.415.949	5.421.349	5.426.252
Slovenia	44,122	-1,8%	21.375,0	2.046.976	2.050.189	2.055.496	2.058.821	2.061.085	2.062.874	2.064.188
Spain	1.252,163	4,5%	26.959,6	46.486.619	46.667.174	46.818.219	46.727.890	46.512.199	46.449.565	46.445.828
Sweden	517,440	0,9%	52.526,6	9.340.682	9.415.570	9.482.855	9.555.893	9.644.864	9.747.355	9.851.017
Switzerland	662,483		79.557,2	7.785.806	7.870.134	7.954.662	8.039.060	8.139.631	8.237.666	8.327.126
United Kingdom	2.649,893	-3,0%	40.529,1	62.510.197	63.022.532	63.495.303	63.905.297	64.308.261	64.875.165	65.382.556

Asyl_app_rate_2016/2015/2014/2013/2012/2011/2010 – Share of the total EU/EFTA asylum applications in 2016/2015/2014/ 2013/2012/2011/2010
Asyl_app_rate_mean – Average share of the total EU/EFTA asylum applications between 2010 and 2016
Asyl_decis – Total first instance decisions on asylum applications in 2016
Asyl_rec – Total positive first instance decisions on asylum applications in 2016
Asyl_rec_rate – Percentage of positive first instance decisions as of all first instance decisions in 2016
GDP_absolut – Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in current prices (billion US Dollars), 2016 (estimation)
Gov_defi – General government deficit/surplus in % of GDP (million Euro), 2016

GDP_capita – GDP per capita in 2016 (US Dollars) (October 2016 estimation)
Pop_2016/2015/2014/2013/2012/2011/2010 – Total population in 2016/2015/2014/2013/2012/2011/2010 (as of 1 January)

Country	Nation	Foreign	Foreign_rate	Unemp_rate	ODA	ODA_rate
Austria	7.433.203	1.256.873	14,5%	6,0%	1.583,20	0,41%
Belgium	9.977.874	1.333.243	11,8%	7,8%	2.305,85	0,49%
Bulgaria	7.075.726	78.058	1,1%	7,6%		
Croatia	4.147.382	43.287	1,0%	13,3%	40,75	0,08%
Cyprus	701.051	147.268	17,4%	13,1%		
Czech Republic	10.077.497	476.346	4,5%	4,0%	261,14	0,13%
Denmark	5.244.104	463.147	8,1%	6,2%	2.371,56	0,78%
Estonia	1.117.693	198.251	15,1%	6,8%	43,90	0,19%
Finland	5.257.543	229.765	4,2%	8,8%	1.056,87	0,44%
France	62.351.387	4.408.563	6,6%	10,1%	9.501,27	0,38%
Germany	73.523.726	8.651.958	10,5%	4,1%	24.669,53	0,71%
Hungary	9.673.879	156.606	1,6%	5,1%	155,40	0,13%
Iceland	306.044	26.485	8,0%	3,0%	50,18	0,26%
Ireland	4.137.894	586.826	12,4%	7,9%	802,22	0,26%
Latvia	1.680.011	288.946	14,7%	9,6%	27,91	0,10%
Liechtenstein	24.847	12.775	34,0%			
Lithuania	2.869.876	18.682	0,6%	7,9%	57,61	0,13%
Luxembourg	307.074	269.175	46,7%	6,3%	383,72	0,63%
Malta	403.480	30.923	7,1%	4,7%	20,49	0,20%
Netherlands	16.078.619	900.501	5,3%	6,0%	4.988,22	0,65%
Norway	4.676.268	534.453	10,3%	4,7%	4.352,24	1,16%
Poland	37.811.676	155.533	0,4%	6,2%	603,33	0,13%
Portugal	9.952.599	388.731	3,8%	11,2%	339,61	0,16%
Romania	19.653.079	107.235	0,5%	5,9%	198,20	0,11%
Slovakia	5.360.412	65.840	1,2%	9,6%	107,12	0,12%
Slovenia	1.956.422	107.766	5,2%	8,0%	79,66	0,18%
Spain	42.027.670	4.418.158	9,5%	19,6%	4.095,81	0,33%
Sweden	9.068.184	782.833	7,9%	6,9%	4.870,44	0,94%
Switzerland	6.278.459	2.048.667	24,6%	4,7%	3.562,90	0,54%
United Kingdom	59.698.509	5.684.047	8,7%	4,8%	18.013,11	0,68%

Nation – People with the citizenship of the reporting country, 2016
Foreign – People without the citizenship of the reporting country (i.e. EU-28, non-EU-28, stateless and unknown), 2016
Foreign_rate – Percentage of people without the citizenship of the reporting country as of the entire population, 2016
Unemp_rate – Unemployment rate in 2016
ODA – Official development assistance in current prices (million US Dollars), 2016. Includes bilateral and multilateral ODA, net disbursements.
ODA_rate – Official development assistance as percentage of absolute GDP, 2016.
Intra_export_rate – The reporting country's percentage of total EU-28 goods export to EU/EFTA countries, 2016.
Reset_2016/2015/2014/2013/2012/2011/2010 – UNHCR resettlements to the reporting country in 2016/2015/2014/2013/ 2012/2011/2010.
Reset_mean – Average number of UNHCR resettlements to the reporting country between 2010 and 2016.

Country	Intra_export_rate	Reset_2010	Reset_2011	Reset_2012	Reset_2013	Reset_2014	Reset_2015	Reset_2016	Reset_mean
Austria	3,10%	0	0	0	4	269	642	81	142,3
Belgium	8,29%	2	19	1	100	32	276	456	126,6
Bulgaria	0,50%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,0
Croatia	0,26%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,0
Cyprus	0,02%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,0
Czech Republic	3,92%	48	0	25	1	4	0	22	14,3
Denmark	1,85%	386	606	324	471	332	486	315	417,1
Estonia	0,29%	0	0	0	0	0	0	11	1,6
Finland	1,02%	543	573	763	665	1.011	964	926	777,9
France	8,56%	217	42	84	100	52	700	1.328	360,4
Germany	22,71%	457	22	323	1.092	3.467	2.097	1.229	1.241,0
Hungary	2,38%	0	0	1	0	4	2	4	1,6
Iceland	0,09%	6	0	9	0	4	13	56	12,6
Ireland	1,88%	20	36	40	62	98	178	359	113,3
Latvia	0,25%	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	0,9
Liechtenstein		0	0	0	0	5	17	0	3,1
Lithuania	0,46%	0	0	0	0	0	0	25	3,6
Luxembourg	0,37%	0	0	0	0	28	49	52	18,4
Malta	0,03%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,0
Netherlands	12,44%	430	479	262	362	743	428	689	484,7
Norway	1,85%	1.088	1.258	1.137	938	1.188	2.220	3.149	1.568,3
Poland	4,68%	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0,3
Portugal	1,20%	24	28	21	6	14	39	12	20,6
Romania	1,37%	38	0	0	0	44	2	0	12,0
Slovakia	1,90%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,0
Slovenia	0,71%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,0
Spain	5,48%	0	0	80	0	30	92	288	70,0
Sweden	2,77%	1.789	1.896	1.483	1.832	1.812	1.808	1.864	1.783,4
Switzerland	3,04%	19	39	54	78	139	664	667	237,1
United Kingdom	5,68%	695	424	989	750	628	1.768	5.074	1.475,4

Country	Reset_ pop_2010	Reset_ pop_2011	Reset_ pop_2012	Reset_ pop_2013	Reset_ pop_2014	Reset_ pop_2015	Reset_ pop_2016	Reset_ pop_mean	Relo_act	Relo_aim	Relo_rate
Austria	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,5	31,6	74,9	9,3	16,6	0	1.953	0,0%
Belgium	0,2	1,7	0,1	9,0	2,9	24,5	40,3	11,2	206	3.812	5,4%
Bulgaria	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	29	1.302	2,2%
Croatia	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	19	968	2,0%
Cyprus	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	52	320	16,3%
Czech Republic	4,6	0,0	2,4	0,1	0,4	0,0	2,1	1,4	12	2.691	0,4%
Denmark	69,7	109,0	58,1	84,1	59,0	85,9	55,2	74,4	0		
Estonia	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	8,4	1,2	66	329	20,1%
Finland	101,5	106,6	141,3	122,5	185,5	176,2	168,8	143,2	901	2.078	43,4%
France	3,4	0,6	1,3	1,5	0,8	10,5	19,9	5,4	2.373	19.714	12,0%
Germany	5,6	0,3	3,9	13,3	42,9	25,8	15,0	15,3	615	27.536	2,2%
Hungary	0,0	0,0	0,1	0,0	0,4	0,2	0,4	0,2	0	1.294	0,0%
Iceland	18,9	0,0	28,2	0,0	12,3	39,5	168,4	38,2	0		
Ireland	4,4	7,9	8,7	13,5	21,3	38,5	76,0	24,3	109	600	18,2%
Latvia	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	3,0	0,4	148	481	30,8%
Liechtenstein	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	134,7	455,0	0,0	84,2	0		
Lithuania	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	8,7	1,2	185	671	27,6%
Luxembourg	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	50,9	87,0	90,2	32,6	176	557	31,6%
Malta	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	80	131	61,1%
Netherlands	25,9	28,8	15,7	21,6	44,1	25,3	40,6	28,9	1.098	5.947	18,5%
Norway	224,0	255,7	228,0	185,7	232,6	429,7	604,3	308,6	100		
Poland	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,1	0,0	0,0	0	6.182	0,0%
Portugal	2,3	2,6	2,0	0,6	1,3	3,8	1,2	2,0	720	2.951	24,4%
Romania	1,9	0,0	0,0	0,0	2,2	0,1	0,0	0,6	542	4.180	13,0%
Slovakia	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	9	902	1,0%
Slovenia	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	124	567	21,9%
Spain	0,0	0,0	1,7	0,0	0,6	2,0	6,2	1,5	398	9.323	4,3%
Sweden	191,5	201,4	156,4	191,7	187,9	185,5	189,2	186,2	39	3.766	1,0%
Switzerland	2,4	5,0	6,8	9,7	17,1	80,6	80,1	28,8	161		
United Kingdom	11,1	6,7	15,6	11,7	9,8	27,3	77,6	22,8	0		

Reset_pop_2016/2015/2014/2013/2012/2011/2010 – UNHCR-resettled persons per 1 million inhabitants in 2016/2015/2014/2013/2012/2011/2010
Reset_pop_mean – Average number of UNHCR-resettled persons per 1 million inhabitants between 2010 and 2016
Relo_act – Effective relocations from Greece and Italy (combined) by 06 December 2016
Relo_aim – Official objectives for relocation as set out in Council Decision (EU) 2015/1601 of 22 September 2015 and as amended by Council Decision 2016/1754 of 29 September 2016
Relo_rate – Percentage of effective relocations as of the official objective

Sources: own compilation based on data from

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Note: Please note that the distinct colours used to highlight the variable names serve to increase the clarity of the table by grouping variables together that are either connected by timeline or content-related proximity. Since most columns merely serve to calculate the variables actually included in the Stata analysis, the latter are highlighted in blue colour.

Finally, the rows related to certain countries have been highlighted because not all data were available in their case: first, for Bulgaria and Cyprus no data were provided on ODA and its percentage of GDP accordingly. Second, since Croatia was no member of the EU, there are no Eurostat reports on asylum applications before 2013. Third, Eurostat does not include data on the government deficit/surplus of non-EU members Iceland, Norway, Switzerland and Liechtenstein. As for Liechtenstein, there is no information available on its GDP (per capita), ODA (rate) and exports to the EU/EFTA in 2016 either. Fourth, the table does not provide any figures for a relocation objective or rate for those four non-EU states because they contribute on a voluntary basis to the scheme, whereas the same applies for Denmark and the UK because they have opted out of the relocation decisions and accordingly did not relocate any single person. Nevertheless, they are included in the table as their non-participation can be interpreted from the theoretical approaches taken in the analysis.

Due to the lack of data, different regression models have been produced in the Stata analysis for separate groups. Comparability of the respective case selection has been assured as far as possible.

4 DO-FILE FOR THE PRODUCTION OF THE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS WITH STATA

```
1   ********************************************************************************
2   *       Step 1: Import excel sheet "Data_relocation_2016_final.xlsx",
3   *               using the first row as variable names in lower case.
4   *       Step 2: The coding of the variables ranges from lines 27 to 133.
5   *       Step 3: The common distribution of dependent and independent variables by
6   *               visualisation runs from lines 134 to 436:
7   *                     A) dependent variable: relocation rate
8   *                     B) dependent variable: actual relocation
9   *       Step 4: Summary statistics and intercorrelations are produced in order to
10  *               test whether multiple regressions are possible with regard to
11  *               potential multicollinearity and how simple regressions relate to
12  *               each other (lines 437 to 453).
13  *       Step 5: The regression results presented in the paper are produced from
14  *               lines 454 to 1694 (end) and follow this pattern:
15  *               [The figure in brackets refers to the number of observations n.]
16  *
17  *              Simple regressions
18  *              A)      EU participants
19  *                      a.      Simple Models 1a-12a: Relocation rate in EU24 (23/22)
20  *                      b.      Simple Models 1b-12b: Actual relocation in EU24 (23/22)
21  *              B)      EU participants plus UK and Denmark
22  *                              Simple Models 1c-12c: Actual relocation in EU26 (25/24)
23  *              C)      EU/EFTA participants (without Liechtenstein)
24  *                              Simple Models 1-2d, 4-12d: Actual relocations
25  *                              in EU24 (23/22) + EFTA3
26  ********************************************************************************
27  *
28  *******Independent variables*****
29  *
30  **********************************************

31
32  *********************************
33  *1: Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
34  *********************************
35  tab gdp_absolut
36  label variable gdp_absolut "GDP in current prices"
37
38  *********************************
39  *2: GDP per capita
40  *********************************
41  tab gdp_capita
42  label variable gdp_capita "GDP per capita"
43
44  *********************************
45  *3: Government deficit/surplus
46  *********************************
47  tab gov_defi
48  label variable gov_defi "Government deficit/surplus"
49
50  *********************************
51  *4: Percentage of asylum applications/EU/EFTA total in 2016
52  *********************************
53  tab asyl_app_rate_2016
54  label variable asyl_app_rate_2016 "Asylum application rate (EU/EFTA) 2016"
55
56  *********************************
57  *5: Percentage of total intra-EU/EFTA export of goods
58  *********************************
59  tab intra_export_rate
60  label variable intra_export_rate "Intra-EU/EFTA export rate"
61
62  *********************************
63  *6: Population size 2016
64  *********************************
65  tab pop_2016
```

```
label variable pop_2016 "Population size 2016"

*********************************
*7: Unemployment rate
*********************************
tab unemp_rate
label variable unemp_rate "Unemployment rate"

*********************************
*8: Average number of asylum applications per 1 million inhabitants 2010-2016
*********************************
tab asyl_pop_mean
label variable asyl_pop_mean "Mean asylum applications per million inhabitants"

*********************************
*9: Average number of UNHCR Resettlements per 1 million inhabitants 2010-2016
*********************************
tab reset_pop_mean
label variable reset_pop_mean "Mean resettlement per million inhabitants"

*********************************
*10: Asylum recognition rate
*********************************
tab asyl_rec_rate
label variable asyl_rec_rate "Asylum recognition rate"

*********************************
*11: Official development assistance/GDP
*********************************
tab oda_rate
label variable oda_rate "Official development assistance as of GDP"

*********************************************
*
***********Control/additional variables*****
*
*********************************************

*********************************
*Percentage of foreigners/population
*********************************
tab foreign_rate
label variable foreign_rate "Non-nationals rate as of population"

*********************************
*Relocation aim for September 2017
*********************************
tab relo_aim
label variable relo_aim "Relocation aim 09/2017"

*********************************************
*
***********Dependent variables***
*
*********************************************

*********************************
*1: Percentage of actual relocations/aim 2017
*********************************
tab relo_rate
label variable relo_rate "Actual relocations as of aim 2017"

*********************************
*2: Number of effective relocations by 6 December 2016
*********************************
tab relo_act
label variable relo_act "Actual relocations by 12/2016"

```

```
134 ********************************************************************************
135 *
136 *Observing the common distribution by visualisation: relocation rate
137 *
138 ********************************************************************************
139
140 ******************************
141 *1 GDP in absolute terms and relocation rate
142 ******************************
143 twoway (scatter relo_rate gdp_absolut, mlabel (country_code))/*
144 */(lfit relo_rate gdp_absolut), ytitle (Relocation rate)
145
146 ******************************
147 *2 GDP per capita and relocation rate
148 ******************************
149 twoway (scatter relo_rate gdp_capita, mlabel (country_code))/*
150 */(lfit relo_rate gdp_capita), ytitle (Relocation rate)
151 *excluding Luxembourg
152 gen gdp_capita_wlux=gdp_capita if id!=18
153 twoway (scatter relo_rate gdp_capita_wlux, mlabel (country_code))/*
154 */(lfit relo_rate gdp_capita_wlux), ytitle (Relocation rate)
155 *excluding Malta
156 gen gdp_capita_wmlt=gdp_capita if id!=19
157 twoway (scatter relo_rate gdp_capita_wmlt, mlabel (country_code))/*
158 */(lfit relo_rate gdp_capita_wmlt), ytitle (Relocation rate)
159
160 ******************************
161 *3 Government deficit/surplus and relocation rate
162 ******************************
163 twoway (scatter relo_rate gov_defi, mlabel (country_code))/*
164 */(lfit relo_rate gov_defi), ytitle (Relocation rate)
165 *excluding Spain
166 gen gov_defi_wesp=gov_defi if id!=27
167 twoway (scatter relo_rate gov_defi_wesp, mlabel (country_code))/*
168 */(lfit relo_rate gov_defi_wesp), ytitle (Relocation rate)
169
170 ******************************
171 *4 Asylum application rate 2016 and relocation rate
172 ******************************
173 twoway (scatter relo_rate asyl_app_rate_2016, mlabel (country_code))/*
174 */(lfit relo_rate asyl_app_rate_2016), ytitle (Relocation rate)
175 *excluding Germany
176 gen asyl_app_rate_2016_wdeu=asyl_app_rate_2016 if id!=11
177 twoway (scatter relo_rate asyl_app_rate_2016_wdeu, mlabel (country_code))/*
178 */(lfit relo_rate asyl_app_rate_2016_wdeu), ytitle (Relocation rate)
179
180 ******************************
181 *5 Share of intra-EU/EFTA exports in goods
182 ******************************
183 twoway (scatter relo_rate intra_export_rate, mlabel (country_code))/*
184 */(lfit relo_rate intra_export_rate), ytitle (Relocation rate)
185
186 ******************************
187 *6 Population size 2016 and relocation rate
188 ******************************
189 twoway (scatter relo_rate pop_2016, mlabel (country_code)) /*
190 */(lfit relo_rate pop_2016), ytitle (Relocation rate)
191 *excluding France and Germany
192 gen pop_2016_wdf=pop_2016 if id!=10 & id!=11
193 twoway (scatter relo_rate pop_2016_wdf, mlabel (country_code)) /*
194 */(lfit relo_rate pop_2016_wdf), ytitle (Relocation rate)
195
196 ******************************
197 *7 Unemployment rate and relocation rate
198 ******************************
199 twoway (scatter relo_rate unemp_rate, mlabel (country_code)) /*
200 */(lfit relo_rate unemp_rate), ytitle (Relocation rate)
201
```

```
202  ******************************
203  *8 Mean asylum applications/million inhabitants and relocation rate
204  ******************************
205  twoway (scatter relo_rate asyl_pop_mean, mlabel (country_code)) /*
206  */(lfit relo_rate asyl_pop_mean), ytitle (Relocation rate)
207  *excluding Malta
208  gen asyl_pop_mean_wmlt=asyl_pop_mean if id!=19
209  twoway (scatter relo_rate asyl_pop_mean_wmlt, mlabel (country_code)) /*
210  */(lfit relo_rate asyl_pop_mean_wmlt), ytitle (Relocation rate)
211  *excluding Sweden
212  gen asyl_pop_mean_wswe=asyl_pop_mean if id!=28
213  twoway (scatter relo_rate asyl_pop_mean_wswe, mlabel (country_code)) /*
214  */(lfit relo_rate asyl_pop_mean_wswe), ytitle (Relocation rate)
215
216  ******************************
217  *9 Mean resettlements/million inhabitants and relocation rate
218  ******************************
219  twoway (scatter relo_rate reset_pop_mean, mlabel (country_code)) /*
220  */(lfit relo_rate reset_pop_mean), ytitle (Relocation rate)
221  *excluding Malta and Sweden
222  gen reset_pop_mean_wms=reset_pop_mean if id!=19 & id!=28
223  twoway (scatter relo_rate reset_pop_mean_wms, mlabel (country_code)) /*
224  */(lfit relo_rate reset_pop_mean_wms), ytitle (Relocation rate)
225  *excluding Malta, Finland and Sweden
226  gen reset_pop_mean_wmfs=reset_pop_mean if id!=9 & id!=19 & id!=28
227  twoway (scatter relo_rate reset_pop_mean_wmfs, mlabel (country_code)) /*
228  */(lfit relo_rate reset_pop_mean_wmfs), ytitle (Relocation rate)
229
230  ******************************
231  *10 Asylum recognition rate (first instance decisions) and relocation rate
232  ******************************
233  twoway (scatter relo_rate asyl_rec_rate, mlabel (country_code)) /*
234  */(lfit relo_rate asyl_rec_rate), ytitle (Relocation rate)
235  *excluding Hungary and Poland
236  gen asyl_rec_rate_whp=asyl_rec_rate if id!=12 & id!=22
237  twoway (scatter relo_rate asyl_rec_rate_whp, mlabel (country_code)) /*
238  */(lfit relo_rate asyl_rec_rate_whp), ytitle (Relocation rate)
239
240  ******************************
241  *11 Official development aid rate and relocation rate
242  ******************************
243  twoway (scatter relo_rate oda_rate, mlabel (country_code)) /*
244  */(lfit relo_rate oda_rate), ytitle (Relocation rate)
245  *excluding Malta
246  gen oda_rate_wmlt=oda_rate if id!=19
247  twoway (scatter relo_rate oda_rate_wmlt, mlabel (country_code)) /*
248  */(lfit relo_rate oda_rate_wmlt), ytitle (Relocation rate)
249  *excluding Sweden
250  gen oda_rate_wswe=oda_rate if id!=28
251  twoway (scatter relo_rate oda_rate_wswe, mlabel (country_code)) /*
252  */(lfit relo_rate oda_rate_wswe), ytitle (Relocation rate)
253
254  ******************************
255  *12 Percentage of non-nationals in population and relocation rate
256  ******************************
257  twoway (scatter relo_rate foreign_rate, mlabel (country_code)) /*
258  */(lfit relo_rate foreign_rate), ytitle (Relocation rate)
259  *excluding Luxembourg
260  gen foreign_rate_wlux=foreign_rate if id!=18
261  twoway (scatter relo_rate foreign_rate_wlux, mlabel (country_code)) /*
262  */(lfit relo_rate foreign_rate_wlux), ytitle (Relocation rate)
263
264  *excluding Malta and Finland
265  gen foreign_rate_wmf=foreign_rate if id!=9 & id!=19
266  twoway (scatter relo_rate foreign_rate_wmf, mlabel (country_code)) /*
267  */(lfit relo_rate foreign_rate_wmf), ytitle (Relocation rate)
268  *excluding Luxembourg, Malta and Finland
269  gen foreign_rate_wmfl=foreign_rate if id!=9 & id!=18 & id!=19
```

```
twoway (scatter relo_rate foreign_rate_wmfl, mlabel (country_code)) /*
*/(lfit relo_rate foreign_rate_wmfl), ytitle (Relocation rate)

*******************************
*13 Relocation aim for September 2017 and relocation rate
*******************************
twoway (scatter relo_rate relo_aim, mlabel (country_code)) /*
*/ (lfit relo_rate relo_aim), ytitle (Relocation rate)
*excluding Malta
gen relo_aim_wmlt=relo_aim if id!=19
twoway (scatter relo_rate relo_aim_wmlt, mlabel (country_code)) /*
*/ (lfit relo_rate relo_aim_wmlt), ytitle (Relocation rate)
*excluding Germany and France
gen relo_aim_wdf=relo_aim if id!=10 & id!=11
twoway (scatter relo_rate relo_aim_wdf, mlabel (country_code)) /*
*/ (lfit relo_rate relo_aim_wdf), ytitle (Relocation rate)
*excluding Germany, France and Malta
gen relo_aim_wdfm=relo_aim if id!=10 & id!=11 & id!=19
twoway (scatter relo_rate relo_aim_wdfm, mlabel (country_code)) /*
*/ (lfit relo_rate relo_aim_wdfm), ytitle (Relocation rate)

*******************************************************************************
*
*Observing the common distribution by visualisation: actual relocation
*
*******************************************************************************

*******************************
*1 GDP in absolute terms and actual relocation
*******************************
twoway (scatter relo_act gdp_absolut, mlabel (country_code))/*
*/(lfit relo_act gdp_absolut), ytitle (Actual relocations)
*excluding Germany and France
gen gdp_absolut_wdf=gdp_absolut if id!=10 & id!=11
twoway (scatter relo_act gdp_absolut_wdf, mlabel (country_code))/*
*/(lfit relo_act gdp_absolut_wdf), ytitle (Actual relocations)
*excluding UK and Denmark
gen gdp_absolut_wukd=gdp_absolut if id!=7 & id!=30
twoway (scatter relo_act gdp_absolut_wukd, mlabel (country_code))/*
*/(lfit relo_act gdp_absolut_wukd), ytitle (Actual relocations)

*******************************
*2 GDP per capita and actual relocation
*******************************
twoway (scatter relo_act gdp_capita, mlabel (country_code)) /*
*/(lfit relo_act gdp_capita), ytitle (Actual relocations)
*excluding Luxembourg
twoway (scatter relo_act gdp_capita_wlux, mlabel (country_code)) /*
*/(lfit relo_act gdp_capita_wlux), ytitle (Actual relocations)

*******************************
*3 Government deficit/surplus and actual relocation
*******************************
twoway (scatter relo_act gov_defi, mlabel (country_code)) /*
*/(lfit relo_act gov_defi), ytitle (Actual relocations)
*excluding France
gen gov_defi_wfra=gov_defi if id!=10
twoway (scatter relo_act gov_defi_wfra, mlabel (country_code)) /*
*/(lfit relo_act gov_defi_wfra), ytitle (Actual relocations)
*excluding Spain
twoway (scatter relo_act gov_defi_wesp, mlabel (country_code)) /*
*/(lfit relo_act gov_defi_wesp), ytitle (Actual relocations)

*******************************
*4 Asylum application rate 2016 and actual relocation
*******************************
twoway (scatter relo_act asyl_app_rate_2016, mlabel (country_code)) /*
*/(lfit relo_act asyl_app_rate_2016), ytitle (Actual relocations)
```

```
*excluding France and Germany
gen asyl_app_rate_2016_wdf=asyl_app_rate_2016 if id!=10 & id!=11
twoway (scatter relo_act asyl_app_rate_2016_wdf, mlabel (country_code)) /*
*/(lfit relo_act asyl_app_rate_2016_wdf), ytitle (Actual relocations)

*******************************
*5 Share of intra-EU/EFTA exports in goods
*******************************
twoway (scatter relo_act intra_export_rate, mlabel (country_code))/*
*/(lfit relo_act intra_export_rate), ytitle (Actual relocations)

*******************************
*6 Population size and actual relocation
*******************************
twoway (scatter relo_act pop_2016, mlabel (country_code)) /*
*/(lfit relo_act pop_2016), ytitle (Actual relocations)
*excluding France and Germany
twoway (scatter relo_act pop_2016_wdf, mlabel (country_code)) /*
*/(lfit relo_act pop_2016_wdf), ytitle (Actual relocations)

*******************************
*7 Unemployment rate and actual relocation
*******************************
twoway (scatter relo_act unemp_rate, mlabel (country_code)) /*
*/(lfit relo_act unemp_rate), ytitle (Actual relocations)

*******************************
*8 Mean asylum applications/million inhabitants and actual relocation
*******************************
twoway (scatter relo_act asyl_pop_mean, mlabel (country_code)) /*
*/(lfit relo_act asyl_pop_mean), ytitle (Actual relocations)

*******************************
*9 Mean resettlements/million inhabitants and actual relocation
*******************************
twoway (scatter relo_act reset_pop_mean, mlabel (country_code)) /*
*/(lfit relo_act reset_pop_mean), ytitle (Actual relocations)
*excluding France
gen reset_pop_mean_wfra=reset_pop_mean if id!=10
twoway (scatter relo_act reset_pop_mean_wfra, mlabel (country_code)) /*
*/(lfit relo_act reset_pop_mean_wfra), ytitle (Actual relocations)
*excluding Finland, Sweden and Norway
gen reset_pop_mean_wfsn=reset_pop_mean if id!=9 & id!=21 & id!=28
twoway (scatter relo_act reset_pop_mean_wfsn, mlabel (country_code)) /*
*/(lfit relo_act reset_pop_mean_wfsn), ytitle (Actual relocations)

*******************************
*10 Asylum recognition rate (first instance decisions) and actual relocation
*******************************
twoway (scatter relo_act asyl_rec_rate, mlabel (country_code)) /*
*/(lfit relo_act asyl_rec_rate), ytitle (Actual relocations)
*excluding France
gen asyl_rec_rate_wfra=asyl_rec_rate if id!=10
twoway (scatter relo_act asyl_rec_rate_wfra, mlabel (country_code)) /*
*/(lfit relo_act asyl_rec_rate_wfra), ytitle (Actual relocations)
*excluding Hungary and Poland
twoway (scatter relo_act asyl_rec_rate_whp, mlabel (country_code)) /*
*/(lfit relo_act asyl_rec_rate_whp), ytitle (Actual relocations)

*******************************
*11 Official development aid rate and actual relocation
*******************************
twoway (scatter relo_act oda_rate, mlabel (country_code)) /*
*/(lfit relo_act oda_rate), ytitle (Actual relocations)
*excluding France
gen oda_rate_wfra=oda_rate if id!=10
twoway (scatter relo_act oda_rate_wfra, mlabel (country_code)) /*
*/(lfit relo_act oda_rate_wfra), ytitle (Actual relocations)
```

```
*excluding Sweden and Norway
gen oda_rate_wsn=oda_rate if id!=21 & id!=28
twoway (scatter relo_act oda_rate_wsn, mlabel (country_code)) /*
*/(lfit relo_act oda_rate_wsn), ytitle (Actual relocations)

*****************************
*12 Percentage of non-nationals in population and actual relocation
*****************************
twoway (scatter relo_act foreign_rate, mlabel (country_code)) /*
*/(lfit relo_act foreign_rate), ytitle (Actual relocations)
*excluding France
gen foreign_rate_wfra=foreign_rate if id!=10
twoway (scatter relo_act foreign_rate_wfra, mlabel (country_code)) /*
*/(lfit relo_act foreign_rate_wfra), ytitle (Actual relocations)
*excluding Luxembourg
twoway (scatter relo_act foreign_rate_wlux, mlabel (country_code)) /*
*/(lfit relo_act foreign_rate_wlux), ytitle (Actual relocations)
*excluding France, Luxembourg, Switzerland and Liechtenstein
gen foreign_rate_wflsl=foreign_rate if id!=10 & id!=18 & id!=16 & id!=29
twoway (scatter relo_act foreign_rate_wflsl, mlabel (country_code)) /*
*/(lfit relo_act foreign_rate_wflsl), ytitle (Actual relocations)

*****************************
*13 Relocation aim for September 2017 and actual relocation
*****************************
twoway (scatter relo_act relo_aim, mlabel (country_code)) /*
*/ (lfit relo_act relo_aim), ytitle (Actual relocations)
*excluding Germany and France
twoway (scatter relo_act relo_aim_wdf, mlabel (country_code)) /*
*/ (lfit relo_act relo_aim_wdf), ytitle (Actual relocations)

*******************************************************************************
*
*General statistics and intercorrelations*
*
*******************************************************************************

*Summary statistics
sum gdp_absolut gdp_capita gov_defi asyl_app_rate_2016 intra_export_rate /*
*/ pop_2016 unemp_rate asyl_pop_mean reset_pop_mean asyl_rec_rate oda_rate /*
*/ foreign_rate relo_rate relo_aim relo_act

*Correlations between dependent variables
pwcorr gdp_absolut gdp_capita gov_defi asyl_app_rate_2016 intra_export_rate /*
*/ pop_2016 unemp_rate asyl_pop_mean reset_pop_mean asyl_rec_rate oda_rate /*
*/ foreign_rate
pwcorr relo_rate relo_aim relo_act

*******************************************************************************
*
***********Regression models*************
*
*******************************************************************************

*******************************************************************************
* Simple linear regressions
*******************************************************************************

*****************************
*Simple models 1a-12a: Relocation rate in EU 24 (23/22)
*Simple models 1b-12b: Actual relocation in EU 24 (23/22)
*Simple models 1c-12c: Actual relocation in EU 24 (23/22) + UK and Denmark
*Simple Models 1-2d, 4-12d: Actual relocations in EU24 (23/22) + EFTA3
*****************************

*****************************
*1 GDP
*****************************
```

```
*Simple model 1a
regress relo_rate gdp_absolut, beta
*Checking for influential data (outliers and leverage)
lvr2plot, mlabel(country_code)
predict r1a, rstudent
list relo_rate gdp_absolut country r1a if abs(r1a)>2
* Outlier: Malta
predict lev1a, leverage
list relo_rate gdp_absolut country lev1a if abs(lev1a) >(2*1+2)/24
* High leverage: Germany and France
dfbeta
list relo_rate gdp_absolut country _dfbeta_1 if abs(_dfbeta_1) >2/sqrt(24)
* Malta: -0.4287

*Simple model 1a.i: excluding Malta
regress relo_rate gdp_absolut if id!=19, beta
*No significant change
*Simple model 1a.ii: excluding Germany and France
regress relo_rate gdp_absolut if id!= 10 & id!=11, beta
*Changes t-test from p=0.212 to p=0.144 and beta from -0.26 to -0.32(negligible)

*Checking for heteroscedasticity
*Simple model 1a
regress relo_rate gdp_absolut, beta
kdensity r1a, normal
pnorm r1a
qnorm r1a
hettest
*insignificant
regress relo_rate gdp_absolut, beta robust

****************

*Simple model 1b
regress relo_act gdp_absolut if id!=7 & id!=13 & id!=21 & id<29, beta
*Checking for influential data (outliers and leverage)
lvr2plot, mlabel(country_code)
predict r1b, rstudent
list relo_act gdp_absolut country r1b if abs(r1b) >2
*Outliers: Germany and France
predict lev1b, leverage
list relo_act gdp_absolut country lev1b if abs(lev1b) >(2*1+2)/24
*High leverage: Germany and France
dfbeta
list relo_act gdp_absolut country _dfbeta_2 if abs(_dfbeta_2)>2/sqrt(24)
*Malta: -0.4287

*Simple model 1b.i: excluding Germany and France
regress relo_act gdp_absolut if id!=7 & id !=10 & id!=11 & id!=13 & id!=21 & /*
*/id<29, beta
*Changes t-test from p=0.002 to p=0.080 and beta from 0.61 to 0.38
*Simple model 1b.ii: excluding Malta
regress relo_act gdp_absolut if id!=7 & id!=13 & id!=19 & id!=21 & id<29, beta
*No significant change

*Checking for heteroscedasticity
*Simple model 1b
regress relo_act gdp_absolut if id!=7 & id!=13 & id!=21 & id<29, beta
kdensity r1b, normal
pnorm r1b
qnorm r1b
hettest
*significant!
regress relo_act gdp_absolut if id!=7 & id!=13 & id!=21 & id<29, beta robust
*Simple model 1b.i
regress relo_act gdp_absolut if id!=7 & id !=10 & id!=11 & id!=13 & id!=21 & /*
*/id<29, beta
hettest
```

```
*significant!
regress relo_act gdp_absolut if id!=7 & id !=10 & id!=11 & id!=13 & id!=21 & /*
*/id<29, beta robust

****************

*Simple model 1c
regress relo_act gdp_absolut if id!=13 & id!=21 & id!=29, beta
hettest
regress relo_act gdp_absolut if id!=13 & id!=21 & id!=29, beta robust

****************

*Simple model 1d
regress relo_act gdp_absolut if id!=7 & id!=30, beta
hettest
regress relo_act gdp_absolut if id!=7 & id!=30, beta robust

*****************************
*2 GDP per capita
*****************************
*Simple model 2a
regress relo_rate gdp_capita, beta
*Checking for influential data (outliers and leverage)
lvr2plot, mlabel(country_code)
predict r2a, rstudent
list relo_rate gdp_capita country r2a if abs(r2a) >2
*Outlier: Malta
predict lev2a, leverage
list relo_rate gdp_capita country lev2a if abs(lev2a)>(2*1+2)/24
*High leverage: Luxembourg
dfbeta
list relo_rate gdp_capita country _dfbeta_3 if abs(_dfbeta_3)>2/sqrt(24)
*Luxembourg: 0.6185

*Simple model 2a.i: excluding Malta
regress relo_rate gdp_capita if id!=19, beta
*Changes t-test from p=0.377 to p=0.183 and beta from 0.19 to 0.29
*Simple model 2a.ii: excluding Luxembourg
regress relo_rate gdp_capita if id!=18, beta
*Changes t-test from p=0.377 to p=0.853 and beta from 0.19 to 0.04

*Checking for heteroscedasticity
*Simple model 2a
regress relo_rate gdp_capita, beta
kdensity r2a, normal
pnorm r2a
qnorm r2a
hettest
*insignificant
regress relo_rate gdp_capita, beta robust
*Simple model 2a.i: excluding Malta
regress relo_rate gdp_capita if id!=19, beta
hettest
*insignificant
regress relo_rate gdp_capita if id!=19, beta robust
*Simple model 2a.ii: excluding Luxembourg
regress relo_rate gdp_capita if id!=18, beta
hettest
*insignificant
regress relo_rate gdp_capita if id!=18, beta robust

****************

*Simple model 2b
regress relo_act gdp_capita if id!=7 & id!=13 & id!=21 & id<29, beta
*Checking for influential data (outliers and leverage)
lvr2plot, mlabel(country_code)
```

```
predict r2b, rstudent
list relo_act gdp_capita country r2b if abs(r2b) >2
*Outlier: France
predict lev2b, leverage
list relo_act gdp_capita country lev2b if abs(lev2b) >(2*1+2)/24
*High leverage: Luxembourg
dfbeta
list relo_act gdp_capita country _dfbeta_4 if abs(_dfbeta_4)>2/sqrt(24)
*France: 0.4252; Luxembourg: -1.2143

*Simple model 2b.i: excluding France
regress relo_act gdp_capita if id!=7 & id!=10 & id!=13 & id!=21 & id<29, beta
*No significant change
*Simple model 2b.ii: excluding Luxembourg
regress relo_act gdp_capita if id!=7 & id!=13 & id!=18 & id!=21 & id<29, beta
*Changes t-test from p=0.468 to p=0.186 and beta from 0.16 to 0.28

*Checking for heteroscedasticity
*Simple model 2b
regress relo_act gdp_capita if id!=7 & id!=13 & id!=21 & id<29, beta
kdensity r2b, normal
pnorm r2b
qnorm r2b
hettest
*insignificant
regress relo_act gdp_capita if id!=7 & id!=13 & id!=21 & id<29, beta robust
*Simple model 2b.ii
regress relo_act gdp_capita if id!=7 & id!=13 & id!=18 & id!=21 & id<29, beta
hettest
*significant!
regress relo_act gdp_capita if id!=7 & id!=13 & id!=18 & id!=21 & id<29, beta /*
*/ robust

****************

*Simple model 2c
regress relo_act gdp_capita if id!=13 & id!=21 & id!=29, beta
hettest
regress relo_act gdp_capita if id!=13 & id!=21 & id!=29, beta robust

****************

*Simple model 2d
regress relo_act gdp_capita if id!=7 & id!=30, beta
hettest
regress relo_act gdp_capita if id!=7 & id!=30, beta robust

*****************************
*3 Government deficit/surplus
*****************************
*Simple model 3a
regress relo_rate gov_defi, beta
*Checking for influential data (outliers and leverage)
lvr2plot, mlabel(country_code)
predict r3a, rstudent
list relo_rate gov_defi country r3a if abs(r3a)>2
*Outliers: Malta and Finland
predict lev3a, leverage
list relo_rate gov_defi country lev3a if abs(lev3a) >(2*1+2)/24
* High leverage: Spain
dfbeta
list relo_rate gov_defi country _dfbeta_5 if abs(_dfbeta_5) >2/sqrt(24)
* Malta: 0.6646; Spain: -0.9537

*Simple model 3a.i: excluding Malta and Finland
regress relo_rate gov_defi if id!=9 & id!=19, beta
*No significant change
*Simple model 3a.ii: excluding Spain
```

```
678  regress relo_rate gov_defi if id!=27, beta
679  *Changes t-test from p=0.597 to p=0.245 and beta from 0.11 to 0.25
680
681  *Checking for heteroscedasticity
682  *Simple model 3a
683  regress relo_rate gov_defi, beta
684  kdensity r3a, normal
685  pnorm r3a
686  qnorm r3a
687  hettest
688  *insignificant
689  regress relo_rate gov_defi, beta robust
690  *Simple model 3a.ii
691  regress relo_rate gov_defi if id!=27, beta
692  hettest
693  *insignificant
694  regress relo_rate gov_defi if id!=27, beta robust
695
696  ****************
697
698  *Simple model 3b
699  regress relo_act gov_defi if id!=7 & id!=30, beta
700  *Checking for influential data (outliers and leverage)
701  lvr2plot, mlabel(country_code)
702  predict r3b, rstudent
703  list relo_act gov_defi country r3b if abs(r3b) >2
704  *Outlier: France
705  predict lev3b, leverage
706  list relo_act gov_defi country lev3b if abs(lev3b) >(2*1+2)/24
707  *High leverage: Spain
708  dfbeta
709  list relo_act gov_defi country _dfbeta_6 if abs(_dfbeta_6)>2/sqrt(24)
710  *France: -2.1996; Spain: 0.9350
711
712  *Simple model 3b.i: excluding France
713  regress relo_act gov_defi if id!=7 & id!=10 & id!=30, beta
714  *Significant change! Changes t-test from p=0.175 to p=0.954 and beta from /*
715  */-0.29 to -0.01
716  *Simple model 3b.ii: excluding Spain
717  regress relo_act gov_defi if id!=7 & id!=27 & id!=30, beta
718  *Changes t-test from p=0.175 to p=0.074 and beta from -0.29 to -0.38
719
720  *Checking for heteroscedasticity
721  *Simple model 3b
722  regress relo_act gov_defi if id!=7 & id!=30, beta
723  kdensity r3b, normal
724  pnorm r3b
725  qnorm r3b
726  hettest
727  *significant!
728  regress relo_act gov_defi if id!=7 & id!=30, beta robust
729  *Simple model 3b.i
730  regress relo_act gov_defi if id!=7 & id!=10 & id!=30, beta
731  hettest
732  *insignificant
733  regress relo_act gov_defi if id!=7 & id!=10 & id!=30, beta robust
734  *Simple model 3b.ii
735  regress relo_act gov_defi if id!=7 & id!=27 & id!=30, beta
736  hettest
737  *significant!
738  regress relo_act gov_defi if id!=7 & id!=27 & id!=30, beta robust
739
740  ****************
741
742  *Simple model 3c
743  regress relo_act gov_defi, beta
744  hettest
745  *significant!
```

```
regress relo_act gov_defi, beta robust

*****************************
*4 Percentage of asylum applications/EU/EFTA total in 2016
*****************************
*Simple model 4a
regress relo_rate asyl_app_rate_2016, beta
*Checking for influential data (outliers and leverage)
lvr2plot, mlabel(country_code)
predict r4a, rstudent
list relo_rate asyl_app_rate_2016 country r4a if abs(r4a)>2
*Outlier: Malta
predict lev4a, leverage
list relo_rate asyl_app_rate_2016 country lev4a if abs(lev4a) >(2*1+2)/24
*High leverage: Germany
dfbeta
list relo_rate asyl_app_rate_2016 country _dfbeta_7 if abs(_dfbeta_7) >2/sqrt(24)
*Germany: 11.7217

*Simple model 4a.i: excluding Malta
regress relo_rate asyl_app_rate_2016 if id!=19, beta
*No significant change
*Simple model 3a.ii: excluding Germany
regress relo_rate asyl_app_rate_2016 if id!=11, beta
*Changes t-test from p=0.325 to p=0.121 and beta from -0.21 to -0.33

*Checking for heteroscedasticity
*Simple model 4a
regress relo_rate asyl_app_rate_2016, beta
kdensity r4a, normal
pnorm r4a
qnorm r4a
hettest
*insignificant
regress relo_rate asyl_app_rate_2016, beta robust
*Simple model 4a.ii
regress relo_rate asyl_app_rate_2016 if id!=11, beta
hettest
*insignificant
regress relo_rate asyl_app_rate_2016 if id!=11, beta robust

***************

*Simple model 4b
regress relo_act asyl_app_rate_2016 if id!=7 & id!=13 & id!=16 & id!=21 & /*
*/ id<29, beta
*Checking for influential data (outliers and leverage)
lvr2plot, mlabel(country_code)
predict r4b, rstudent
list relo_act asyl_app_rate_2016 country r4b if abs(r4b) >2
*Outliers: France and Germany
predict lev4b, leverage
list relo_act asyl_app_rate_2016 country lev4b if abs(lev4b) >(2*1+2)/24
*High leverage: Germany and France
dfbeta
list relo_act asyl_app_rate_2016 country _dfbeta_8 if abs(_dfbeta_8)>2/sqrt(24)
*France: 2.9767; Germany: -5.1157

*Simple model 4b.i: excluding France and Germany
regress relo_act asyl_app_rate_2016 if id!=7 & id!=13 & id!=16 & id!=21 & /*
*/ id<29 & id!=10 & id!=11, beta
*Changes t-test from p=0.365 to p=0.820 and beta from 0.19 to -0.05

*Checking for heteroscedasticity
*Simple model 4b
regress relo_act asyl_app_rate_2016 if id!=7 & id!=13 & id!=16 & id!=21 & /*
*/ id<29, beta
kdensity r4b, normal
```

```
pnorm r4b
qnorm r4b
hettest
*insignificant
regress relo_act asyl_app_rate_2016 if id!=7 & id!=13 & id!=16 & id!=21 & /*
*/ id<29, beta robust
*Simple model 4b.i
regress relo_act asyl_app_rate_2016 if id!=7 & id!=13 & id!=16 & id!=21 & /*
*/ id<29 & id!=10 & id!=11, beta
hettest
*insignificant
regress relo_act asyl_app_rate_2016 if id!=7 & id!=13 & id!=16 & id!=21 & /*
*/ id<29 & id!=10 & id!=11, beta robust

****************

*Simple model 4c
regress relo_act asyl_app_rate_2016 if id!=13 & id!=16 & id!=21 & id!=29, beta
hettest
*insignificant
regress relo_act asyl_app_rate_2016 if id!=13 & id!=16 & id!=21 & id!=29, beta/*
*/ robust

****************

*Simple model 4d
regress relo_act asyl_app_rate_2016 if id!=7 & id!=30 & id!=16, beta
hettest
*insignificant
regress relo_act asyl_app_rate_2016 if id!=7 & id!=30 & id!=16, beta robust

*****************************
*5 Percentage of intra-EU/EFTA export of goods
*****************************
*Simple model 5a
regress relo_rate intra_export_rate, beta
*Checking for influential data (outliers and leverage)
lvr2plot, mlabel(country_code)
predict r5a, rstudent
list relo_rate intra_export_rate country r5a if abs(r5a)>2
*Outlier: Malta
predict lev5a, leverage
list relo_rate intra_export_rate country lev5a if abs(lev5a) >(2*1+2)/24
*High leverage: Germany (& Netherlands)
dfbeta
list relo_rate intra_export_rate country _dfbeta_9 if abs(_dfbeta_9) >2/sqrt(24)
*Germany: 0.9015; Malta: -0.5160

*Simple model 5a.i: excluding Malta
regress relo_rate intra_export_rate if id!=19, beta
*No significant change
*Simple model 5a.ii: excluding Germany
regress relo_rate intra_export_rate if id!=11, beta
*No significant change

*Checking for heteroscedasticity
*Simple model 5a
regress relo_rate intra_export_rate, beta
kdensity r5a, normal
pnorm r5a
qnorm r5a
hettest
*insignificant
regress relo_rate intra_export_rate, beta robust

****************


```

```
*Simple model 5b
regress relo_act intra_export_rate if id!=7 & id!=13 & id!=21 & id<29, beta
*Checking for influential data (outliers and leverage)
lvr2plot, mlabel(country_code)
predict r5b, rstudent
list relo_act intra_export_rate country r5b if abs(r5b) >2
*Outliers: France and Germany
predict lev5b, leverage
list relo_act intra_export_rate country lev5b if abs(lev5b) >(2*1+2)/24
*High leverage: Germany (& Netherlands)
dfbeta
list relo_act intra_export_rate country _dfbeta_10 if abs(_dfbeta_10)>2/sqrt(24)
*France: 1.3935; Germany: -2.5742

*Simple model 5b.i: excluding France and Germany
regress relo_act intra_export_rate if id!=7 & id!=13 & id!=21 & id<29 & id!=10/*
*/ & id!=11, beta
*No significant change

*Checking for heteroscedasticity
*Simple model 5b
regress relo_act intra_export_rate if id!=7 & id!=13 & id!=21 & id<29, beta
kdensity r5b, normal
pnorm r5b
qnorm r5b
hettest
*significant!
regress relo_act intra_export_rate if id!=7 & id!=13 & id!=21 & id<29, beta /*
*/ robust

**********

*Simple model 5c
regress relo_act intra_export_rate if id!=13 & id!=21 & id!=29, beta
hettest
*significant!
regress relo_act intra_export_rate if id!=13 & id!=21 & id!=29, beta robust

**********

*Simple model 5d
regress relo_act intra_export_rate if id!=7 & id!=30, beta
hettest
*significant!
regress relo_act intra_export_rate if id!=7 & id!=30, beta robust

**************************
*6 Population size 2016
**************************
*Simple model 6a
regress relo_rate pop_2016, beta
*Checking for influential data (outliers and leverage)
lvr2plot, mlabel(country_code)
predict r6a, rstudent
list relo_rate pop_2016 country r6a if abs(r6a)>2
*Outlier: Malta
predict lev6a, leverage
list relo_rate pop_2016 country lev6a if abs(lev6a) >(2*1+2)/24
*High leverage: Germany and France
dfbeta
list relo_rate pop_2016 country _dfbeta_11 if abs(_dfbeta_11) >2/sqrt(24)
*France: 0.4838; Malta: -0.5313

*Simple model 6a.i: excluding Malta
regress relo_rate pop_2016 if id!=19, beta
*Changes t-test from p=0.091 to 0.117. Yet, the difference is so minimal that
* Malta should not be excluded.
*Simple model 6a.ii: excluding France and Germany
```

```
regress relo_rate pop_2016 if id!=10 & id!=11, beta
*Changes t-test from p=0.117 to p=0.052 and beta from -0.34 to -0.42

*Checking for heteroscedasticity
*Simple model 6a
regress relo_rate pop_2016, beta
kdensity r6a, normal
pnorm r6a
qnorm r6a
hettest
*insignificant
regress relo_rate pop_2016, beta robust
*Simple model 6a.ii
regress relo_rate pop_2016 if id!=10 & id!=11, beta
hettest
*insignificant
regress relo_rate pop_2016 if id!=10 & id!=11, beta robust

****************

*Simple model 6b
regress relo_act pop_2016 if id!=7 & id!=13 & id!=16 & id!=21 & id<29, beta
*Checking for influential data (outliers and leverage)
lvr2plot, mlabel(country_code)
predict r6b, rstudent
list relo_act pop_2016 country r6b if abs(r6b) >2
*Outliers: France and Germany
predict lev6b, leverage
list relo_act pop_2016 country lev6b if abs(lev6b) >(2*1+2)/24
*High leverage: Germany and France
dfbeta
list relo_act pop_2016 country _dfbeta_12 if abs(_dfbeta_12)>2/sqrt(24)
*France: 2.9896; Germany: -1.9927

*Simple model 6b.i: excluding France and Germany
regress relo_act pop_2016 if id!=7 & id!=13 & id!=16 & id!=21 & id<29 & id!=10/*
*/ & id!=11, beta
*Changes t-test from p=0.003 to p=0.342 and beta from 0.58 to 0.21

*Checking for heteroscedasticity
*Simple model 6b
regress relo_act pop_2016 if id!=7 & id!=13 & id!=16 & id!=21 & id<29, beta
kdensity r6b, normal
pnorm r6b
qnorm r6b
hettest
*significant!
regress relo_act pop_2016 if id!=7 & id!=13 & id!=16 & id!=21 & id<29, beta /*
*/ robust
*Simple model 6b.i
regress relo_act pop_2016 if id!=7 & id!=13 & id!=16 & id!=21 & id<29 & id!=10/*
*/ & id!=11, beta
hettest
*insignificant
regress relo_act pop_2016 if id!=7 & id!=13 & id!=16 & id!=21 & id<29 & id!=10/*
*/ & id!=11, beta robust

****************

*Simple model 6c
regress relo_act pop_2016 if id!=13 & id!=16 & id!=21 & id!=29, beta
hettest
*significant!
regress relo_act pop_2016 if id!=13 & id!=16 & id!=21 & id!=29, beta robust

****************
```

```
*Simple model 6d
regress relo_act pop_2016 if id!=7 & id!=30 & id!=16, beta
hettest
*significant!
regress relo_act pop_2016 if id!=7 & id!=30 & id!=16, beta robust

*****************************
*7 Unemployment rate
*****************************
*Simple model 7a
regress relo_rate unemp_rate, beta
*Checking for influential data (outliers and leverage)
lvr2plot, mlabel(country_code)
predict r7a, rstudent
list relo_rate unemp_rate country r7a if abs(r7a)>2
*Outlier: Malta
predict lev7a, leverage
list relo_rate unemp_rate country lev7a if abs(lev7a) >(2*1+2)/24
*High leverage: Spain
dfbeta
list relo_rate unemp_rate country _dfbeta_13 if abs(_dfbeta_13) >2/sqrt(24)
*Malta: 0.7887; Spain: -0.5607

*Simple model 7a.i: excluding Malta
regress relo_rate unemp_rate if id!=19, beta
*No significant change
*Simple model 7a.ii: excluding Spain
regress relo_rate unemp_rate if id!=27, beta
*No significant change (change does only increase the overall high p for t-test)

*Checking for heteroscedasticity
*Simple model 7a
regress relo_rate unemp_rate, beta
kdensity r7a, normal
pnorm r7a
qnorm r7a
hettest
*insignificant
regress relo_rate unemp_rate, beta robust

***************

*Simple model 7b
regress relo_act unemp_rate if id!=7 & id!=13 & id!=21 & id<29, beta
*Checking for influential data (outliers and leverage)
lvr2plot, mlabel(country_code)
predict r7b, rstudent
list relo_act unemp_rate country r7b if abs(r7b) >2
*Outlier: France
predict lev7b, leverage
list relo_act unemp_rate country lev7b if abs(lev7b) >(2*1+2)/24
*High leverage: Spain
dfbeta
list relo_act unemp_rate country _dfbeta_14 if abs(_dfbeta_14)>2/sqrt(24)
*France: 0.7790

*Simple model 7b.i: excluding France
regress relo_act unemp_rate if id!=7 & id!=13 & id!=21 & id!=10 & id<29, beta
*No significant change (change does only increase the overall high p for t-test
*and decreases beta)
*Simple model 7b.ii: excluding Spain
regress relo_act unemp_rate if id!=7 & id!=13 & id!=21 & id!=27 & id<29, beta
*No significant change

*Checking for heteroscedasticity
*Simple model 7b
regress relo_act unemp_rate if id!=7 & id!=13 & id!=21 & id<29, beta
kdensity r6b, normal
```

```
pnorm r6b
qnorm r6b
hettest
*insignificant
regress relo_act unemp_rate if id!=7 & id!=13 & id!=21 & id<29, beta robust

****************

*Simple model 7c
regress relo_act unemp_rate if id!=13 & id!=21 & id!=29, beta
hettest
*insignificant
regress relo_act unemp_rate if id!=13 & id!=21 & id!=29, beta robust

****************

*Simple model 7d
regress relo_act unemp_rate if id!=7 & id!=30, beta
hettest
*insignificant
regress relo_act unemp_rate if id!=7 & id!=30, beta robust

*****************************
*8 Average number of asylum applications per 1 million inhabitants 2010-2016
*****************************
*Simple model 8a (without Croatia)
regress relo_rate asyl_pop_mean, beta
*Checking for influential data (outliers and leverage)
lvr2plot, mlabel(country_code)
predict r8a, rstudent
list relo_rate asyl_pop_mean country r8a if abs(r8a)>2
*Outlier: Malta
predict lev8a, leverage
list relo_rate asyl_pop_mean country lev8a if abs(lev8a) >(2*1+2)/23
*High leverage: Sweden
dfbeta
list relo_rate asyl_pop_mean country _dfbeta_15 if abs(_dfbeta_15) >2/sqrt(23)
*Malta: 1.1695; Spain: -0.7738

*Simple model 8a.i: excluding Malta
regress relo_rate asyl_pop_mean if id!=19, beta
*Significant change! Changes t-test from p=0.846 to p=0.187 and beta from -0.04
*to -0.29
*Simple model 8a.ii: excluding Sweden
regress relo_rate asyl_pop_mean if id!=28, beta
*Changes t-test from p=0.846 to p=0.654 and beta from -0.04 to 0.10

*Checking for heteroscedasticity
*Simple model 8a
regress relo_rate asyl_pop_mean, beta
kdensity r8a, normal
pnorm r8a
qnorm r8a
hettest
*significant
regress relo_rate asyl_pop_mean, beta robust
*Simple model 8a.i
regress relo_rate asyl_pop_mean if id!=19, beta
hettest
*insignificant
regress relo_rate asyl_pop_mean if id!=19, beta robust
*Simple model 8a.ii
regress relo_rate asyl_pop_mean if id!=28, beta
hettest
*significant!
regress relo_rate asyl_pop_mean if id!=28, beta robust
```

```
1154    ***************
1155
1156    *Simple model 8b (without Croatia)
1157    regress relo_act asyl_pop_mean if id!=7 & id!=13 & id!=16 & id!=21 & id<29, /*
1158    */ beta
1159    *Checking for influential data (outliers and leverage)
1160    lvr2plot, mlabel(country_code)
1161    predict r8b, rstudent
1162    list relo_act asyl_pop_mean country r8b if abs(r8b) >2
1163    *Outlier: France
1164    predict lev8b, leverage
1165    list relo_act asyl_pop_mean country lev8b if abs(lev8b) >(2*1+2)/23
1166    *High leverage: Sweden
1167    dfbeta
1168    list relo_act asyl_pop_mean country _dfbeta_16 if abs(_dfbeta_16)>2/sqrt(23)
1169    *France: -0.4305
1170
1171    *Simple model 8b.i: excluding France
1172    regress relo_act asyl_pop_mean if id!=7 & id!=13 & id!=16 & id!=21 & id<29 /*
1173    */ & id!=10, beta
1174    *No significant change
1175    *Simple model 8b.ii: excluding Sweden
1176    regress relo_act asyl_pop_mean if id!=7 & id!=13 & id!=16 & id!=21 & id<29 /*
1177    */ & id!=28, beta
1178    *No significant change (change does only increase the overall high p for t-test
1179    *and decreases beta)
1180
1181    *Checking for heteroscedasticity
1182    *Simple model 8b
1183    regress relo_act asyl_pop_mean if id!=7 & id!=13 & id!=16 & id!=21 & id<29, /*
1184    */ beta
1185    kdensity r8b, normal
1186    pnorm r8b
1187    qnorm r8b
1188    hettest
1189    *insignificant
1190    regress relo_act asyl_pop_mean if id!=7 & id!=13 & id!=16 & id!=21 & id<29, /*
1191    */ beta robust
1192
1193    ***************
1194
1195    *Simple model 8c (without Croatia)
1196    regress relo_act asyl_pop_mean if id!=13 & id!=16 & id!=21 & id!=29, beta
1197    hettest
1198    *insignificant
1199    regress relo_act asyl_pop_mean if id!=13 & id!=16 & id!=21 & id!=29, beta robust
1200
1201    ***************
1202
1203    *Simple model 8d (without Croatia)
1204    regress relo_act asyl_pop_mean if id!=7 & id!=30 & id!=16, beta
1205    hettest
1206    *insignificant
1207    regress relo_act asyl_pop_mean if id!=7 & id!=30 & id!=16, beta robust
1208
1209    ******************************
1210    *9 Average number of resettlements per 1 million inhabitants 2010-2016
1211    ******************************
1212    *Simple model 9a
1213    regress relo_rate reset_pop_mean, beta
1214    *Checking for influential data (outliers and leverage)
1215    lvr2plot, mlabel(country_code)
1216    predict r9a, rstudent
1217    list relo_rate reset_pop_mean country r9a if abs(r9a)>2
1218    *Outliers: Malta and Sweden
1219    predict lev9a, leverage
1220    list relo_rate reset_pop_mean country lev9a if abs(lev9a) >(2*1+2)/24
1221    *High leverage: Finland and Sweden
```

```
dfbeta
list relo_rate reset_pop_mean country _dfbeta_17 if abs(_dfbeta_17) >2/sqrt(24)
*Finland: 1.3795; Sweden: -2.4829

*Despite these influential data, no model specification is taken because the
*remaining variance concerning the independent variable is otherwise too minimal
*to produce robust outcomes.

*Checking for heteroscedasticity
*Simple model 9a
regress relo_rate reset_pop_mean, beta
kdensity r9a, normal
pnorm r9a
qnorm r9a
hettest
*insignificant
regress relo_rate reset_pop_mean, beta robust

****************

*Simple model 9b
regress relo_act reset_pop_mean if id!=7 & id!=13 & id!=16 & id!=21 & id<29, /*
*/ beta
*Checking for influential data (outliers and leverage)
lvr2plot, mlabel(country_code)
predict r9b, rstudent
list relo_act reset_pop_mean country r9b if abs(r9b) >2
*Outlier: France
predict lev9b, leverage
list relo_act reset_pop_mean country lev9b if abs(lev9b) >(2*1+2)/24
*High leverage: Finland and Sweden
dfbeta
list relo_act reset_pop_mean country _dfbeta_18 if abs(_dfbeta_18)>2/sqrt(24)
*Finland: 0.7135; France: -0.4401; Sweden: -1.626

*Simple model 9b.i: excluding France
regress relo_act reset_pop_mean if id!=7 & id!=13 & id!=16 & id!=21 & id<29 /*
*/ & id!=10, beta
*Changes t-test from p=0.693 to p=0.272 and beta from 0.08 to 0.24
*Simple model 9b.ii: excluding Finland and Sweden
regress relo_act reset_pop_mean if id!=7 & id!=13 & id!=16 & id!=21 & id<29 /*
*/ & id!=9 & id!=28, beta
*Changes t-test from p=0.693 to 0.399 and beta from 0.08 to 0.19

*Checking for heteroscedasticity
*Simple model 9b
regress relo_act reset_pop_mean if id!=7 & id!=13 & id!=16 & id!=21 & id<29, /*
*/ beta
kdensity r9b, normal
pnorm r9b
qnorm r9b
hettest
*insignificant
regress relo_act reset_pop_mean if id!=7 & id!=13 & id!=16 & id!=21 & id<29, /*
*/ beta robust
*Simple model 9b.i
regress relo_act reset_pop_mean if id!=7 & id!=13 & id!=16 & id!=21 & id<29 /*
*/ & id!=10, beta
hettest
*significant!
regress relo_act reset_pop_mean if id!=7 & id!=13 & id!=16 & id!=21 & id<29 /*
*/ & id!=10, beta robust
*Simple model 9b.ii
regress relo_act reset_pop_mean if id!=7 & id!=13 & id!=16 & id!=21 & id<29 /*
*/ & id!=9 & id!=28, beta
hettest
*insignificant
regress relo_act reset_pop_mean if id!=7 & id!=13 & id!=16 & id!=21 & id<29 /*
```

```
*/ & id!=9 & id!=28, beta robust

***************

*Simple model 9c
regress relo_act reset_pop_mean if id!=13 & id!=16 & id!=21 & id!=29, beta
hettest
*insignificant
regress relo_act reset_pop_mean if id!=13 & id!=16 & id!=21 & id!=29, beta /*
*/ robust

***************

*Simple model 9d
regress relo_act reset_pop_mean if id!=7 & id!=30 & id!=16, beta
hettest
*insignificant
regress relo_act reset_pop_mean if id!=7 & id!=30 & id!=16, beta robust

*******************************
*10 Asylum recognition rate
*******************************
*Simple model 10a
regress relo_rate asyl_rec_rate, beta
*Checking for influential data (outliers and leverage)
lvr2plot, mlabel(country_code)
predict r10a, rstudent
list relo_rate asyl_rec_rate country r10a if abs(r10a)>2
*Outliers: Malta and Finland
predict lev10a, leverage
list relo_rate asyl_rec_rate country lev10a if abs(lev10a) >(2*1+2)/24
*High leverage: Hungary and Poland
dfbeta
list relo_rate asyl_rec_rate country _dfbeta_19 if abs(_dfbeta_19) >2/sqrt(24)
*Finland: -0.4776; Malta: 1.020; Slovakia: -0.4253

*Simple model 10a.i: excluding Malta and Finland
regress relo_rate asyl_rec_rate if id!=9 & id!=19, beta
*No significant change
*Simple model 10a.ii: excluding Hungary and Poland
regress relo_rate asyl_rec_rate if id!=12 & id!=22, beta
*Changes t-test from p=0.246 to p=0.705 and beta from 0.25 to 0.09

*Checking for heteroscedasticity
*Simple model 10a
regress relo_rate asyl_rec_rate, beta
kdensity r10a, normal
pnorm r10a
qnorm r10a
hettest
*insignificant
regress relo_rate asyl_rec_rate, beta robust
*Simple model 10a.ii
regress relo_rate asyl_rec_rate if id!=12 & id!=22, beta
hettest
*insignificant
regress relo_rate asyl_rec_rate if id!=12 & id!=22, beta robust

*****************

*Simple model 10b
regress relo_act asyl_rec_rate if id!=7 & id!=13 & id!=16 & id!=21 & id<29, /*
*/ beta
*Checking for influential data (outliers and leverage)
lvr2plot, mlabel(country_code)
predict r10b, rstudent
list relo_act asyl_rec_rate country r10b if abs(r10b) >2
*Outlier: France
```

```
predict lev10b, leverage
list relo_act asyl_rec_rate country lev10b if abs(lev10b) >(2*1+2)/24
*High leverage: Hungary and Poland
dfbeta
list relo_act asyl_rec_rate country _dfbeta_20 if abs(_dfbeta_20)>2/sqrt(24)
*France: -1.4107; Hungary: 0.4644

*Simple model 10b.i: excluding France
regress relo_act asyl_rec_rate if id!=7 & id!=13 & id!=16 & id!=21 & id<29 /*
*/ & id!=10, beta
*Changes t-test from p=0.683 to 0.496 and beta from -0.09 to 0.15
*Simple model 10b.ii: excluding Hungary and Poland
regress relo_act asyl_rec_rate if id!=7 & id!=13 & id!=16 & id!=21 & id<29 /*
*/ & id!=12 & id!=22, beta
*Changes t-test from p=0.683 to 0.217 and beta from -0.09 to -0.27

*Checking for heteroscedasticity
*Simple model 10b
regress relo_act asyl_rec_rate if id!=7 & id!=13 & id!=16 & id!=21 & id<29, /*
*/ beta
kdensity r10b, normal
pnorm r10b
qnorm r10b
hettest
*significant!
regress relo_act asyl_rec_rate if id!=7 & id!=13 & id!=16 & id!=21 & id<29, /*
*/ beta robust
*Simple model 10b.i
regress relo_act asyl_rec_rate if id!=7 & id!=13 & id!=16 & id!=21 & id<29 /*
*/ & id!=10, beta
hettest
*insignificant
regress relo_act asyl_rec_rate if id!=7 & id!=13 & id!=16 & id!=21 & id<29 /*
*/ & id!=10, beta robust
*Simple model 10b.ii
regress relo_act asyl_rec_rate if id!=7 & id!=13 & id!=16 & id!=21 & id<29 /*
*/ & id!=12 & id!=22, beta
hettest
*significant!
regress relo_act asyl_rec_rate if id!=7 & id!=13 & id!=16 & id!=21 & id<29 /*
*/ & id!=12 & id!=22, beta robust

*****************

*Simple model 10c
regress relo_act asyl_rec_rate if id!=13 & id!=16 & id!=21 & id!=29, beta
hettest
*significant
regress relo_act asyl_rec_rate if id!=13 & id!=16 & id!=21 & id!=29, beta robust

*****************

*Simple model 10d
regress relo_act asyl_rec_rate if id!=7 & id!=30 & id!=16, beta
hettest
*significant!
regress relo_act asyl_rec_rate if id!=7 & id!=30 & id!=16, beta robust

******************************
*11 Official development assistance/GDP
******************************
*Simple model 11a (without Bulgaria and Cyprus)
regress relo_rate oda_rate, beta
*Checking for influential data (outliers and leverage)
lvr2plot, mlabel(country_code)
predict r11a, rstudent
list relo_rate oda_rate country r11a if abs(r11a)>2
*Outlier: Malta
```

```
predict lev11a, leverage
list relo_rate oda_rate country lev11a if abs(lev11a) >(2*1+2)/22
*High leverage: Sweden
dfbeta
list relo_rate oda_rate country _dfbeta_21 if abs(_dfbeta_21) >2/sqrt(22)
*Sweden: -0.5757

*Simple model 11a.i: excluding Malta
regress relo_rate oda_rate if id!=19, beta
*No significant change (only increases the overall high p for t-test)
*Simple model 11a.ii: excluding Sweden
regress relo_rate oda_rate if id!=28, beta
*Changes t-test from p=0.702 to p=0.879 and beta from -0.09 to 0.04

*Checking for heteroscedasticity
*Simple model 11a
regress relo_rate oda_rate, beta
kdensity r11a, normal
pnorm r11a
qnorm r11a
hettest
*insignificant
regress relo_rate oda_rate, beta robust
*Simple model 11a.ii
regress relo_rate oda_rate if id!=28, beta
hettest
*insignificant
regress relo_rate oda_rate if id!=28, beta robust

*****************

*Simple model 11b (without Bulgaria and Cyprus)
regress relo_act oda_rate if id!=7 & id!=13 & id!=21 & id<29, beta
*Checking for influential data (outliers and leverage)
lvr2plot, mlabel(country_code)
predict r11b, rstudent
list relo_act oda_rate country r11b if abs(r11b) >2
*Outlier: France
predict lev11b, leverage
list relo_act oda_rate country lev11b if abs(lev11b) >(2*1+2)/22
*High leverage: Sweden
dfbeta
list relo_act oda_rate country _dfbeta_22 if abs(_dfbeta_22)>2/sqrt(22)
*Sweden: -1.1524

*Simple model 11b.i: excluding France
regress relo_act oda_rate if id!=7 & id!=13 & id!=21 & id<29 & id!=10, beta
*Changes t-test from p=0.276 to 0.141 and beta from 0.24 to 0.33
*Simple model 11b.ii: excluding Sweden
regress relo_act oda_rate if id!=7 & id!=13 & id!=21 & id<29 & id!=28, beta
*Changes t-test from p=0.276 to 0.076 and beta from 0.24 to 0.40

*Checking for heteroscedasticity
*Simple model 11b
regress relo_act oda_rate if id!=7 & id!=13 & id!=21 & id<29, beta
kdensity r11b, normal
pnorm r11b
qnorm r11b
hettest
*insignificant
regress relo_act oda_rate if id!=7 & id!=13 & id!=21 & id<29, beta robust
*Simple model 11b.i
regress relo_act oda_rate if id!=7 & id!=13 & id!=21 & id<29 & id!=10, beta
hettest
*significant!
regress relo_act oda_rate if id!=7 & id!=13 & id!=21 & id<29 & id!=10, beta /*
*/ robust
*Simple model 11b.ii
```

```
regress relo_act oda_rate if id!=7 & id!=13 & id!=21 & id<29 & id!=28, beta
hettest
*significant!
regress relo_act oda_rate if id!=7 & id!=13 & id!=21 & id<29 & id!=28, beta /*
*/ robust

*****************

*Simple model 11c (without Bulgaria and Cyprus)
regress relo_act oda_rate if id!=13 & id!=21 & id!=29, beta
hettest
*insignificant
regress relo_act oda_rate if id!=13 & id!=21 & id!=29, beta robust

*****************

*Simple model 11d (without Bulgaria and Cyprus)
regress relo_act oda_rate if id!=7 & id!=30, beta
hettest
*insignificant
regress relo_act oda_rate if id!=7 & id!=30, beta robust

*********************************
*12 Percentage of foreigners/population
*********************************
*Simple model 12a
regress relo_rate foreign_rate, beta
*Checking for influential data (outliers and leverage)
lvr2plot, mlabel(country_code)
predict r12a, rstudent
list relo_rate foreign_rate country r12a if abs(r12a)>2
*Outliers: Malta and Finland
predict lev12a, leverage
list relo_rate foreign_rate country lev12a if abs(lev12a) >(2*1+2)/24
*High leverage: Luxembourg
dfbeta
list relo_rate foreign_rate country _dfbeta_23 if abs(_dfbeta_23) >2/sqrt(24)
*none

*Simple model 11a.i: excluding Malta and Finland
regress relo_rate foreign_rate if id!=9 & id!=19, beta
*Significant change! Changes t-test from p=0.245 to 0.032 and beta from 0.25 to
* 0.46. Yet, the model is not robust, because the effect is due to the leverage
* of Luxembourg.
*Simple model 11a.ii: excluding Luxembourg
regress relo_rate foreign_rate if id!=18, beta
*Changes t-test from p=0.246 to p=0.617 and beta from 0.25 to 0.11
*Simple model 11a.iii: excluding Luxembourg, Malta and Finland
regress relo_rate foreign_rate if id!=9 & id!=18 & id!=19, beta
*No significant change

*Checking for heteroscedasticity
*Simple model 11a
regress relo_rate foreign_rate, beta
kdensity r11a, normal
pnorm r11a
qnorm r11a
hettest
*insignificant
regress relo_rate foreign_rate, beta robust
*Simple model 11a.ii
regress relo_rate foreign_rate if id!=18, beta
hettest
*insignificant
regress relo_rate foreign_rate if id!=18, beta robust

*****************

```

```
*Simple model 12b
regress relo_act foreign_rate if id!=7 & id!=13 & id!=16 & id!=21 & id<29, beta
*Checking for influential data (outliers and leverage)
lvr2plot, mlabel(country_code)
predict r12b, rstudent
list relo_act foreign_rate country r12b if abs(r12b) >2
*Outlier: France
predict lev12b, leverage
list relo_act foreign_rate country lev12b if abs(lev12b) >(2*1+2)/22
*High leverage: Luxembourg
dfbeta
list relo_act foreign_rate country _dfbeta_24 if abs(_dfbeta_24)>2/sqrt(22)
*none

*Simple model 12b.i: excluding France
regress relo_act foreign_rate if id!=7 & id!=13 & id!=16 & id!=21 & id<29/*
*/ & id!=10, beta
*No significant change
*Simple model 12b.ii: excluding Luxembourg
regress relo_act foreign_rate if id!=7 & id!=13 & id!=16 & id!=21 & id<29/*
*/ & id!=18, beta
*No significant change
*Simple model 12b.iii: excluding France and Luxembourg
regress relo_act foreign_rate if id!=7 & id!=13 & id!=16 & id!=21 & id<29/*
*/ & id!=10 & id!=18, beta
*No significant change

*Checking for heteroscedasticity
*Simple model 12b
regress relo_act foreign_rate if id!=7 & id!=13 & id!=16 & id!=21 & id<29, beta
kdensity r12b, normal
pnorm r12b
qnorm r12b
hettest
*insignificant
regress relo_act foreign_rate if id!=7 & id!=13 & id!=16 & id!=21 & id<29, /*
*/ beta robust

*****************

*Simple model 12c
regress relo_act foreign_rate if id!=13 & id!=16 & id!=21 & id!=29, beta
hettest
*insignificant
regress relo_act foreign_rate if id!=13 & id!=16 & id!=21 & id!=29, beta robust

*****************

*Simple model 12d
regress relo_act foreign_rate if id!=7 & id!=30 & id!=16, beta
hettest
*insignificant
regress relo_act foreign_rate if id!=7 & id!=30 & id!=16, beta robust

********************************
*13 General control regression
********************************
*Simple model 13a
regress relo_rate relo_aim, beta
*Checking for influential data (outliers and leverage)
lvr2plot, mlabel(country_code)
predict r13a, rstudent
list relo_rate relo_aim country r13a if abs(r13a)>2
*Outlier: Malta
predict lev13a, leverage
list relo_rate relo_aim country lev13a if abs(lev13a) >(2*1+2)/24
*High leverage: Germany and France
dfbeta
```

```
list relo_rate relo_aim country _dfbeta_25 if abs(_dfbeta_25) >2/sqrt(24)
*Malta

*Simple model 13a.i: excluding Malta
regress relo_rate relo_aim if id!=19, beta
*No significant change
*Simple model 13a.ii: excluding Germany and France
regress relo_rate relo_aim if id!=10 & id!=11, beta
*Changes t-test from p=0.182 to p=0.089 and beta from -0.28 to -0.37
*Simple model 13a.iii: excluding Germany, France and Malta
regress relo_rate relo_aim if id!=10 & id!=11 & id!=19, beta
*No significant change

*Checking for heteroscedasticity
*Simple model 13a
regress relo_rate relo_aim, beta
kdensity r13a, normal
pnorm r13a
qnorm r13a
hettest
*insignificant
regress relo_rate relo_aim, beta robust
*Simple model 13a.ii
regress relo_rate relo_aim if id!=10 & id!=11, beta
hettest
*insignificant
regress relo_rate relo_aim if id!=10 & id!=11, beta robust

*****************

*Simple model 13b
regress relo_act relo_aim, beta
*Checking for influential data (outliers and leverage)
lvr2plot, mlabel(country_code)
predict r13b, rstudent
list relo_act relo_aim country r13b if abs(r13b) >2
*Outliers: France and Germany
predict lev13b, leverage
list relo_act relo_aim country lev13b if abs(lev13b) >(2*1+2)/22
*High leverage: Germany and France
dfbeta
list relo_act relo_aim country _dfbeta_26 if abs(_dfbeta_26)>2/sqrt(22)
*Germany and France

*Simple model 13b.i: excluding Germany and France
regress relo_act relo_aim if id!=10 & id!=11, beta
*Changes t-test from p=0.001 to p=0.051 and beta from 0.61 to 0.42

*Checking for heteroscedasticity
*Simple model 13b
regress relo_act relo_aim, beta
kdensity r13b, normal
pnorm r13b
qnorm r13b
hettest
*significant!
regress relo_act relo_aim, beta robust
*Simple model 13b.i
regress relo_act relo_aim if id!=10 & id!=11, beta
hettest
*significant!
regress relo_act relo_aim if id!=10 & id!=11, beta robust

*******************************************************************************
*END
```

5 *ADDITIONAL TABLES AND FIGURES*

Table 3: Progress on relocation from Italy and Greece (combined) by country

	Mar 2016	Apr 2016	May 2016	June 2016	July 2016	Sep 2016[1]	Nov 2016	Dec 2016	Feb 2017	Mar 2017	Apr 2017	May 2017	June 2017	Aim Sep 2017
Austria[2]	- / -[3]	- / -	- / -	- / -	- / -	- / -	- / -	- / -	- / -	- / -	- / -	- / 50	- / 50	**1953**
Belgium	24 / 30	24 / 130	24 / 230	49 / 230	119 / 230	182 / 530	206 / 530	206 / 530	206 / 630	396 / 730	492 / 930	551 / 1030	623 / 1130	**3812**
Bulgaria	2 / 250	2 / 250	4 / 250	4 / 350	6 / 350	6 / 400	29 / 400	29 / 400	29 / 400	29 / 450	29 / 450	29 / 670	47 / 710	**1302**
Croatia	- / -	- / -	- / 20	- / 20	4 / 20	14 / 26	19 / 26	19 / 26	19 / 76	19 / 76	19 / 96	49 / 96	54 / 136	**968**
Cyprus	6 / 80	6 / 80	6 / 80	12 / 80	45 / 80	52 / 80	52 / 140	52 / 140	65 / 140	65 / 140	65 / 190	73 / 190	89 / 190	**320**
Czech Republic	- / 30	- / 30	4 / 50	4 / 50	4 / 40	12 / 50	12 / 50	12 / 50	12 / 50	12 / 50	12 / 50	12 / 50	12 / 50	**2691**
Estonia	- / 31	7 / 46	19 / 66	19 / 86	27 / 101	49 / 136	66 / 157	66 / 177	87 / 235	87 / 261	100 / 290	122 / 315	130 / 340[4]	**329**
Finland	173 / 320	246 / 320	259 / 620	329 / 720	397 / 820	690 / 970	862 / 1270	901 / 1270	919 / 1420	1064 / 1570	1340 / 1870	1443 / 1970	1640 / 2128	**2078**
France	283 / 770	379 / 1170	499 / 1570	735 / 2020	991 / 2470	1952 / 3320	2155 / 3320	2373 / 3720	2727 / 4170	2758 / 5090	3157 / 5540	3404 / 5940	3478 / 5940	**19714**
Germany	57 / 50[5]	57 / 50	57 / 50	57 / 150	57 / 250	215 / 1250	216 / 2250	615 / 3250	2042 / 5250	2626 / 6250	3511 / 7250	4478 / 8750	5658 / 9250	**27536**
Hungary	- / -	- / -	- / -	- / -	- / -	- / -	- / -	- / -	- / -	- / -	- / -	- / -	- / -	**1294**
Iceland	- / -	- / -	- / -	- / -	- / -	- / -	- / -	- / -	- / -	- / -	- / -	- / -	- / -	-[6]
Ireland	10 / 60	10 / 60	10 / 100	10 / 100	38 / 150	69 / 273	109 / 353	109 / 434	280 / 514	320 / 681	382 / 763	459 / 963	459 / 963	**600**
Latvia	6 / 46	6 / 76	23 / 101	23 / 156	41 / 159	76 / 264	148 / 324	148 / 334	197 / 424	228 / 454	270 / 468	308 / 468	317 / 468	**481**
Liechtenstein	- / -	- / -	- / -	- / -	- / -	- / 10	- / 10	- / 10	10 / 10	10 / 10	10 / 10	10 / 10	10 / 10	-
Lithuania	6 / 80	6 / 110	6 / 250	6 / 340	34 / 420	86 / 520	147 / 520	185 / 520	229 / 570	229 / 570	237 / 650	275 / 790	307 / 810	**671**
Luxembourg	30 / 100	30 / 100	30 / 100	71 / 120	71 / 120	124 / 220	144 / 220	176 / 220	225 / 270	225 / 320	277 / 320	277 / 420	326 / 420	**557**
Malta	21 / 23[7]	21 / 41	26 / 41	41 / 41	41 / 41	50 / 71	70 / 99	80 / 99	80 / 114	96 / 114	112 / 144	126 / 164	137 / 164	**131**
Netherlands	98 / 200	98 / 200	192 / 325	275 / 475	367 / 625	726 / 1025	915 / 1225	1098 / 1375	1361 / 1675	1486 / 1825	1636 / 1975	1776 / 2125	1907 / 2275	**5947**
Norway	- / -	- / -	- / -	- / -	- / -	- / 100	20 / 385	100 / 670	619 / 1120	664 / 1260	1022 / 1506	1147 / 1500[8]	1345 / 1500	-
Poland	- / 100	- / 100	- / 100	- / 100	- / 100	- / 100	- / 100	- / 100	- / 100	- / 100	- / 100	- / 100	- / 100	**6182**
Portugal	149 / 718	181 / 718	211 / 718	379 / 1118	452 / 1118	555 / 1518	706 / 1518	720 / 1618	957 / 1618	1085 / 1618	1228 / 1618	1302 / 2218	1374 / 2218	**2951**
Romania	15 / 515	15 / 715	35 / 715	35 / 985	68 / 1315	202 / 1632	386 / 1702	542 / 1702	568 / 1702	568 / 1702	568 / 1942	568 / 1982	634 / 2022	**4180**
Slovakia	- / -	- / -	- / -	- / 10	- / 10	3 / 20	3 / 20	9 / 30	9 / 30	16 / 40	16 / 40	16 / 50	16 / 50	**902**
Slovenia	- / 40	- / 40	28 / 70	34 / 70	34 / 80	74 / 130	83 / 130	124 / 130	124 / 180	124 / 180	165 / 230	172 / 230	199 / 280	**567**
Spain	18 / 200	18 / 200	18 / 200	124 / 400	187 / 400	363 / 400	398 / 900	398 / 900	744 / 900	851 / 900	886 / 1100	886 / 1500	886 / 1500	**9323**
Sweden[9]	39 / 50	39 / 50	39 / 50	39 / 50	39 / 50	39 / 50	39 / 50	39 / 50	39 / 50	39 / 50	39 / 1450	39 / 2600	228 / 3777	**3766**
Switzerland	- / 30	- / 30	10 / 30	34 / 60	34 / 160	112 / 490	140 / 560	161 / 760	418 / 1280	549 / 1280	767 / 1280	896 / 1530	993 / 1530	-
Total	**937 / 3723**	**1145 / 4516**	**1500 / 5736**	**2280 / 7731**	**3056 / 9119**	**5651 / 13585**	**6925 / 16259**	**8162 / 18515**	**11966 / 22928**	**13546 / 25721**	**16340 / 30262**	**18418 / 35711**	**20869 / 38011**	**98255**

Source: own compilation based on the Commission reports on relocation and resettlement and their annexes (2016b, d, f, h, i, l-n; 2017b-d, f, g).

Notes:

[1] Reports were published on a roughly monthly basis. Yet, there are irregularities, i.e. monthly gaps as between July and September 2016.

[2] The Commission proposal (COM(2016)80final) for a suspension of 30% of Austrian obligations under the relocation decisions for one year has been adopted on 10 March 2016 by Council Decision (EU) 2016/408.
[3] The second figure shows the pledges made by the state, whereas the first figure indicates the number of persons actually relocated.
[4] Estonia, Finland, Ireland, Lithuania, Malta and Sweden are pledging more places than determined in the officially amended target.
[5] This inconsistency between pledges and actual relocations is not explained in the official tables.
[6] Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland contribute to the programme as associated states. Thus, no commitment is legally foreseen in the Council decisions. Their aim is simply the numbers pledged when agreeing to take part (cf. Guild *et al.*, 2017, p. 27).
[7] Again, there is no explanation for the inconsistency in formal pledges by Malta for February and March 2016.
[8] There is no explanation provided for the decrease in pledges between the two reports. Yet, in general there is a practice by receiving states whereby pledges expire due to administrative delays – without specified legal grounds in the Council decisions (Guild *et al.*, 2017, p. 37).
[9] Commission proposal for a full suspension of the Swedish obligations under the relocation decisions for one year (COM(2015)677final) was adopted on 9 June 2016 under Council Decision (EU) 2016/946.

Table 4: Intercorrelations of dependent and independent variables

	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**8**	**9**	**10**	**11**	**12**
Independent variables 1.Absolute GDP	1,0000											
2. GDP per capita	0,1441	1,0000										
3. Government deficit/surplus	0,0738	0,1836	1,0000									
4. National share of total EU asylum applications 2016	0,7285	0,0696	0,1207	1,0000								
5. Intra-EU/EFTA export rate	0,8166	0,1076	0,0385	0,8228	1,0000							
6. Population size	0,9503	0,0394	0,1063	0,6523	0,7691	1,0000						
7. Unemployment rate	0,0486	0,3065	0,3218	0,1941	0,1429	0,0490	1,0000					
8. Asylum applications per 1 Mio inhabitants 2010-2016	0,0454	0,4108	0,1698	0,1892	0,1163	0,0967	0,2803	1,0000				
9. Resettlements per 1 Mio inhabitants 2010-2016	0,0261	0,4882	0,0569	0,0581	0,0656	0,1510	0,2095	0,4085	1,0000			
10. Asylum recognition rate	0,0461	0,0790	0,3947	0,1166	0,0852	0,1470	0,1268	0,1994	0,1045	1,0000		
11. ODA share of GDP	0,3789	0,7035	0,1587	0,2545	0,3469	0,2069	0,2763	0,5450	0,7627	0,2787	1,0000	
12. Share of foreigners/ population	0,0032	0,7385	0,3578	0,0016	0,0444	0,1699	0,0746	0,3158	0,1155	0,1741	0,3449	1,0000
Dependent variables	**13**	**14**	**15**									
13. Relocation rate	1,0000											
14. Actual relocations	0,2819	1,0000										
(15. Relocation aim)	0,1345	0,6147	1,0000									

Table 5: Summary statistics of dependent and independent variables

	N	Mean	Std. dev.	Min	Max
Independent variables					
1.Absolute GDP	29	535,47	868,21	10,46	3494,9
2. GDP per capita	29	35600,85	24181,73	7051,65	105829,3
3. Government deficit/surplus	26	-0,006	0,018	-0,034	0,045
4. National share of total EU asylum applications 2016	30	0,03	0,1	0,00006	0,58
5. Intra-EU/EFTA export rate	29	0,03	0,05	0,0002	0,23
6. Population size	30	15100000	21800000	37622	82200000
7. Unemployment rate	29	0,07	0,03	0,03	0,2
8. Asylum applications per 1 Mio inhabitants 2010-2016	29	1539,56	1582,14	49,08	6320,47
9. Resettlements per 1 Mio inhabitants 2010-2016	30	34,31	67,9	0	308,57
10. Asylum recognition rate	30	0,53	0,21	0,08	0,84
11. ODA share of GDP	27	0,0038	0,0029	0,0008	0,01
12. Share of foreigners/ population	30	0,99	0,1	0,004	0,47
Dependent variables					
13. Relocation rate	24	0,15	0,16	0	0,61
14. Actual relocations	24	4093,96	6535,57	131	27536
(15. Relocation aim)	30	272,07	490,81	0	2373

Table 6: Simple regression results using uncorrected standard errors

	Relocation rate			Actual relocation				
	(a)	(a.i)	(a.ii)	(b)	(b.i)	(b.ii)	(c)	(d)
1. Absolute GDP	-0.00005/ -0.26 (0.00004) [0.0697]	-	-	0.39/ 0.61*** (0.11) [0.3681]	-	0.40/ 0.38* (0.21) [0.1453][1]	0.27/ 0.48** (0.10) [0.2271]	0.39/ 0.61*** (0.10) [0.3687]
2. GDP per capita	0.000001/ 0.19 (0.000001) [0.0356]	0.000002/ 0.29 (0.000001) [0.0829][2]	0.0000004/ 0.04 (0.000002) [0.0017] [3]	0.004/ 0.16 (0.005) [0.0242]	-	0.01/ 0.29 (0.007) [0.0818][3]	0.003/ 0.11 (0.005) [0.0132]	0.001/ 0.06 (0.004) [0.0033]
3. Government deficit/ surplus	1.01/ 0.11 (1.89) [0.0129]	-	2.79/ 0.25 (2.33) [0.0638][4]	-8592.5/ -0.29 (6131.8) [0.0819]	-234.9/ -0.01 (4044.8) [0.0002][5]	-14256.5/ -0.38* (7588.10) [0.1439][4]	-6855.5/ -0.23 (5816.0) [0.0547]	-
4. National share of total EU asylum applications 2016	-0.29/ -0.21 (0.28) [0.0441]	-	-3.52/ -0.33 (2.2) [0.1108][6]	887.15/ 0.19 (958.27) [0.0375]	-1726.0/ -0.05 (6443.8) [0.0027][1]	-	916.20/ 0.20 (929.46) [0.0389]	938.47/ 0.20** (442.89) [0.0412]
5. Intra-EU/EFTA export rate	-1.001/ -0.33 (0.62) [0.1069]	-	-	4405.4/ 0.43** (1988.5) [0.1825]	-	-	4329.5/ 0.42** (1932.1) [0.1730]	4539.0/ 0.44** (1856.7) [0.1929]
6. Population size	-2.60e-09/ -0.35* (1.47e-09) [0.1242]	-	-5.86e-09/ -0.42** (2.10e-09) [0.1765][1]	0.00001/ 0.58*** (0.000004) [0.3357]	0.000006/ 0.21 (0.000006) [0.0452][1]	-	0.00001/ 0.47** (0.000004) [0.2225]	0.00001/ 0.59*** (0.000004) [0.3493]
7. Unemployment rate	-0.35/ -0.08 (0.97) [0.0058]	-	-	1860.6/ 0.12 (3240.6) [0.0148]	-	-	2324.8/ 0.15 (3058.4) [0.0235]	2448.2/ 0.17 (2834.0) [0.0290]
8. Asylum applications per 1 m. inhabitants 2010-2016	-0.000004/ -0.04 (0.00002) [0.0018]	-0.00002/ -0.29 (0.00002) [0.0854][2]	0.00001/ 0.10 (0.00003) [0.0103][7]	-0.05/ -0.16 (0.07) [0.0247]	-	-	-0.04/ -0.14 (0.07) [0.0196]	-0.05/ -0.16 (0.06) [0.0251]
9. Resettlements per 1 m. inhabitants 2010-2016	0.0003/ 0.10 (0.0007) [0.0099]	-	-	0.98/ 0.08 (2.46) [0.0072]	1.61/ 0.24 (1.43) [0.0572][5]	9.93/ 0.19 (11.52) [0.0359][8]	0.59/ 0.05 (2.33) [0.0027]	-0.13/ -0.02 (0.89) [0.0003]
10. Asylum recognition rate	0.18/ 0.27 (0.15) [0.0607]	-	0.08/ 0.09 (0.21) [0.0073][9]	-221.28/ -0.09 (534.6) [0.0077]	223.2/ 0.15 (322.4) [0.0223][5]	-875.9/ -0.27 (687.3) [0.0751][9]	-186.6/ -0.08 (503.8) [0.0057]	-126.6/ -0.05 (476.5) [0.0028]
11. ODA share of GDP	-5.91/ -0.09 (15.22) [0.0075]	-	2.93/ 0.04 (18.94) [0.0013][7]	55997.8/ 0.24 (49948.4) [0.0591]	44216.3/ 0.33 (28785.4) [0.1105][5]	111452.8/ 0.40* (59347.4) [0.1566][7]	26268.3/ 0.13 (43984.8) [0.0160]	24273.9/ 0.13 (38224.2) [0.0172]
12. Share of foreigners/ population	0.40/ 0.25 (0.34) [0.0608]	-	0.32/ 0.11 (0.63) [0.0121][3]	-492.5/ -0.09 (1167.7) [0.0080]	-	-	-490.1/ -0.09 (1135.0) [0.0077]	-543,5/ -0.10 (1048.9) [0.0106]
13. Relocation aim	-0.000007/ -0.28 (0.000005) [0.0794]	-	-0.00003/ -0.37* (0.00001) [0.1375][1]	0.05/ 0.61*** (0.01) [0.3778]	0.06/ 0.42* (0.03) [0.1776][1]	-	-	-

Note: a = EU24 (23/22); a.i = specification 1; a.ii = specification 2; b = EU24 (23/22); b.i = specification 1; b.ii = specification 2; c = EU24 (23/22) + UK & Denmark; d = EU24 (23/22) + EFTA3

EU24 = Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden

EU23 = EU24 – Croatia

EU22 = EU24 – Bulgaria & Cyprus

EFTA3 = Iceland, Norway, Switzerland

OLS regression coefficients/beta coefficients with standard errors reported in round brackets and R^2 reported in square brackets.

***prob.<0.01, **prob.<0.05, *prob.<0.1

[1] excluding Germany and France
[2] excluding Malta
[3] excluding Luxembourg
[4] excluding Spain
[5] excluding France
[6] excluding Germany
[7] excluding Sweden
[8] excluding Sweden and Finland
[9] excluding Hungary and Poland

Figure 2: Absolute number of asylum applications per country, 2015



Source: own depiction based on data from the Migration Policy Institute (MPI) Data Hub (2016): *Asylum applications in the EU/EFTA by country, 2008-2016*. Retrieved from http://www.migrationpolicy.org/programs/data-hub/charts/asylum-applications-euefta-country-2008-2016-q3

Figure 3: Relative number of asylum applications per country, 2015



Source: own depiction based on data from the Migration Policy Institute (MPI) Data Hub (2016): *Asylum applications in the EU/EFTA by country, 2008-2016*. Retrieved from http://www.migrationpolicy.org/programs/data-hub/charts/asylum-applications-euefta-country-2008-2016-q3

Figure 4: Share of total EU/EFTA asylum applications per country, 2015



Source: own depiction based on data from the Migration Policy Institute (MPI) Data Hub (2016): *Asylum applications in the EU/EFTA by country, 2008-2016*. Retrieved from http://www.migrationpolicy.org/programs/data-hub/charts/asylum-applications-euefta-country-2008-2016-q3

Figure 5: Absolute number of asylum applications per country, 2016



Source: own depiction based on data from the Migration Policy Institute (MPI) Data Hub (2016): *Asylum applications in the EU/EFTA by country, 2008-2016*. Retrieved from http://www.migrationpolicy.org/programs/data-hub/charts/asylum-applications-euefta-country-2008-2016-q3

Figure 6: Relative number of asylum applications per country, 2016



Source: own depiction based on data from the Migration Policy Institute (MPI) Data Hub (2016): *Asylum applications in the EU/EFTA by country, 2008-2016*. Retrieved from http://www.migrationpolicy.org/programs/data-hub/charts/asylum-applications-euefta-country-2008-2016-q3

Figure 7: Share of total EU/EFTA asylum applications per country, 2016



Source: own depiction based on data from the Migration Policy Institute (MPI) Data Hub (2016): *Asylum applications in the EU/EFTA by country, 2008-2016*. Retrieved from http://www.migrationpolicy.org/programs/data-hub/charts/asylum-applications-euefta-country-2008-2016-q3

6 DECLARATION OF ACADEMIC ORIGINALITY

Erklärung für schriftliche Prüfungsleistungen

gemäß § 13 Abs. 2 und Abs. 3 sowie § 20 der Ordnung der Fachbereiche 02, 05 und 07 der Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz für die Prüfung im Zwei-Fächer-Bachelorstudiengang (BAPO)

Bachelorstudiengang: **Politikwissenschaft (Kernfach) / Komparatistik (Beifach)**

Hiermit erkläre ich, **Julia Blöser,**
Matrikelnummer: **2717164**,
dass ich die vorliegende Arbeit mit dem Titel

Rationales of Action in the European Union's Asylum Policy:
An Empirical Investigation of Relocation Commitment Between Interests and Norms

Handlungslogiken der europäischen Asylpolitik:
Eine empirische Untersuchung von Umverteilungserklärungen zwischen Interessen und Normen

selbstständig verfasst und keine anderen als die angegebenen Quellen oder Hilfsmittel (einschließlich elektronischer Medien und Online-Quellen) benutzt habe. Von der Ordnung zur Sicherung guter wissenschaftlicher Praxis in Forschung und Lehre und zum Verfahren zum Umgang mit wissenschaftlichem Fehlverhalten habe ich Kenntnis genommen (zu finden unter http://www.uni-mainz.de/organisation/Dateien/ordnung_sicherung_guter_wissenschaftlicher_praxis.pdf).

Mir ist bewusst, dass ein Täuschungsversuch oder ein Ordnungsverstoß vorliegt, wenn sich diese Erklärung als unwahr erweist. § 20 Absatz 3 und Absatz 5 der Prüfungsordnung (s.u.) habe ich zur Kenntnis genommen.

Wiesbaden, den 17.07.2017 _____

Auszug aus § 20 Abs. 3 BAPO: Versäumnis, Rücktritt, Täuschung, Ordnungsverstoß
(3) Versucht die Kandidatin oder der Kandidat das Ergebnis einer Prüfung durch Täuschung oder Benutzung nicht zugelassener Hilfsmittel zu beeinflussen, oder erweist sich eine Erklärung gem. § 13 Abs. 2 Satz 5 als unwahr, gilt die betreffende Prüfungsleistung als mit „nicht ausreichend" (5,0) absolviert (...)

§ 20 Abs. 5 BAPO: Versäumnis, Rücktritt, Täuschung, Ordnungsverstoß
(5) Bei schriftlichen Prüfungsleistungen gemäß § 13 mit Ausnahme von Klausuren sowie bei der Bachelorarbeit gemäß § 15 hat die oder der Studierende bei der Abgabe der Arbeit eine schriftliche Erklärung beizufügen, dass die Arbeit selbstständig verfasst und ausschließlich die angegebenen Quellen und Hilfsmittel verwendet wurden und von der Ordnung zur Sicherung guter wissenschaftlicher Praxis in Forschung und Lehre und zum Verfahren zum Umgang mit wissenschaftlichem Fehlverhalten Kenntnis genommen wurde. Erweist sich eine solche Erklärung als unwahr oder liegt ein sonstiger Täuschungsversuch oder ein Ordnungsverstoß bei der Erbringung von Prüfungsleistungen vor, gelten die Absätze 3 und 4 entsprechend.

Auszug aus § 13 Abs. 2 BAPO: Schriftliche Prüfungen
(2) Bei der Abgabe der Hausarbeit hat die oder der Studierende eine schriftliche Erklärung vorzulegen, dass sie oder er die Arbeit selbständig verfasst und keine anderen als die angegebenen Quellen und Hilfsmittel benutzt hat; bei einer Gruppenarbeit sind die eigenständig sowie gegebenenfalls die gemeinsam verfassten Teile der Arbeit eindeutig zu benennen.